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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores social learning in mother-reared and “enculturated” capuchin 
monkeys (Cebus apella). At the outset a framework for understanding the social 
influence on learning is discussed, followed by a review of the social and cognitive 
abilities of capuchin monkeys, establishing the rationale for studying social learning in 
this species.  
Studies of wild capuchins suggest an important role for social learning but 
experiments with captive subjects have generally failed to support this. Some potential 
reasons for the lack of evidence in experimental settings are given.   
An example of using the two - method design to test social learning in acquiring 
behaviour by enculturated subjects is addressed. The results are related to findings with 
other species tested with a similar apparatus. Before testing mother-reared monkeys, an 
observational study of the object manipulation and tool-use repertoire of the subjects was 
carried out in order to facilitate the design of suitable social learning tasks for these 
monkeys. 
The first empirical study in Chapter 6 reports results of experiments with the 
enculturated and mother-reared capuchin monkeys employing the two -action method 
together with a third control group. The enculturated monkeys exhibited high fidelity 
copying that included the specific tool use technique witnessed while opening the 
foraging box. Mother-reared monkeys exhibited fidelity at a lower level, tending only to 
re-create the results the model had achieved. 
 The second empirical study in Chapter 7 tested whether capuchin monkeys could 
show cumulative cultural learning manifested in the ability to switch from an established 
mode of manipulating a dipping box to a complex yet more advantageous one.  Both 
populations were able to do so. The enculturated monkeys, as in the previous study, 
showed higher fidelity copying of the model.  
The last experiment was a preliminary study employing the “do as I do” method 
which was carried out with four of the enculturated monkeys. It provides suggestive 
evidence for at least one monkey's understanding of the task.  
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The results of the studies are discussed in relation to previous experimental 
research as well as to data from capuchin monkeys in nature. The possible role of 
enculturation in social learning ability is considered.  
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Prologue 
 
 
The typical Israeli way of washing floors, known as the “sponja”, uses a bucket full of 
water mixed with washing liquid and a T shaped stick which has a piece of rubber on 
the bottom . A rag is first soaked in the bucket and then folded round the rubber end of 
the stick. After washing the floor the rubber end is then used to wipe up the remaining 
water.  When Rusty, a male capuchin monkey, was about five years old I saw him do 
just this while I was washing the floors in the house. He soaked the rag in water, put it 
on the rubber part of the stick (although he did not actually rap the rag around the stick) 
and holding this long stick with his two hands pushed it along the floor. He has enjoyed 
doing this ever since. Was he imitating? 
 
It has been almost twenty years now since my first encounter with capuchin 
monkeys, which was followed by my living with a small group of these monkeys for 
more than five years. Living with capuchin monkeys, and not always being  the alpha in 
the group,  demanded that I was alert at all times, trying to understand what was going on 
in their minds and how they saw the  world we lived in. I seemed to be juggling between 
the emotional way I perceived them, being at times anthropomorphic towards them, but  
at the same time  trying to  view  them and their behaviour  through a  primatologist’s 
eye,   hoping  to see them for what they truly were. 
During these years, I did not always have the time to stop and think about each of 
the fascinating behaviours I was witnessing, taking it for granted that monkeys would 
“pick up” behaviours they saw around them. Throughout history, man has accepted 
without question the notion that it is in a monkey’s nature to imitate.  This is so rooted in 
our belief systems that in many languages the word “to imitate” is connected to the word 
monkey (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a). This is true as well as in Hebrew and is 
captured in the popular saying “Kof acharey ben-adam” - “Monkey after man” – that 
describes a person copying someone else. This reflects the common notion that monkeys 
imitate and do so for the pleasure of imitating. “It is proverbial that monkeys carry the 
principle of imitation... they are animals that imitate for the mere sake of imitating” 
(Romanes, 1884 p.477). Yet, although “my” capuchins seemed to pick up many 
behaviours which were happening in the house, many more behaviours were not copied. 
Why was that so? 
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Social animals are continually communicating with each other through different 
modes of communication; visual, acoustic, chemical and so on.  Some animals are finely 
tuned to receive some of these transmitted signals, sometimes in ways that other animals 
cannot.  For example, pygmy marmosets (Cebuella pygmaea) may emit high pitch tones 
which other primates and animals cannot perceive (Snowdon & Hodun, 1981). However, 
when information is transmitted socially, what kind of tuning is required?  As opposed to 
overt communication, social information does not necessarily require   intention 
(conscious or not) on the part of the transmitter. It is the “responsibility” of the observer 
to make use of the information or part of it.  Which part of my actions and behaviour 
were the monkeys tuned to? Were they paying attention to every fine movement? To the 
end result? Which situations were more influential and which components of the 
behaviours were totally neglected? These and  many more questions are far from being 
new and have intrigued researchers for decades, during which time they have tried to 
define  the social influence on behaviour in many ways. This thesis seeks to find some of 
the answers. 
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Chapter 1 
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL LEARNING AND IMITATION 
 
In this chapter I present a framework to study social learning and imitation. 
I discuss three different levels of social influence on the behaviour of an observer 
according to the information s/he utilizes from the model's actions. I also address 
related issues regarding the motivation for social learning, the significance of the type 
of action observed and relevant characteristics of the model and the observer.  
 
 
Two general frameworks guide the current quest for understanding social 
learning. The first, depicted in Figure 1.1, looks at the general context in which social 
learning occurs, and takes into account factors such as the type of action observed and the 
characteristics of the model and the observer. The second, shown in Table 1.1, is a more 
detailed analysis of one of the components described in the first framework; namely, the 
type of information the observer derives from the model’s action. This is divided into 
three general levels. Table 1.1 presents some of the different terms used for describing 
this social influence. Several points should be made before proceeding: 
A.    I use the word “level” and not “types”, as it is accepted by most authors that there is 
a qualitative difference between the three levels in terms of the cognitive demand 
(however see e.g. Heyes, 1994; Zentall, 1996). I return to this issue later on in depth. 
B. One of the problems in integrating the history of social learning research is the vast 
number of terms and definitions used in the literature.  Table 1.1 summarizes the most 
important terms. However it should be borne in mind that the terminologies come from 
different fields and eras, which makes it very difficult to compare them in a systematic 
and hierarchical way (Heyes, 1994).  
C.    It has been acknowledged that different levels of influence may result in the same 
behaviour by the observer (e.g. Thorpe, 1956; Galef, 1988, 1992; Whiten & Ham 1992); 
thus, it is often difficult to conclude what information was actually used to produce the 
behaviour.  It is also worthwhile remembering that in any given situation the observer 
may be utilizing information on different levels in concert, as the levels are not mutually 
exclusive.  
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Table 1.1 Levels of social influence on behaviour. Terms used in the literature to describe social learning. 
 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Facilitating a 
behaviour 
Learning about  the environment Learning about  behaviour 
 Learning about 
locus 
Learning about 
stimuli 
Learning about 
results 
Learning about 
 Action 
Learning about 
Action+ Intention   
Contagious 
Behaviour 
(Thorpe, 1956). 
 
Response 
Facilitation 
(Byrne, 1994). 
 
Mimesis 
(Armstrong, 
1951). 
 
Local 
enhancement 
(Thorpe, 1956). 
 
Matched 
dependent 
learning (Miller 
& Dollard, 
1941). 
 
Stimulus 
enhancement 
(Spence, 1937). 
 
Emulation 
(Call & 
Tomasello, 
1994). 
 
Observational 
conditioning 
(Cook et al. 
1985). 
 
Valence 
transformation 
(Hogan, 1988). 
 Goal emulation 
(Wood, 1989). 
 
Object  movement 
re- enactment 
(Custance et al. 
1999). 
Impersonation 
(Tomasello, 1990) 
 
Copying (Galef, 
1988) 
 
Mimicry 
(Tomasello, 1996) 
Imitation (Thorndike, 
1898)  
 
Reflective imitation 
(Morgan, 1900)  
 
True imitation 
(Thorpe, 1956) 
 
Observational learning 
(Hall, 1963) 
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 Facilitating 
behaviour 
        (Level 1) 
 
 Utilizing 
information 
about  the 
environment 
(Level 2) 
 
 Utilizing 
information  
about action 
(Level 3) 
  
 
Type of behaviour 
 Vocal 
 Object 
manipulation 
 Tool use  
 Gestures 
 
Behavioural complexity 
 Single action 
 Sequential 
actions 
 
Action characteristics 
 Novelty 
 Opacity 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
for learning 
Observed behaviour 
Type of 
information 
utilized from the 
demonstration 
Immediate 
production 
 
 Observer 
motivation 
 
 Model- observer 
relation and 
characteristics  
Memory and  
representation Delayed 
production 
No 
production 
Figure 1.1  The social context of learning including: the background for learning, the properties of the action 
observed, the type of information utilized from the observation, and its production.    
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Level 1: Socially facilitating  behaviour  
 Before starting to examine what capuchin monkeys are able to learn from 
each other or from humans I shall briefly consider the level of social influence on 
behaviour which will not be dealt with further in this thesis, and referred to as Level 1 
in Table 1.1. The mere presence of a conspecific can alter the motivational state of an 
animal and may facilitate or retard behaviour (Zentall & Levine, 1972; Levine & 
Zentall, 1974). The term social facilitation has been used in many different ways (see 
Level 1, Table 1.1). Zajonc (1965) first used it to describe “a motivational facilitation 
of performing a behavioural act already in the individual’s repertoire (whether 
acquired phylogenetically or ontogenetically) through experiencing another individual 
behaving similarly” (see also Clayton, 1978). On the other hand, Thorpe (1956) 
suggested that social facilitation only enhances innate stereotyped behaviour patterns. 
He labelled such learning contagious behaviour.  This behaviour is released 
involuntarily (Zentall, 1996). Examples are adult humans yawning after seeing 
another yawning (Provine, 1989) and flight responses in various animals (Galef, 
1988). Byrne (1994) uses the term response facilitation to describe a wider range of 
contagious behaviour: “the presence of a conspecific performing an act (often one 
resulting in reward) increasing the probability of an animal which sees it doing the 
same” (p. 236). It differs from contagion by the fact that the responses may be 
voluntary as well as involuntary. Such social influences on the behaviour of an 
observer may seem to be based on simple mechanisms, but response facilitation has 
not been widely documented in animals, and thus might be a more demanding process 
than described by Byrne (Byrne, 1994). I shall return to this question later.  
Social influence is powerful enough to result in cultural transmission of 
behaviours when accompanied by other mechanisms such as associative learning 
(Noble & Todd, 1999) as animals, which behave contagiously as a response to other 
animals responding to stimulus X, may eventually associate stimulus X with that 
behaviour and respond to it directly themselves. 
However learning something new from a demonstration is the basic 
component which differentiates social learning from social influence and this will 
now be discussed. 
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 Social learning 
 
Throughout the history of social learning research, authors have tried to 
classify different types of social learning in terms of what has been learned. Drawing 
on the vast literature of definitions and classifications (e.g. Byrne & Russon, 1988; 
Call, 1999; Fragaszy & Perry, 2003; Galef 1988; Heyes, 1994; Miklosi, 1999; 
Mitchell, 1987; Nicol, 1995; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Tomasello et al. 1987; 
Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a), I describe two main levels of information use by an 
observer in a social context (see Table 1).  
Level 2.  Using information about stimuli - Learning something new about the 
environment.  
Level 3.  Using information from the action - Learning something new about a 
potential behaviour or action. 
Unlike social facilitation discussed earlier, in which the presence of the model 
merely facilitates behaviour already in the observer's repertoire, in levels 2 and 3 the 
observer makes use of information to learn something new.  
 
Level 2. Using stimulus information to learn about the environment   
Local enhancement (Thorpe, 1956) and stimulus enhancement (Spence, 1937) 
have been used to describe how an organism is attracted to some salient feature in the 
environment after viewing a conspecific interacting with it. As a result, the organism 
tends to approach or contact it or a similar stimulus. The observer then may perform 
acts which are already in its repertoire and which are therefore usually very similar to 
the behaviour of other members of its species. In both stimulus and local 
enhancement, the observer learns about the stimuli and not about the behaviour itself 
or the intentions behind it. When simple objects and actions are involved, stimulus 
enhancement can result in very rapid learning, which highly resembles the action 
viewed and may mistakenly be considered as imitation.  
  This mechanism is very powerful and plays a major role in many socially 
transmitted behaviours. Its ecological importance can be seen in the way different 
species acquire knowledge of which plants and food items are edible and where to 
find them (Whiten, 1989). This has been shown in birds (e.g. Mason & Reidinger, 
1981, 1982; Fisher & Hinde, 1949). Stimulus enhancement has also been found to be 
the basis of mate choice behaviour in fish (Dugatkin, 1996 for guppies).  
 14 
It can be important for an animal to see the end result of the action and 
incorporate this in its representation. Palameta & Lefebvre (1985) showed how 
learning through stimulus enhancement occurred only when the observer bird saw the 
model succeed in gaining food. This, to my knowledge, has not yet been tested in 
primates.  
Learning about the rewarding or aversive aspect of the stimulus is known  as 
observational conditioning (Cook et al. 1985; Whiten & Ham, 1992), in which an 
observer may learn to approach an object or avoid it after seeing the reaction of a 
conspecific towards the object (e.g. red winged black birds, Mason & Reidinger, 
1981, 1982). When the observer itself is rewarded at the same time as the model is 
rewarded, learning is strengthened (e.g. bar pressing behaviour in rats: Del Russo, 
1971). 
Mineka & Cook (1988) showed how naive Rhesus monkeys learned to fear 
snakes (but not arbitrary objects) through the observation of the behaviour of other 
monkeys. The observer must be exposed to both in order to be conditioned to fear. 
Matched dependent behaviour (Miller & Dollard, 1941) is yet another process 
suggested for the way a subject may learn socially about the environment. In this case 
a learner uses the model’s behaviour as a discriminative cue for emitting a response. 
For example, rats may learn to solve a maze by following a leader rat (Church, 1957). 
However, once the model no longer responds or is absent, the learner stops 
responding as well. For the behaviour to become part of the learner’s repertoire a 
transfer must be made to a control by an external cue independent of the model. 
However, Zentall (1996) noted that both observational conditioning and 
matched dependent behaviours are examples of simple conditioning processes. The 
first is an example of classical conditioning in which the model’s behaviour (the UR) 
becomes associated with the stimuli (CS) to bring about a similar response in the 
observer (CR).  Matched dependent behaviour is a special case of operant 
conditioning. 
Watching a model interact with a stimulus may provide more information than 
merely “approach or avoid”. An observer may learn about more specific properties of 
the stimulus, as described in emulation. Emulation has been given different meanings 
in the social learning literature.  Tomasello et al. (1987) first used the term emulation 
to describe the increase in the salience of a tool as well as learning its properties and 
its affordance (Gibson, 1979) and realising its function as a tool. Byrne (2002) also 
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described this form of learning as “stimulus enhancement of an object in the specific 
context of an action.” Tomasello (1990) argued that many of the elaborate tool use 
behaviours of wild chimpanzees could be learned through emulation rather than 
imitation. 
A related concept, which focuses on the movement of the object and not the 
actual behaviour of the model, is object movement re-enactment (Custance, Whiten & 
Fredman, 1999) in which the observer attends to how an object moves in space and 
not to the precise movement used by the model to move the object.  A similar focus is 
found in the term object centred social learning (Custance et al. 2001). 
Further information, which can be derived from the environment, is about the 
end state of the behaviour, as described in the term goal emulation (Wood, 1989; 
Tomasello, 1990; Whiten & Ham, 1992). In this usage, emulation describes focusing 
on the end results of the model’s behaviour. The way the observer reaches these 
results is based on previous knowledge and/or trial and error learning. Here again the 
observer may act towards the results in a similar way to the action of the model, or in 
a totally different manner.  
What, then, is the importance of the model on this level of social learning if 
what the observer is learning is only connected to the stimulus and not to the model’s 
actions? Would an animal learn, for instance, about the “cracking” properties of a 
stone falling by chance on a hard shelled fruit just as much as watching a conspecific 
use the stone? Does the model give extra strength to the learning process? Fragaszy & 
Perry, (2003) conclude that  
“The trajectory of action and perception through time is different in 
social versus non-social conditions. This could arise through increased 
salience of experiences that occur in presence of others… Social partners 
generate particular experiences: they are animate, active agents and they 
produce behaviours that are particularly salient to conspecifics…Social 
context constitutes a means of focusing behaviour more effectively or 
differently than would have occurred in an asocial context” (pp. 9-10). 
 
Heyes et al. (1994) suggested a “ghost” study to test the importance of the 
model for learning to take place. In their study, a joystick was operated automatically 
without the intervention of the model.  The rats in that experiment showed a bias 
toward moving the joystick in the direction they had observed only when it was 
moved by a conspecific and not automatically. Fawcett and colleagues (Fawcett et al. 
2002) tested European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) in a “ghost” experiment in which 
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the demonstrator attended closely to the stimuli but did not operate it. The results 
showed that the action of the model was crucial for social learning to take place. 
Results for chimpanzees have not been conclusive. Tennie et al (2006) found that 
chimpanzees, but not children, acted in the same way regardless of whether they had 
watched the model act or the “ghost” condition. By contrast, Hopper et al. (2007) 
found that chimpanzees had benefited more from watching a conspecific act than a 
“ghost” demonstration. 
Thompson & Russell (2004), on the other hand, found that 14-26 month old 
children were just as likely to learn in the ghost situation as when a human model was 
involved. 
 
Level 3. Using information about actions or behaviour  
Imitation in its different definitions (e.g. Thorndike, 1898; Spence 1937, 
Mitchell, 1987; Lefebvre & Palameta, 1988; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a) focuses 
on the way the observer makes use of information from the actual action of the model.  
In this thesis I will use the definition proposed by Mitchell (1987), with 
additions by Visalberghi & Fragaszy (1990a) and Whiten & Ham (1992), as a 
working definition. An action may be considered imitative when the following criteria 
are fulfilled: 
1. Something C (the copy) is produced by an organism. 
2. C is similar to M (the model).  
3. Observation of C is necessary for the production of M (above baseline levels of C 
occurring spontaneously). 
4. C is designed to be similar to M. 
5. C must be novel at least in some aspects (Whiten & Ham 1992) or not already 
organized in that precise way in the organism’s repertoire (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 
1990a). 
The requirements of each of these criteria are discussed below. 
 
1.  Production of observed behaviour 
A potential limitation of this stipulation is that a behaviour may be learned but 
not performed immediately. An observer may implement what s/he learned only later, 
in suitable conditions. Such delayed imitation has been considered by some authors to 
be more advanced than immediate imitation (Bandura, 1969). Piaget (1945) used the 
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term deferred imitation and claimed it required remembering the action, representing 
it and performing it without the model’s presence. According to Meltzoff, the ability 
for deferred imitation is important as a social tool and has been shown from nine 
months of age, when infants produce an observed act after 24 hours. Older children at 
the age of 14 months can even re-enact motor actions after a week (Meltzoff, 1988a b, 
c). 
Dorrance & Zentall (2001) found that quails showed a significant tendency to 
reproduce the same behaviour they observed even after a delay of half an hour 
between observation and production. Zentall (2005) thus claims that in infants below 
the age of nine months, the inability for deferred imitation may reflect “sensory and 
especially motor limitations rather than an inability to imitate" (p. 191). Enculturated 
chimpanzees and orang-utans have also demonstrated deferred imitation (Bering et al. 
2000; Bjorklund et al. 2000). 
 
2. Similarity between observed behaviour and its production 
How can one tell if the observer has learned the behaviour s/he observed? 
An act may be recognized as imitative even if the replication is only “in outline” or if 
it only involves one or two of several features, which could potentially be copied. 
Such features could include, for example, the shape of movement, its speed or 
laterality (Whiten & Ham, 1992). 
Even when an action has been represented in the observer's mind its 
production may take some practice in order to reproduce it faithfully (Bernstein, 
1996). The social context for performance is important as well. Caldwell (2002) found 
that subordinate olive baboons performed poorly when in the presence of dominant 
individuals.  
 
3. The necessity of observation for producing the copy 
This criterion is important in order to preclude the possibility that the subject 
is merely producing a well known behaviour in its repertoire, which would imply 
social influence of the kind found in Level 1 and Level 2.  It also stresses the need to 
eliminate explanation of trial and error learning.  This will further be dealt with in 
Chapter 2 while discussing empirical data from social learning studies in primates. 
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4.   Intention to imitate 
This condition is the most problematic to apply to the study of imitation with 
subjects without language, especially as regards free observation and anecdotal 
reports, since it is almost impossible to infer the intention to imitate merely from the 
behaviour of an animal. An example of such a problematic interpretation can be found 
in Breuggeman (1973), who described a young female rhesus monkey that carried a 
coconut shell the exact way her mother carried her infant, and suggested that the 
young monkey was intending to imitate her mother.  
This type of example highlights the   need for an experimental paradigm 
designed to pinpoint intentionality to imitate directly. One key feature which should 
be included in such a paradigm is persistence. Persistence is one of the criteria put 
forward by Bates et al. (1979) to identify intentional communication in infants. It 
would be worthwhile to test this operationally with non-human primates in a social 
learning context. 
 
5.   Novelty  
As early as 1937, Spence argued that imitation through observation can only 
be considered to have taken place in the case of novel behaviour. He claimed that the 
behaviour observed must be novel, sufficiently complex, and that the observer has not 
had an opportunity to practice the behaviour.  
Want & Harris (2002) attempted to broaden the range for novelty, and 
suggested that the task should be novel in terms of action, affordance and goal (p. 6). 
More flexible definitions allow the action to be either novel or an “… 
improbable act or utterance, or some act for which there is clearly no instinctive 
tendency” (Thorpe, 1956 pp. 122) or not part of the animal’s repertoire (Clayton, 
1978). 
 Others claim that a “novel” behaviour does not necessarily have to be totally 
novel. It is sufficient for part of the behaviour to be novel; for example acting in a 
familiar way in a new location or on novel stimuli (Zentall, 2001), or a new 
combination of activities (Watson, 1914). 
Novelty is an elusive concept, since any action an animal is able to perform 
has most likely been performed in some sense in its past (Mikolski, 1999; Whiten & 
Custance, 1996).  Laland & Bateson (2001) suggest more lenient criteria and claim 
that novelty can be considered even when the behaviour is common but used in an 
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“unfamiliar context” (p. 210). Thus, even when acts already in the observer's 
repertoire are combined with each other or with an environmental interface, this can 
still be seen as imitation (Heyes & Ray 2000; Whiten & Custance, 1996). 
What is the minimum component for novelty? Is changing the orientation 
towards a stimulus as a result of observation enough to be considered novelty? Heyes 
(1995) claims it is. Others (e.g. Byrne & Tomasello, 1995) do not see this as 
sufficient. 
One operational way to achieve novelty in experimental investigations is by 
using arbitrary acts, which are not necessary for solving the task used in the 
experiment; another may be by using uncommon gestures. 
 
Mechanisms underlying imitation 
Why is imitation so scarce in the animal literature? What makes it so difficult 
to achieve? Two suggestions have been put forward by researchers to explain the 
complexity of imitation:   
1.   There is need for high cognitive computation abilities in order to transform visual 
information into the matching motor acts (Bruner, 1972; Whiten & Ham, 1992; 
Heyes, 1993).  
2.  There is need for mental abilities to represent the intention of the model as it is 
manifested in his/her behaviour (Piaget 1945). 
I shall now elaborate on these suggestions and discuss the necessity of such 
mechanism for imitation. 
 
Imitation: the complexity of kinesthetic–visual matching 
In order to reproduce an action, the imitator has to transform visual input into 
action using kinesthetic and/or proprioceptive stimulation as feedback (Mitchell, 
1994). This is an especially demanding variety of visual-tactile cross-modal 
performance (Heyes, 1993) especially when the imitator cannot see his own action, 
thus not having visual feedback for his acts (e.g. when imitating facial expressions or 
using body parts which cannot be seen).  
Heyes & Ray (2000) rank all actions on a continuum of perceptual opacity, 
starting from the most opaque actions to the most perceptible behaviours. The less 
opaque behaviours are easier to replicate (Zentall, 2001), such as vocal sounds in 
which the observer has to match his own sounds that sound (almost) the same as a 
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memorized template of the sound he heard. In the same vein, actions on stimuli, 
which are more visible than body gestures, should be easier to imitate. However, even 
when movements can be seen, there is still need for a transformation from how the 
behaviour looks on the model to how it feels when acted by the observer, since 
additional factors may be involved such as when observer and model are standing 
opposite to each other and a transformation of the actions has to be made.  
Such visual - kinesthetic matching is also the basis for mirror self -recognition, 
in which the subject can translate visual information into haptic information and 
understand that what s/he sees in the mirror is similar to what s/he feels (e.g. 
Guillaume 1926/1971; Parker, 1991; Mitchell, 1992). Mirror self- recognition has 
only been found in humans, great apes and perhaps dolphins (Gallup, 1970, 1985; 
Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Anderson, 1984a, b, Patterson & Cohn, 1994; Marten 
& Psarakos, 1994) and mainly these species have been shown to imitate (Mitchell, 
1987; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a; Whiten & Ham, 1992). It was thought at one 
time that rats could challenge this assumption as Heyes (1993) claimed to have shown 
imitation in this species yet rats do not evidence mirror self -recognition. However, 
further studies showed that the rats in Heyes’s (1993) experiment were not imitating 
but rather responding according to the odour on the rod they were moving (Mitchell, 
Heyes & Gardner, 1999).  Studies with birds (e.g. pigeons Zentall, Sutton & 
Sherburne, 1996; quails Akins & Zentall, 1996; starlings Campbell et al. 1999) have 
also claimed to show imitation without demonstrating self-recognition, thus posing a 
problem for the theory (although Epstein et al. (1981) showed that through training 
pigeons could be brought to recognize dots on their body by using a mirror, but later 
experiments failed to replicate these results, Thompson & Contie, 1994). 
Callithricidae are another exception: it has been claimed (Bugnyar & Huber, 1997; 
Voelkl & Huber, 2000) that marmosets can imitate, and it has been found that a 
related species, cotton top tamarins, demonstrate mirror self-recognition (Hauser et al. 
1995). However, this evidence is problematic. Some researchers characterized two of 
the tamarins' actions toward a mirror as looking at their body parts, which are not 
visible without a mirror, or wiping off a mark near their face while looking in the 
mirror (Hauser et al. 1995). However, there was no baseline for this behaviour before 
placing the mirror, thus alternative interpretations are possible (Anderson & Gallup, 
1997). Similarly, some potential evidence for action imitation in marmosets (Bugnyar 
& Huber, 1997) may result from visual-visual matching and/or chance similarities in 
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handedness between  the observer and the demonstrator (see Mitchell, 2002), but the 
evidence is still suggestive.  
Support for the assumption of a connection between imitation and self- 
recognition comes from studies dealing with autistic children, who have difficulties in 
imitation as well as in mirror self- recognition (Mitchell, 1997).  Child development 
studies suggest that there is a synchrony between the development of self-recognition 
and generalized bodily imitation (Nielsen, 2001; Baudonnière et al. 2002).  
A breakthrough as to how visual information may be transformed into action 
comes from neuroscience where the study of mirror neurons in monkeys suggests that 
a direct mapping may exist between movements a primate sees and movements 
performed, in that the same neurons fire when observing an action in a conspecific 
and when performing the action  (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). However, these finding 
are still not enough to explain how the visual-tactile transformation actually occurs. 
 
Imitation - the ability to represent the intention of the model 
Several authors have suggested that for imitation it is not enough for an 
observer to be able to behave in a way topographically similar to the behaviour he or 
she observed. More than that is needed for imitation to be feasible.  Piaget (1945) 
suggested that the basis for imitation lies in the ability to take the perspective of the 
other; to treat others as intentional beings, thus giving their actions extra meaning. 
This has been echoed also in the primate social-learning literature by Tomasello and 
colleagues (Tomasello & Call, 1997; Call & Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello et al. 1993). 
These authors, as well as Povinelli and colleagues (e.g. Povinelli et al. 1996), 
first claimed that no non-human primate could take the perspective of the other or 
understand its intentions. However, in the last few years more data have been 
accumulated shedding new light on how primates, and particularly chimpanzees, 
understand the mental states of the other (Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003). It was 
found that at least in competitive situations, chimpanzees can take into account what a 
conspecific can and cannot see, and represent their intentions (Call et al. 2004). 
Capuchin monkeys also showed a preference to take food, which was hidden from the 
dominant monkeys. However, the subordinate capuchin did not preferentially 
approach the hidden food first when given a head start (just like the chimpanzees in 
Karin-D’Arcy & Povinelli, 2002), suggesting that the capuchins were predicting the 
 22 
dominant’s behaviour based on gaze and movement cues but did not appreciate their 
perspective (Hare et al. 2003).  
 
Fidelity of Imitation 
Different behaviours may fit the definition of imitation presented above but 
still show different degrees of resemblance to the model's action.  It has been 
suggested that imitation may best be seen as a continuum of behaviours reflecting the 
degree of fidelity of copying the model’s action (a function also of the information 
utilized from the model's action) (see Table 1.1).  
When only information about the topography of the action is used, such 
imitation is referred to as copying (Galef, 1988), impersonation (Tomasello, et al. 
1993) or mimicking (Tomasello, 1996). There are only few valid examples for such 
imitation; one example comes from Hayes & Hayes (1952), who raised a common 
chimpanzee named Viki in their home. After intensive training, Viki was able to 
imitate different actions shown to her after the spoken command “Do this”. Taylor & 
Saayman (1973) described bottlenose dolphins' impersonation of some behaviours of 
humans and a sea-lion all of which were foreign to the dolphins' natural repertoire. 
When information is used about the action and goal of a behaviour – this is 
referred to as true imitation (Thorpe 1956). An example of the difference between 
imitation and mimicking can be found in Call & Tomasello's (1995) study in which a 
human-raised orang-utan was trained to mimic different body movements. When the 
same ape was presented with a goal-orientated tool use problem, he was not able to 
solve the problem through observation. The authors therefore concluded that this 
orang-utan was able to mimic but not imitate.  
Is Level 3 of social learning more adaptive than Level 2? This might not 
always be so. First, technically speaking, it is not always easy to differentiate between 
the two and thus Whiten (2000) suggests “we should be thinking of an imitation/ 
emulation continuum, rather than a neat dichotomy” (p. 483), since this continuum 
may be governed by fidelity based on different parameters of the model's action the 
observer pays attention to and makes use of. 
Second, it is not always the case that imitating rather than emulating is the 
more intelligent, beneficial choice. In some situations, emulation would actually be 
the better choice. For example, when the mechanism of a behaviour with a tool may 
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not be understood or visible, imitation may be the best choice, whereas when the 
mechanism can be understood, emulation may be more useful.  Thus, emulation may 
result in more flexible knowledge than imitation (Want & Harris, 2002). The same 
conclusion was reached by Huber (2002): “We conclude that emulation learning is a 
very intelligent and creative learning process that, in some circumstances, is a more 
adaptive strategy than imitative learning” (p. 1).  
Although emulation has been used as a “null hypothesis” for detecting 
imitation in great apes, the ability of non-human apes to emulate has been doubted 
(Byrne, 2002; Byrne & Russon, 1998).  
However, Horner & Whiten (2005) found that when the causal information 
which was available to a subject was manipulated, chimpanzees showed both 
emulation and imitation, whereas 3-4 year old children imitated regardless of the 
causal information they had, thus demonstrating the strong tendency of humans to 
imitate. 
In order to complete the theoretical discussion of social learning, I now return 
to Figure 1.1., which describes the social learning context, to address additional 
several points. 
 
1. Background for learning 
For learning to take place, there is a need for a facilitating background that includes   
a. Motivation – physiological and social, as well as   
b. Supportive social conditions – the model and the observer’s 
characteristics.  
Motivation  
Motivation is important for any type of learning to take place. As in 
individual learning, physiological states such as hunger, thirst and fear may 
facilitate or retard social learning.  
The importance of reward for social learning has been stressed by several 
authors (Bandura, 1986; Bruner, 1972; Yando et al. 1978) and has been shown 
in birds (e.g. pigeons, Palameta & Lefebvre, 1985; Japanese quails, Dorrance 
& Zentall, 2001) and rats (e.g. Heyes et al. 1993), as well as in primates (e.g. 
chimpanzees were able to learn arbitrary gestures through rewards: Custance 
et al. 1995). In some cases, however, the reward had an interfering effect. 
Whiten (1998b) suggested that seeing the food reward through the Plexiglas of 
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an 'artificial fruit' interfered with the learning of the observer, because less 
attention was paid to the model's  actions.  
Social motivation may also play an important role (Tomasello, Savage Rumbaugh 
& Kruger, 1993), and the social reward in these cases can have a considerable effect. 
This may be manifested by receiving attention from a caretaker, as in infant mimicry 
(Myowa-Yamakoshi et al. 2004). Matsuzawa et al. (2001) and de Waal (2001) claim 
that in non-human primates as in humans, performing socially-learned behaviours 
may be strengthened by the need to conform to salient performers. 
 
Model and observer’s characteristics  
Learning socially may be more advantageous than individual learning “…when 
the observer is not proficient, when opportunities for practice are limited, when the 
costs of errors are high, and when learning by individual experience would slow the 
process” (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a,  p. 247). Laland & Kendal (2003) add that 
learning socially is beneficial when competition for resources is high.   
However, although learning from the other can in some situations be 
beneficial, animals do not learn completely indiscriminately. In a social 
context, the relationship between model and observer, as well as their 
properties, may play a role in facilitating learning.  
Social tolerance between the observer and demonstrator can be crucial for 
learning to take place (Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995; Russon & Galdikas, 1995). 
Van Schaik has described how social tolerance is important for transmitting 
technological traditions in apes (van Schaik, 2003; van Schaik et al. 1999). Rank and 
gender of the learner and model can be important in determining the level of tolerance 
the observer can receive from the model.  
 Since learning demands attention, memory and perhaps reasoning, the 
observer has to be mature enough to display the required abilities (Custance et al. 
1995). On the other hand, field studies have shown that young monkeys are more 
likely to learn “new tricks”, as young animals are also usually more tolerated around 
adults and thus have better opportunities to observe and learn (Perry & Manson, 
2003). Thus, there may be an optimal time window in the life of an animal, which 
better facilitates social learning. 
Although it can be important that the model acts competently, studies have 
shown that viewing an unskilful model can result in better learning (e.g. Vanayan et 
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al. 1985 for pigeons; Templeton, 1998 for starlings). This may be due to the emphasis 
on response–reinforcement contingencies. 
 Recently, capuchin monkeys have been seen to make use of conspecifics' 
mistakes in order to learn how to open a box (Kuroshima, 2008).  But young 
chimpanzees, as well as 3-4 year old children, did not benefit from seeing others’ 
mistakes while learning a difficult trap-tube task (Horner & Whiten, 2007). 
 
2. Type of behaviour observed  
As described in Figure 1.1, the type and complexity of the action observed 
may play a significant role in the process of social learning. 
 
 Action versus a sequence of actions  
The behaviour observed may be a single action or a sequence of actions. Is 
there a difference in socially learning a sequence of actions rather than a single 
action? 
 Byrne (Byrne, 1995; Byrne & Russon, 1998) dealt with this question and 
suggested a program level of imitation, in which a sequence of action is learnt, but the 
actions building the sequence may not be a perfect copy and can be learnt through 
trial and error. Thus, the observer copies “... the structural organization of a complex 
process (including the sequence of stages, subroutine structure, and bimanual co - 
ordination) by observation of the behaviour of another individual, while furnishing the 
exact details of actions by individual learning” (Byrne & Russon, 1998, p. 676) or by 
other social processes, such as emulation. In this sense imitation is one part of the 
cognitive mechanisms that deal with hierarchical representations of behaviour. 
Byrne found support for this assumption in the way wild mountain gorillas 
(gorilla gorilla beringei) learn complex leaf eating techniques. Hundreds of hours of 
focal observations of these apes gathering and preparing plant food have shown that 
these gorillas use complex techniques, which are divided into different levels.  But the 
general structure of the leaf gathering process is highly standardized, although there 
are individual variations in the more detailed movements (Byrne & Byrne, 1991, 
1993). The inherent improbability of such complex sequences being achieved through 
individual learning has been used to claim that gorillas imitate at the ‘program-level’ 
(Byrne, 1994; Byrne & Russon, 1998). 
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The idea that behaviour is hierarchically organized (Lashley, 1951) implies 
that, in principle, imitation can be used at any level of the hierarchy and, depending at 
what level it is used, we should find different patterns of behaviour. 
In order to copy the logical structure of a behaviour there is no need to 
understand the intentions of the model.  It does, however, put a burden on memory 
span and requires understanding that the sub-goal order is important.  
Nevertheless, even when a sequence of behaviours is learned socially, it may 
not be achieved by imitation after all, and just like action learning, could be learned 
by emulation (Whiten, 1996; Byrne, 1995).      
 
To conclude 
The social context has a complex multilevel influence on the acquisition of 
behaviour by an individual. Inference of the process underlying a behaviour just from 
observing its production is not possible. There is a need to take into account the 
different factors described in this chapter when addressing potential cases of social 
learning in animals, such as those which will be described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 
DO “CEBUS SEE CEBUS DO”? 
 
 
 
In this chapter I shall portray the characteristics of Cebus monkeys, which 
make them good candidates for studying social learning and imitation. I will then 
proceed to describe the evidence from the field which suggest the existence of social 
learning in this species and discuss these finding as related to traditions and culture. 
Next, I will review what laboratory experiments can tell us about the mechanisms 
underlying social learning in capuchin monkeys. Last, I will deal with the issue of 
enculturation and its influence on the ability to imitate, as some of the subjects used in 
this thesis can be regarded as enculturated capuchin monkeys.  
 
 
I . Capuchin monkeys - what makes them potential social learners? 
 
Rusty, an adult Cebus apella living in the Israeli Primate Sanctuary, loves to make 
"mud cakes". He fills a small bucket with earth then takes it to the tap to add water. While 
kneading the "dough" he sometimes adds more water or a handful of earth until the texture is 
satisfactory.  Eventually, he turns the bucket upside down to take out the cake.  
 
Such complex behaviour has prompted human interest in Cebus and has often 
raised the question of whether such behaviour is acquired socially or learned 
individually by each monkey. These small South American monkeys acquired their 
name “capuchin” from the brown hair on the top of their head, which resembles the  
"capuche", the hood worn by Franciscan monks. Cebus are widely spread in South 
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America from Honduras to Argentina, with Cebus apella being the most widespread 
species, ranging from Colombia to Argentina (Kinzey, 1997).  
 
1. Tool use  
Capuchin monkeys’ varied diet, which includes plants and prey, together with 
their highly manipulative foraging strategies (Izawa, 1979), have enabled them to live 
in a variety of habitats (Robinson & Janson, 1987) as well as  survive in a habitat 
where fruit is relatively scarce (Fernaneds, 1991; Hernandez-Camacho & Cooper, 
1976). It is in such situations that we would expect to find capuchins employing their 
tool use skills to find food. A recent report, which strengthens this claim, comes from 
Moura & Lee (2004), who describe  how capuchin monkeys in Brazil use stones as 
spades to dig up tubers as well as hammers to crack open nuts. Nut-cracking 
behaviour is seen mainly in areas where the monkeys are more terrestrial, perhaps 
because in order to do this action efficiently, suitable hard objects are needed to serve 
as a hammer and an anvil.  
Cebus’ complex foraging ability, as seen in tool use behaviour, may be 
partially explained by their large brain in relation to their body size (Jerison, 1973; 
Stephan et al. 1988). McGrew (1993) argued that primates feeding on animal protein 
were more likely to use tools. However, the fact that capuchin monkeys have often 
been seen  feeding on meat, but more rarely use tools in their natural environment, 
puts this theory in some doubt (Fragaszy et al. 2004).  
Capuchin tool use in captivity has been characterized by its flexibility: 
monkeys can use one type of tool for different purposes as well as using different 
tools for a specific purpose (Visalberghi, 1993a). A vivid example of the creative tool 
use of capuchin monkeys is found in Warden, Koch & Fjeld (1940), who describe one 
of their subjects using tools to rake in hard- to- reach food items. On one occasion the 
monkey even used an albino rat for this purpose. Parker & Gibson (1977) claim that 
capuchin monkeys show an intelligent tool using ability characteristic of the fifth sub-
stage of the sensorimotor period (Piaget, 1952) (See Chapter 4 of this thesis for a 
more detailed descriptions of capuchin monkeys' tool use repertoire).  
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2. Cebus cognition 
 2a. Cognitive basis of tool use behaviour 
Object manipulation and object-object relations are possible due to the 
development of cognitive abilities (Vauclair, 1984). Yet, the question may be asked as 
to what Cebus monkeys understand about the relation between the tool and the task.  
Do they have a mental representation of the task? This has great relevance to the 
study of social learning in this species, as it taps the question of which information a 
capuchin can make use of while observing a model. More specifically, can they utilize 
information based on the causal relation between the action of the model and the tools 
the model uses? Most studies claim that capuchin monkeys learn how to use tools 
through trial and error (Anderson, 1990; Visalberghi, 1987). Others, e.g. Parker & 
Poti (1990), conclude that Cebus monkeys are capable of perceiving means-end 
relations as manifested in their success in using a stick as a rake. 
 
Tool choice 
Choosing the right tool  for a task could indicate that these monkeys have a 
representation of the task and an understanding of its components. However, studies 
have not been conclusive on the ability of Cebus monkeys to choose a tool correctly.  
Several authors report result of experiments in which their subjects showed a definite 
preference towards choosing the right tool for the task (Anderson & Henneman, 1994; 
Antinucci & Visalberghi, 1986; Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1989; Westergaard & 
Fragaszy; 1987a; Westergaard & Suomi 1993a), e.g. choosing a stone as a hammer 
more often than a wooden block or plastic container. 
The use of a ‘tool set’- two or more different tools used one after the other to 
obtain a goal (Brewer & McGrew, 1990) - can also indicate an understanding of 
which tool is more suitable for which purpose. Several studies have described  
capuchin monkeys using tool sets (Anderson & Henneman,1994; Westergaard & 
Suomi, 1993a; Westergaard et al. 1997), e.g. using a stone to crack open a nut and 
then a stick as a probing tool to extract the inner meat.   
Capuchin monkeys in nature have been seen to descend to the ground and 
carry palm seeds to a suitable anvil in order to crack them open (Fragaszy et al. in 
Fragaszy et al. 2004; Jalles-Filho et al. 2001; Ottoni & Mannu, 2001; Oxford, 2003). 
This carrying behaviour may also imply that the monkeys understand the necessary 
requirements for successful nut cracking. 
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Visalberghi (1990) argues that, as opposed to apes, capuchin monkeys are not 
able to understand the requirements of a problem.  Visalberghi and colleagues have 
shown, through analyzing the type of mistakes the monkeys made when trying to 
solve a probing task with a stick in a series of experiments, that the capuchin monkeys 
in their studies were unable to choose the right tool for the task (Visalberghi & Trinca, 
1989). Their results indicate that Cebus tool use behaviour may be successful without 
demanding understanding of all its physical properties such as the shape or size of 
tool, or the effect of a well-shaped trap (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994).  
A later experiment by  Fujita et al. (2003) strengthens the claim that capuchin 
monkeys have only a basic understanding of causality, similar to that found in cotton-
top tamarins in a similar study using an apparatus with traps (Hauser, 1997).   
 
2b. Non tool–use tasks 
Testing capuchin monkeys on tasks not relying on tool use has shown that on 
several tests of learning abilities capuchins do not always score higher than other 
primates (see Anderson, 1996 for examples). However in tasks relying on 
sensorimotor intelligence, capuchins (like great apes) surpass other monkeys; this has 
been shown, for example, for the object concept (Schino et al. 1990; Mathieu et al. 
1976) and causality problems (Natale, 1989). 
 
3. Social structure and behaviour 
Not only outstanding tool use ability characterizes this species. Capuchin 
monkeys differ from other platyrrhine primates in their social structure and behaviour, 
which is said to resemble Old World cercopithecine monkeys.  
Cebus apella live in groups composed of 7-30 monkeys. One male and one 
female usually dominate the group (Welker, 1992) and the alpha female is dominant 
over all members of the group except the alpha male. There are strong relationships 
among males in the group in captivity (Fragaszy et al. 2004, p. 213) and low rates of 
aggression have been noted between males in wild groups (e.g. Izawa, 1980; van 
Schaik & van Noordwijk, 1989). Kinship and friendship relations are stable over 
years, starting even from infancy, and mothers and their offspring maintain strong ties 
even when they grow up (Welker, 1992; personal unpublished data). Capuchins are 
very attentive to conspecifics' behaviour (Fragaszy & Adams-Curtis, 1987). 
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Youngsters are attentive to older monkeys, while the adults are tolerant of the infants 
and youngsters (Fragaszy & Adams-Curtis 1991; Ottoni & Mannu, 2001).  
Some researchers argue that social problems “are the driving force behind 
primate cognitive sophistication” (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; de Waal, 1989). In this 
domain as well, there is evidence of complex Cebus behaviour. Mendres & de Waal 
(2000) found that pairs of capuchin monkeys showed some aspects of cooperation on 
food-retrieving tasks such as glancing at each other in a similar way Cebus apella 
monkeys glance to recruit help in agonistic situations (Freese & Oppenheimer, 1981).  
These findings contrast with the results reported by Chalmeau et al. (1997) and 
Visalberghi et al. (2000), who did not find such cooperation in their subjects. This 
may be a result of the different type of tasks used in these studies (Mendres & de 
Waal, 2000). Such basic cooperation may be related to a high level of social 
tolerance, not only towards young members of the group but also to other adults, as 
has been shown also in the acceptance of food sharing. Other studies have 
documented food sharing and tool exchange, again somewhat resembling 
observations of chimpanzees (de Waal et al. 1993; Savage Rumbaugh et al. 1978; 
Westergaard & Suomi, 1996 cited in Westergaard et al. 1997).  
 
Conclusions 
The background for studying social learning in Cebus has been set out in this 
section. Social learning requires the exploitation of other’s expertise. In order for this 
to happen, the social structure of the group must facilitate close probing into 
conspecifics’ behaviour or even their minds. Capuchin monkeys are very social and 
tolerant, rendering social observation of a conspecific at work possible. Reader (2003) 
found a correlation between executive brain size, innovation, tool use and social 
learning, factors which are applicable to capuchin monkeys, as described above.  Can 
they, then, learn to use tools as well as other behaviours, through observation? 
Bearing this in mind I shall next discuss existing data on the ability of capuchin 
monkeys to learn in this way in nature as well as in laboratory experiments.  
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II. Evidence for social learning in capuchin monkeys 
 
a. Field studies - Do capuchin communities have cultures? 
The debate over primate culture has gained momentum in recent years with 
descriptions of distinct behaviours of different populations of wild chimpanzees 
(Whiten et al. 1999), orang-utans (van Schaik, 2003) and capuchins (Ottoni & Mannu, 
2001; Panger et al. 2002; Perry et al. 2003; Perry & Manson, 2003). 
Not all authors are happy to use the word “culture” in the context of non 
human animals and prefer to reserve this term to describe human culture, stressing its 
complex aggregate of art, rules, fashions, customs, technology and so on, mediated by 
language, teaching and imitation. Further, human culture is based on a ratchet effect, 
in which new traditions are built on older ones and the modifications of behaviours 
accumulate over time (Galef, 1992; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 1990, 1994; 
Tomasello et al. 1993).   
Thus, terms such as “protoculture” and “preculture” (e.g. Count, 1973; Kawai, 
1965) were used in the past to differentiate between human and non-human culture. In 
current days, the term “tradition” is often preferred to describe a behaviour found in 
one group of animals but not in another, which has been transmitted socially and not 
caused by genetic or environmental variability between groups (Heyes, 1993). Such 
behaviour must also be persistent over generations or at least long- lasting (Nishida, 
1987; Perry & Manson, 2003). 
This definition of tradition does not say much about the mechanism of the 
social transmission, recognizing that several mechanisms, alone or together, can 
sustain a tradition. 
Such social information can be transmitted in two directions (Laland, 
Richerson, & Boyd 1993): horizontal transmission between monkeys of the same age 
group, and vertical transmission, from older to younger monkeys, typically parents to 
offspring. This latter path, according to Laland et al., results in stable traditions. 
 Whiten (in press) and Whiten & van Schaik (2007) support a less strict 
account of culture and suggests that the term culture can be attributed to non-human 
animals if they exhibit multiple traditions found in different domains of their life.  
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Identifying traditions and culture 
The difficulty of collecting all the relevant data in nature imposes constraints on 
the possibility of determining whether a behaviour has been socially transmitted, or is 
merely a result of ecological and or genetic factors. Several theoreticians have 
proposed ways to overcome this problem. 
a. Longitudinal observations of a population.  This may require more luck than careful 
planning. Sapolsky (2006) was lucky to witness a change in social behaviour in the 
level of aggression in a troop of olive baboons that  took place after the death of the 
high ranking aggressive males and continued after the original males had left and 
been replaced by others. Such a change could only be transmitted socially. 
It is not considered to be ethically appropriate to intervene in the life of groups in 
nature, to relocate monkeys from one group to the other to see whether they bring 
their traditions to their new group or conform to new ones. The closest possibility is to 
bring in an unknown food item to a group, as was done by Matsuzawa with 
chimpanzees (Matsuzawa, 1996). 
However, as Tomasello claims “it is clear that simple observation of animals in 
their natural habitats is not sufficient to determine the ways in which various 
behaviours may be acquired and transmitted” (1990 p. 282); see also Galef (1976, 
1982, 1988).  
b. Group contrast model of traditions or “regional contrast” or “methods of 
eliminations”. These are different terms for an approach claiming that finding 
different behaviours in two groups of the same species, which are genetically similar 
and living in similar ecological environments, may imply that the behaviours were 
transmitted socially among the group members. This approach does not necessarily 
prove social learning but does eliminate other influences. It is used mainly in 
primatology where “subjects are too long lived to adopt an ontogenetic, or process, 
approach” (McGrew, 1998). 
This approach has been criticized on several grounds: 
1.    It does not identify false negatives (although ecological and genetic factors may 
differ, social factors may still be involved) and false positives (perhaps other, asocial 
factors are involved) (Fragaszy & Perry, 2003). 
2.     It is very difficult to prove identical environments and identical genetics 
(Fragaszy & Perry, 2003). 
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3.     Genetics may play a larger role than first thought as some of the identified 
behaviours for chimpanzees and orang-utans have been found in different subspecies 
(Laland & Janik, 2006).   
Therefore, Fragaszy & Perry (2003) claim it is only possible to say that social 
factors aided the behaviour. 
c. The Cue Reliability Approach - CRA (Dewar, 2003). Animals may be using social 
and non-social cues to make decisions.  Therefore, it is possible to state that a 
behaviour has been transmitted socially only if we can show that non-social, reliable 
cues were not available and that the social cue reliability was higher than the 
reliability threshold for that individual. The CRA is a highly theoretical proposal and 
implementing it is very problematic. As Dewar herself mentions, it is not always 
obvious what the are variables in the decision making problem facing the animals.  
“Some researchers have shown that animals do not always exploit environmental and 
social cues in ways that seem consistent with optimality models, e.g. Fragaszy & 
Visalberghi, 1996” (Dewar, 2003 p. 140).  
The CRA is restricted to behaviours that have an adaptive consequence. It is also not 
useful in situations where it is not possible to estimate the reliability threshold for the 
animal.  
         Nevertheless, this theory may predict when a behaviour will be learnt socially, 
taking into account factors such as age, sex, rank, etc. 
 
In what follows I shall review the data available regarding behaviours in monkey 
societies in the wild, which have been interpreted as traditions, through the prism of 
three questions.  
1.  Does the behaviour fit the definition of tradition stated above? 
2.  Is it possible to determine the social mechanism involved in the 
transmission of the behaviour? 
3. Does the specific society of monkeys have other traditions to qualify 
them as having culture?  
 
Tradition in monkey societies  
As early as 1952, Imanishi suggested that many groups of primates have their 
own culture. By this, he meant behaviours acquired through social learning. As a 
result, Imanishi and his Japanese colleagues began intensive research on Japanese 
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macaques (Macaca fuscata) (1952, 1957a, 1957b, 1960), resulting in one of the 
classic descriptions of tradition in non-human animals.   
On Koshima Island, a young female macaque, Imo, began washing sweet 
potatoes in water instead of just cleaning the sand off them with her hands, as the rest 
of the troop did. In subsequent years this behaviour spread to other members of the 
troop.  
It was first proposed (Kawamura, 1954, cited in Itani & Nishimura, 1973) that 
imitation was the mechanism through which the behaviour spread. The potato-
washing behaviour was thought to be strong evidence for the assumption that 
traditions are transmitted through imitation. This was inferred from the fact that with 
time the number of monkeys showing this behaviour increased. 
However, with the development of social learning research and theorizing, 
many questions have been raised and other explanations have been put forward: 
1.  The importance of social cues for the spread of the washing behaviour was 
questioned since it was found that macaques as well as capuchin monkeys 
spontaneously wash food without a need for social learning (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 
1990b). When water and sandy fruits are available, capuchins and crab-eating 
macaque start washing objects in a few hours. Furthermore, Visalberghi (1994) found 
that seeing a model wash fruit (termed live information) does not increase the 
likelihood of learning the behaviour more than when seeing a piece of fruit in the 
water (still information).  However, although imitation is not necessary for the 
acquisition of this behaviour, the presence of food washers was important for its 
spread because it made the conditions suitable for learning by familiarizing the 
monkeys with water and making the clean food remains accessible. 
2.         Learning could have developed individually, because when provisioning the 
monkeys with potatoes, food was thrown in or near water, encouraging the monkeys 
to perform this behaviour (Green, 1975 cited in Tomasello & Call, 1997). Further, 
washing potatoes might simply have been a generalization of cleaning and brushing 
sand off food items seen in this group (Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
3. The fact that the behaviour spread to kin and play-mates was first thought to 
be a proof of imitation. However, stimulus enhancement too can explain the direction 
of spread from Imo to her relatives and friends. This seems logical since in macaque 
species, relatives and peers spend time together and thus have suitable opportunities 
and situations for learning from each other. In the same way, youngsters who were 
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next to their washing mothers could have learnt this behaviour not necessarily through 
imitation but by individual learning using the cues the mothers had left around – such 
as finding potatoes in the water (Galef, 1992; Matsuzawa, 2003; Whiten & Ham, 
1992).  
4.          A further problem in attributing the learning to imitation is the slow rate of 
the spread of the behaviour (Galef, 1992). If imitation was the underlying cognitive 
mechanism for learning this behaviour, it should have been a much faster process, as 
each monkey that mastered the new behaviour could at once serve as an additional 
model. (Galef, 1990; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). But this did not happen and the rate 
of new learners decreased over the years.   
Laland & Kendal (2003) argue that such expectations for a high rate of  spread 
do not take into consideration individual differences in learning, which could also be 
expected in social learning. Social learning as well may show different learning 
curves, which are due to individual characteristics such as age, gender, social rank, 
and competition for resources (Laland et al. 1996, Lefebvre & Giraldeau, 1996), as 
well as the differences in relevance of a particular behaviour to different members of 
the group and group size (Huffman & Hirata, 2003).  
I have described at length the different angles from which this behaviour has 
been analyzed as it is a good example of how a phenomenon should be approached 
and all possible explanations exploited. The study of the Koshima Japanese macaque 
had an enormous impact on the notion of traditions. Since then, many more 
behaviours have been observed as traditions in Japanese macaques, such as wheat 
cleaning through a behaviour known as “placer mining” in which the monkeys throw 
a handful of wheat and sand into the water and gather the clean wheat that floats to 
the surface, fish eating (Watanabe, 1989), hot spring bathing (Suzuki, 1965), candy 
eating (Itani, 1965), as well as pool making.  
All these traditions have adaptive functions, which may explain why they have 
been sustained, although the explanation of perhaps being individually learned could 
also be warranted. However, other behaviours observed in these monkeys, such as 
stone handling (Huffman, 1984) and grooming techniques (Tanaka, 1995), have no 
apparent adaptive function, but still spread in provisioned groups. Tanaka (1998) 
concluded that only imitative processes could explain how the changes in grooming 
technique were adopted by kin.  For a description of many more of the traditions of 
the Japanese macaque see McGrew (1998). 
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I now return to the three questions enumerated at the beginning of this section 
and recast them in terms of the Japanese macaque: 
a. Do the behaviours of the Japanese macaque qualify as traditions?  These behaviours 
fit the different requirements even though some behaviours could have theoretically 
been learned individually.  
b. What mechanism underlies the behaviours? It is not possible to determine this from 
the data.  
c. Is it culture? As the traditions of Japanese macaque are so rich and embodied in so 
many different domains in the macaque life, the answer to this question is in the 
affirmative. 
  Japanese macaques have been studied intensely for years and this is perhaps 
why most information about traditions in monkeys has been found in this species. It is 
logical to presume that at least some other species of macaque monkeys would show 
traditions too, considering that they share many similar properties of social 
organization (see Table 2.1 for a summary of suggested traditions in populations of 
monkeys in nature). 
 
Table 2.1 Behaviours observed in populations of monkeys in nature claimed to be examples of 
tradition. This table does not include research with the Japanese macaque and capuchin monkeys which 
are dealt with separately. 
 
Species Reference Behaviour  Path Of 
Diffusion 
Limitation Is It A 
Tradition?  
Wheatley 
(1988) 
Food washing, 
rubbing and peeling 
Un known  1,3 Not sufficient 
information 
Macaca 
fascicularis 
Chiang, 
(1967) 
Opening oysters 
with stones, 
washing food 
Un known 1 Not sufficient 
information 
Papio ursinus Camberfort 
(1981 
Knowledge about 
location of new food 
items 
All learnt from 
one juvenile 
2,3 +  
Papio anubis  Strum (1975) Specific hunting 
method and meat 
sharing 
 1 Not sufficient 
information 
Camberfort 
(1981) 
Knowledge about 
location of new food 
items 
Several,  not 
much attention  
to conspecifics   
2,3 +  
Less convincing 
than with baboons 
Cercopithecus 
aethiops  
Hauser (1988) Acacia pod  
 dipping  
among adults, 
mother to 
offspring,   
1,3 Not sufficient 
information 
 
1. No research done on neighbouring groups - needed to eliminate ecological factors. 
2. McGrew (1992) added the criterion of “naturalness” to the six criteria already proposed by McGrew 
& Tutin (1978) as an operational definition of culture. By 'naturalness', McGrew means that the 
behaviour is not affected by direct human influence (the other criteria are innovation, dissemination, 
standardization, durability, tradition, non-subsistence).  
3. No information about the duration of this behaviour was obtained for the group. 
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It is very difficult to know how many useful behaviours are not socially 
transmitted in the wild. For example, an adaptive behaviour of rubbing spines off 
caterpillars in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri oerstedii) did not spread in the group 
(Boinski & Fragaszy, 1989). Kummer & Goodall, (1985) concluded that “of the many 
[innovative] behaviours observed, only a few will be passed on to other individuals, 
and seldom will they spread through the whole troop” (p.213).  It is just as interesting 
a question to find out why such behaviours are not transmitted socially to other 
members of the group, as which behaviours are transmitted. 
It is evident from Table 2.1. how little research has been carried out in nature 
to examine traditions in monkey populations (except for the Japanese macaque 
studies). The accumulation of information about capuchin traditions in nature, which I 
discuss now, is therefore impressive and should serve as a framework for studying 
traditions in other species of monkeys as well. 
 
Traditions in capuchin monkeys 
 
In La Macarena national park, Colombia, the brown capuchins (Cebus apella) 
employ complex techniques of exploiting palm nuts (Astocaryum chambira) 
according to the ripeness of the palm (Izawa & Mizuno 1977; at Raleighvallen, Izawa 
1979; Struhsaker & Leland, 1977). The monkeys penetrate the nut with their canines 
and drink the juice through the hole they have made, then they pound the nut on 
guadua bamboo and eat the coco, which comes out of it. 
Other complex foraging techniques have been shown in other sites as well 
(e.g. Izawa 1978, 1979 catching frogs and termites). Boinski et al. (2003) claim that 
“In many respects the manipulative abilities are ... comparable to those described for 
wild chimpanzees. Only the young show different inefficiencies in this behaviour, the 
older show persistence and very aimed smooth actions” (p. 367). 
Nishida (1987) suggested that this very sophisticated food processing 
behaviour of capuchin monkeys might be a result of cultural learning. “Cebus 
monkeys, for example, can obtain important nutrients (palm nuts, frogs and insects) 
that could not easily be obtained without apparently cultural knowledge and 
techniques” (Nishida, 1987, p. 465). 
Yet in order to make such an assumption there is a need to compare 
behaviours with other groups of capuchin monkeys facing the same challenging food 
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items and see the techniques these monkeys use. Furthermore, there is a need to 
observe the way infants and youngsters acquire these food-processing techniques. 
 This challenge was taken up by Chapman & Fedigan (1990), Panger et al. 
(2002), Boinski et al. (2003) Perry et al. (2003) and Rose et al. (2003), who compared 
different behaviours in different groups of capuchin monkeys.  
Table 2.2 summarizes behaviours considered to be traditions in capuchin 
monkeys. Such behaviours include food processing techniques, predator avoidance, 
hunting techniques and social conventions  
Panger et al. (2002) carried out the first systematic comparison of food 
processing behaviours in white-faced capuchins (Cebus capucinus) found in three 
long-term study sites, which were similar ecologically. They listed the food items 
processed in the different sites and then assessed whether there was a difference in the 
processing methods. Six techniques, which seemed to differ, were later more 
thoroughly examined. In addition, the authors calculated the correlation between 
proximity scores and individuals who displayed the same techniques, finding 
statistically higher scores for such dyads than other dyads in the group. Just as with 
findings of ape cultures, some foraging techniques were found at one site but not at 
another. On a small scale these results resemble the findings on traditions in 
chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 1999).  The  resemblances between the two taxa  maybe 
due to “[similar] extractive foraging, dexterous manipulation, tolerant gregariousness, 
long life-history variables, large brain size relative to body size, and/or an omnivorous 
diet” (Panger et al. 2002, p. 62).   
Panger et al. did not try to determine what social learning mechanism was 
responsible for the differences found, as this was not possible to infer from the data 
available. 
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Table 2.2 Behaviours regarded as tradition in wild populations of Cebus capucinus 1, 2,5,6,7 and Cebus 
apella,3,4   
 
Domain  Behaviour 
Reference  
Groups Ecological 
Explanation? 
Duration  Individual 
Learning? 
Direction 
Of Spread 
Pounding or 
scrubbing 
of 16 different 
food species 1 
10   Ruled out ?  ? 
Different ratio 
of fruit to 
insect to meat 
in diet 2 
3  Ruled out  Cannot be 
ruled out 
 
Leaf wrapping, 
fulcrum use, 
ant following 1 
3  Ruled out ?  ? 
Substrate use 
Tool use 3  
4 Needs further 
exploring 
   
Food 
processing 
techniques 
 
Rocks as 
hammers 4 
1 Ruled out  ? No ? 
Hunting 
behaviour 
Neck bite to 
kill 
Squirrels 5+6  
1 Ruled out 1 year  ? 
Predator 
avoidance 
Behaviour 
towards Indigo 
snakes 6 
1 Ruled out 1 year  ? 
Hand sniffing 7 5  Ruled out 7 years No Among adults 
Appendage 
sucking7 
3 Ruled out 6 month  No ? 
Finger-in-
mouth game7 
1 Ruled out 10 years  No Immature to 
adult kin; 
among adults 
Hair game7 1 Ruled out 10 years No Immature to 
adult kin; 
among adults 
Social 
conventions 
Toy game7 2 Ruled out 9 years No Among adults; 
adult to young 
Other  Grooming of 
spider 
monkeys7 
2 Ruled out 4 years Cannot be 
ruled out 
? 
1= Panger et al. 2002 2= Chapman & Fedigan, 1990 3= Boinski et al. 2003 4= Ottoni & Mannu, 2001  
5= Perry et al. 2003, 6= Rose et al. 2003 7 = Perry et al. 2003 
 
  Boinski et al. (2003) tested two categories, substrate use and tool use, in order 
to assess whether these behaviours could be described as a tradition.  They found that 
there was hardly any variation between the skilful monkeys' actions.  The authors are 
confident that this behaviour can be called “tradition”. They describe a life cycle in 
which young capuchins are tolerated by adults while they process fruits through tool 
or object use. Once they have matured and move to the periphery they have to find 
new ways to process less available foods and when they later get a position in the 
centre they can in turn act as models for the young (Boinski relies on the notion that 
good foragers have a higher status as adults and thus these inventors will find their 
way to the centre). However, to identify tradition, further studies of other sites still 
need to be done, in order to test whether the different techniques used for different 
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husked fruits cannot solely be ascribed to the different fruits' morphology, or the 
abundance of the fruit. 
From their results, Panger et al. (2000) and Boinski et al. (2003) were unable 
to determine the mechanism underlying the transmission of the behaviours they 
observed. The most they could say at this stage is that "Social facilitation may be 
important in sustaining the traditions of substrate use among brown capuchins at 
Raleighvallen" (Boinski et al. 2003 p. 380). 
Hunting behaviour and predator avoidance behaviour were also seen to differ 
between sites even though the same predators were present in the different sites. 
Perry et al. (2003) found that the capuchin monkeys spent a long time 
mobbing snakes and emitting alarm calls, even after they no longer presented a 
danger. The authors suggested this may be a way the adults teach the juveniles. The 
adults spent more time engaging in this behaviour than needed to help the juveniles 
learn. This is only anecdotal and more data are needed. Nevertheless, teaching is an 
important factor in the cultural transmission of behaviour in humans and thus 
collecting information about ways in which monkeys actively enable learning of 
others is important to our understanding of how behaviours spread in primate groups. 
Social influences on behaviour are even more convincing in the case of social 
conventions, since, unlike tool use behaviours, where monkeys can find used tools 
and learn the behaviour by themselves, social conventions cannot be discovered 
individually. There are relatively few studies in the literature dealing with diffusion of 
social conventions in primates, which is odd as one might expect to find more in this 
domain given that primates live in complex societies. Studies on chimpanzees, which 
have dealt with this subject, describe behaviours such as scratching, hand clasp 
grooming, and leaf grooming (Boesch 1996; McGrew & Tutin 1978; Whiten et al. 
1999). 
 Perry and colleagues studied social conventions in white-faced capuchin 
monkeys and found behaviours such as hand sniffing, sucking partner’s body parts 
and different social games (Perry et al. 2003). They defined social conventions as 
“dyadic social behaviours of a communicative nature that are shared among members 
of particular social network” (Perry et al .2003, p. 397). Why should monkeys take 
part in such seemingly bizarre behaviours, especially as they seem very 
uncomfortable?  Perry et al. claim that these behaviours may serve different functions 
but they all have some elements in common: they are seen between dyads, separated 
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from the group, performing the behaviours in a very relaxed way, sometimes for a 
very long time (an hour or more) and as mentioned above, can be uncomfortable and 
even dangerous, e.g. poking a finger into the side of the eye of a conspecific.  
These behaviours may be a way of testing the strength of bonds between 
dyads (Zahavi, 1977). Their importance, as a ritual, is not the action itself but more 
the cooperation, the joint intense focus on the behaviour, which emphasizes to the 
partners that they can rely on each other (Perry et al. 2003). Perry et al. suggest that 
these conventions are transmitted through ontogenetic ritualization. “In ontogenetic 
ritualization a communicatory signal is created by two individuals shaping one 
another's behaviour in repeated instances of a social interaction” (Boesch & 
Tomasello, 1998). 
Whiten (2002) suggests that behaviours such as those seen in these social 
conventions may be based on imitation, as the monkey that is to reciprocate to a 
gesture, such as hand sniffing or body parts sucking, has to acquire the “idea” to do so 
from the partner.  
 The careful analysis of data carried out by the authors above authorizes the 
claim that most of the behaviours qualify as traditions. The rich array of traditions 
described for capuchin monkeys does qualify it as culture. 
The findings, however, cannot explain what social mechanism is involved in 
the spread of these traditions. In fact, the specific mechanism is irrelevant to 
determining whether capuchin monkeys have traditions or not. However, some claim 
it is important if we want to ascribe culture to them:  “…individual learning 
supplemented by emulation learning and ritualization, are sufficient to create and 
maintain their species typical cultural activities but they are not sufficient to create 
human-like cultural activities displaying the ratchet effect and cumulative cultural 
evolution” (Tomasello, 1999 p. 36). 
Nevertheless, understanding what kind of social learning mechanism a species 
is capable of using may help to explain what kind of behaviours can or cannot be 
transmitted socially and what level of fidelity we might expect to find. This is where 
controlled laboratory experiments are important. They may help identify what type of 
behaviours can be learnt socially, in what situations and which mechanism(s) are at 
work. However, this is still far from reconstructing what really goes on in natural 
settings (Huffman & Hirata, 2003).  
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b. Empirical evidence of social learning in capuchin monkeys  
 
Early experiments with monkeys tended to disconfirm the notion that monkeys 
can imitate. The few, which did claim to find positive evidence, were criticized on 
methodological grounds, mainly for their lack of suitable controls to rule out other 
learning process, such as stimulus enhancement (see Table 2.3 for a summary of these 
experiments). 
 
Table 2.3 Early laboratory experiments on social learning in capuchin monkeys and 
some other monkey species.  N= number of subjects in the experiment. H=human 
model; M= monkey model; IL= individual learning; SE= stimulus enhancement, 
E=emulation; I=imitation; DI=deferred imitation, 
 
Reference Control N Task Model Author’s 
Conclusions. 
Critique 
Romanes (1883) No 2 Puzzle 
box 
 IL  
Thorndike (1901) No 3 Puzzle 
box & 
Free play 
H+M IL 
 
need more 
subjects 
Watson (1908) No 2 +other 
species 
Tool use 
& Puzzle 
box 
H+M IL  
Watson (1908) No 2 Free play H+M Circular 
behavior 
 
Hobhouse (1901) No 2   M I + E  
Kinnaman (1902)  1 rhesus Puzzle 
box 
 I SE  
Haggerty (1909)  8+ other 
species 
Puzzle 
box 
M I + DI Over training 
=IL, No 
control for SE 
Warden et al. 
(1940) 
No  Puzzle 
box 
M I SE 
 
Later, a developmental approach was taken up and research on imitation in 
primates made use of the Piagetian scheme of sensorimotor development using test 
settings employed with children (Piaget, 1952). Parker (1977) observed the behaviour 
of an infant stump-tailed macaque (Macaca arctoides) and concluded that the monkey 
“displayed no purposeful matching of his behaviour patterns to those of other animals, 
nor did he come to imitate behaviour patterns outside his repertoire as human infants 
do" (Parker, 1977 p. 65). Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1977) tested capuchin monkeys and 
claimed that the imitative ability of these monkeys was at stage 5 or 6 of imitation in 
the sensorimotor series. For example, one monkey, after watching a conspecific bang 
two objects together, immediately picked up two objects and banged them together, 
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too. However, the behaviours the author mentions are very common capuchin 
behaviours; thus there is no way to prove that imitation was taking place and not 
individual independent actions.  
Critics of using Piaget’s framework provide evidence that Piaget underestimated 
the capacities of infants to imitate.  Meltzoff and his colleagues claim that the basic 
ability to imitate facial expressions, such as mouth opening, is present already at birth, 
establishing an altogether different timetable for the development of infant imitative 
development than suggested by Piaget (Meltzoff & Moore, 1999). Humans seem to be 
so predisposed to imitating that the term  Homo imitans applies (Meltzoff 1988d). 
Thus, there is an innate human ability for visual kinesthetic transformation. However, 
results show that infant chimpanzees also imitate tongue protrusion and mouth 
opening (Myowa-Yamakoshi et al. 2004). Similar results have recently been found in 
infant rhesus macaques (Ferrari et al. 2006). At the age of three days, these infants 
were able to imitate lip smacking, tongue protrusion, and mouth opening, after seeing 
a model. This period of neonate imitation in rhesus is much shorter than the one found 
in humans and chimpanzees, yet it still could be an important tool for communication 
between mother and infant as in chimpanzees and humans (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994).  
    Experiments attempting to elicit this behaviour in infant capuchin have not 
been successful (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002). This might be connected to the fact 
that Cebus infants are carried on the mother’s back from birth whereas macaque as 
well as chimpanzee infants are at first carried on the mother’s ventrum and thus have 
face-to-face contact with their infant. 
One of the problems with this line of testing imitation is that no controls are 
employed. Further, researchers have found that capuchin monkeys do better in other 
sensorimotor series, such as achieving stage 6 on the object concept scale (Schino et 
al. 1990). Thus, “imitation must be studied in its own right, not as an element in a 
larger coordinated program of cognitive development” (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 
1990a pp. 252). 
 It was only with the very detailed experimentation of Visalberghi, Fragaszy 
and colleagues that brick after brick was built towards a better understanding of 
Cebus cognition and social learning in particular. More solid information about social 
learning processes was collected. Some of these studies were planned directly to 
assess social influence on learning. Others were part of a battery of studies dealing 
with tool use capacity and therefore often lacked suitable controls, as they were not 
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planned to answer social learning questions. However, they do have importance in 
raising new questions and providing results, which are of interest to this field. For 
example, tool use experiments in capuchin monkeys showed that not all monkeys in a 
group learnt to use a specific tool (e.g. Visalberghi, 1987; Westergaard & Fragaszy, 
1987a). Such findings then triggered experimentation aiming to discover why these 
monkeys were not using tools and how, if at all, they could benefit from observing 
tool-using conspecifics. 
I shall discuss  these experiments, as well as the few others carried out with 
capuchin monkeys by other researchers, and will compare them, when possible, to 
what is known about other primates’ social learning in similar conditions and 
experimental settings. Comparisons with other species of primates that live in similar 
as well as different social and ecological environments, but tested on similar 
procedures, may help to better understand the nature of the results found in capuchin 
monkeys (constraints on such comparison are discussed by Caldwell & Whiten, 
2002). 
 
1. Social learning of food choice 
 
Social learning of food choice, as well as predator avoidance, has been 
considered by many (e.g. Kummer, 1971; Nishida, 1987) as suitable domains for 
testing social learning and cultural transmission, in that avoiding toxic food and 
predators is crucial for survival.  
Camberfort (1981) describes the “feeding culture” as “the total knowledge 
about the diet, which is shared by troop members and transmitted from one generation 
to another, allowing them to survive in their chosen environment” (p. 244). Jouventin, 
Pasteur & Camberfort (1976) showed how, in captive mandrills (Manndrillus sphinx), 
juveniles learned from adults to discriminate between palatable and unpalatable food. 
In contrast, testing baboons and vervets did not show social learning in this domain 
(Camberfort, 1981).  
Visalberghi and colleagues conducted several experiments to test the role of 
social influence on novel food choice (e.g. Addessi & Visalberghi, 2001; Galloway et 
al. 2005; Visalberghi et al. 2003). The results of all these experiments point to social 
facilitation of general eating and not necessarily to matching of the novel food items. 
There was no evidence for higher social learning mechanisms. 
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 Reviewing studies with avian and non-avian species shows that avian species 
are able to socially learn to avoid noxious foods whereas there is no evidence for such 
social learning in non-avian species (Sherwin et al. 2002).  However, there is recent 
evidence that cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) are able to learn to avoid 
noxious foods through observation of conspecifics (Snowdon & Boe, 2003; Prescott 
et al. 2005). 
Brosnan & de Waal (2004) tried approaching the problem of socially learning 
food preference from a different angle. The negative results found in laboratory tests, 
they claimed, may be due to the presence of many possible non-social cues. They 
therefore tested their subjects on the ability to learn the value of tokens by observing 
others use the tokens. Thus, the monkeys were not demanded to learn new skills but 
rather to extract information from the conspecific’s behaviour alone. The results 
showed that the subjects were indeed able to form a preference for one token as a 
result of watching the preference of a conspecific. In a non-social situation, when the 
subjects watched tokens held by the experimenter with their corresponding food 
without the active conspecific, they were not able to develop the same preference. 
However, subjects were not able to learn new values for familiar tokens; once the 
association was made it was difficult to change. The authors explain this by the fact 
that in nature different foods have constant values.  
This experiment, as opposed to food choice experiments cited earlier, show 
positive results for social learning, as the only information for the preference was the 
shape of token that was chosen. Thus monkeys had to rely on the social cue for 
learning. With real food, more cues exist, such as odour and taste. In such a situation 
the social cue may be less salient and may be overlooked (Dewar, 2003). 
 
 
2. Social learning of object manipulation and tool use 
 
Imitation is thought to have a role in the spread of tool use in hominids (Parker 
& Gibson, 1979). The ability to copy tool use thus is considered by some to require a 
high degree of imitative ability (Mitchell, 1994). 
 
Spontaneous imitation of object manipulation 
Perucchini et al. (1997) (cited in Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002) tested dyads 
of capuchin monkeys while they were playing freely with objects. Each monkey in the 
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dyad had the exact same set of objects as the other. The authors checked for any 
instances of imitation, stimulus enhancement or social facilitation, which would be 
seen if subjects contacted the same object their partner did. No imitation was found in 
this experiment, in contrast to results for children as young as 12 months, who did 
imitate in a similar setting (Camaioni et al. 1988). The monkeys did show social 
facilitation, replicating common actions with the objects, as well as stimulus 
enhancement. However the monkeys paid little attention to each other. 
This conflicts with data from chimpanzees where most anecdotal evidence for 
imitation comes from play settings and not from problem solving tasks (Hayes & 
Hayes, 1952). Russon & Galdikas' (1993, 1995) examples for orang-utans will be 
discussed in the section dealing with the effect of enculturation. 
 
 
Nut cracking 
Two different experiments (Antinucci & Visalberghi, 1986; Visalberghi, 
1987) tested capuchin monkeys' ability to open nuts by using different tools, such as 
stones and wooden blocks. In each group one member learned to use the tool. The 
other monkeys in the group were seen to watch closely but did not show any acquired 
nut cracking skills.   
Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1989) aimed to directly check social influence on 
behaviour acquisition in terms of the temporal relationship between behaviours of 
observers and tool users.  In this experiment, too, the authors concluded, “immediate, 
direct imitation of a model’s pounding open nuts did not occur” (Fragaszy & 
Visalberghi, 1989, p. 164). Monkeys were not more interested in the tool after 
watching a conspecific, and exploratory behaviours were not enhanced: “In fact, the 
data suggested that relevant exploratory behaviours were performed by several 
subjects not only independently but preferentially while alone” (Fragaszy & 
Visalberghi, 1989 p. 164). 
 There were also no effects of social facilitation in pounding without a tool 
while near a solver, by contrast to behaviours such as biting the apparatus. Non- 
solvers were seen to scrounge. They learned that when a solver was near the board 
there was a chance of obtaining opened nuts, so scroungers were present at the board 
with solvers. 
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Ottoni et al. (2005) found that capuchin monkeys actively chose which 
monkey to observe.  To do so, they must have had some understanding of the relative 
proficiency of their conspecifics while nut cracking and thus watched the more skilled 
nutcrackers.  This might be done purely for the benefit of scrounging payoffs, but the 
authors claimed this behaviour provided more social learning opportunities as well.  
Fragaszy et al. (1994) found that young monkeys did not learn to crack nuts 
from the older monkeys but the young juveniles preferred to be in the side of the 
housing where the adults were, whereas older juveniles preferred to operate the 
apparatus in the crèche to which adults had no access.  
Some of the solvers in the Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1989) study first 
succeeded while they were alone at the board. The authors took this to suggest that 
their successes were not related to what the other monkeys were doing, and concluded 
that there was no evidence for imitation in either of these experiments. 
It seems to me that the fact the solvers pounded more while alone may rule out 
social facilitation but does not necessarily rule out social learning. Later solvers could 
have used information from observing earlier solvers in order to then open the nuts 
while they were alone and not be threatened by the presence of others. The fact that 
not all monkeys learned the task may be due to individual differences. 
Furthermore, nut cracking is a difficult task to accomplish. It usually takes 
young capuchins until two years of age to master this behaviour (Ottoni et al. 2005; 
Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1987a) hence longer than other tested tool use behaviours, 
such as dipping and raking (Visalberghi, 1990). Thus, an experiment testing naive 
monkeys’ acquisition of nut cracking from short observation sessions may be too 
demanding for some monkeys. 
Nut cracking is thought to be one of the principal tool use behaviours of 
chimpanzees in the wild.  Even for chimpanzees, this is a very complex behaviour to 
master, as it includes using the right anvil (surface) and hammer (stone or other 
object) placed at the correct angle (Boesch & Boesch, 1983). The acquisition of nut 
cracking skills has been considered to be aided by social learning (Hannah & 
McGrew, 1987). However, young chimpanzees need many years of learning and 
practice in order to be skilful nut crackers (Boesch, 1993).  What then is the role of 
social learning in mastering this behaviour?  
Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa (1997) studied the development of this nut 
cracking behaviour in wild chimpanzees of Bossou, Guinea. The authors concluded 
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that the chimpanzees did not copy the behaviours of the model or the way to place the 
different objects, but were rather showing goal emulation. Sumita, Kitahara-Frisch & 
Norikoshi (1985) looked at the acquisition of nut cracking behaviour of individual 
apes in a captive group. As the learning was gradual, they concluded that it was based 
on trial and error and local enhancement. Thus, nut cracking with a tool may be too 
difficult to learn through short observational sessions for Cebus and Pan alike.  
                                           
Probing with a stick 
 In Westergaard & Fragaszy’s (1987a) study, the subjects had to use a stick as 
a probe to obtain syrup.  The authors suggested that observational learning was taking 
place as a monkey detached a stick to use as a tool immediately after viewing another 
monkey in the group dip a stick into the apparatus. However, such results should be 
treated with caution, as other explanations could be given as well: the tendency to 
play and manipulate sticks is common in capuchin monkeys even without a noticeable 
goal. Previous individual experience could also not be ruled out (Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy, 1990a). Fragaszy et al. (1994) tested young capuchins on the same task 
where adult monkeys served as models. They found that although the juveniles did 
not learn to solve the task through observation, they did operate the apparatus more 
after observation. Thus, adult activity facilitated younger monkeys' activity, which 
could eventually lead to individual learning. The authors term this type of influence 
“coordination in time”, where the activity of a model facilitates the activity of the 
observer, yet not in the specific way demonstrated, which they refer to as 
“coordination in space”. 
The same apparatus was used with lion-tailed macaques (Westergaard, 1988). 
Naïve macaques that were present with competent conspecifics were faster to learn 
the task than monkeys that were not next to such models. However, the author did not 
give any information about whether attention was directed towards the competent 
monkey, thus not being able to rule out mere social facilitation. Furthermore, one of 
the successful monkeys had also been part of the first phase of the study where he had 
access to the apparatus and thus had much more time to work it out through trial and 
error. Negative results were found on a similar task with Macaca tonkeana 
(Anderson, 1985). 
 A different way of using a stick was tested by Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1989). 
In this study, monkeys had to insert a stick into the apparatus and use it to push a 
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sliding door, which then released sunflower seeds. Five of the monkeys solved the 
problem and were apt tool users, but this did not result in more exploration by the 
other monkeys, some of which never even contacted the tool. In this experiment, too, 
the inhibiting effect group mates had on their companions might have obscured what 
the observers learned. The authors, realizing this, tried two variations:  
a. The most dominant female was taken out of the room and as a result other 
monkeys approached the apparatus more. One monkey inserted the stick in the tube 
(although not successfully).  
b. More rods were given to the group. This resulted in greater general activity. 
Further, three non-solvers used the sticks to insert them in the tube (although not 
proficiently). Thus, it seems that if the question is ‘can Cebus imitate’, testing each 
monkey separately after they had a chance to observe a solver might give different 
results.  
         In a study by Visalberghi & Trinca (1989), four capuchin monkeys were 
presented with a horizontal transparent tube with a reward in the middle.  The 
monkeys had to push a stick to retrieve the reward.  Three monkeys succeeded and 
one female did not. She was then put together with the solvers but did not learn the 
task from observing them, although she did contact the apparatus more, showing 
stimulus enhancement. Later, she learned to solve a similar task and was then 
presented with the same unsolved tube task again - and solved it in less than 30 
minutes. The authors concluded that “individual experience in a similar task was a 
more powerful aid to the monkey than was the information she was able to acquire 
from the behaviour of models” (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a p. 263). 
Testing what an observer is looking at may be a good indicator of what 
information he is utilizing from the model. In the tube experiment, Visalberghi 
(1993b) reports that by analyzing which part of the apparatus the observers were 
looking at, it was found that they were looking straight at the reward and not at the 
tool, which was used to take the food out or at the model's behaviour.  
Unlike the capuchin monkeys, human infants of 15-21 months were able to 
benefit from watching a model obtain a reward from the tube (Modena &Visalberghi, 
1998). Younger infants showed no learning from such observation.  
 Probing is the basis of termite fishing, which is the second well-known tool 
use behaviour of chimpanzees in nature. Young chimpanzees watch attentively while 
the adult skilfully use sticks to fish termites. Yet, it takes many years of practice for a 
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chimpanzee to skilfully use a stick (Goodall, 1986; McGrew, 1977). Mothers allow 
their young to participate in fishing activity and thus allow their infants to learn 
different parts of the activity. Some may play with the sticks too and learn their 
affordance. 
Paquette (1994) investigated the importance of imitation in the acquisition of 
such tool use in chimpanzees. Local enhancement was found to play the main role in 
the discovery process and mastering the task took place through trial and error, similar 
perhaps to situations in nature, where chimpanzees use fishing holes, which were used 
by others and have sticks next to them (McGrew & Collins, 1985). The precise 
technique, Paquette concluded, was too complex to learn through imitation. 
 
Raking   
Raking an out-of-reach reward was tested on eleven capuchin monkeys 
(Vancatova, 1984). After a baseline phase, the dominant male was taught to use a T-
shaped stick to reach the reward and serve as a demonstrator.  Two monkeys used the 
stick, yet did so differently from the method they had observed. Thus, in this 
experiment the two monkeys had learned the affordance of the stick as a tool to get 
the food, but were not able to learn the action to use the stick, nor the correct 
relationship between the stick and food (i.e. that the stick has to be behind the food in 
order to pull it in). Once again, not all monkeys showed signs of social learning. 
However, as the monkeys were tested in a group setting, inhibition effects could also 
have taken place. Further, there was no control for stimulus enhancement, such as a 
control group viewing the T- stick being manipulated without the presence of food. 
           Beck tested a group of captive hamadryas baboons (Beck 1972, 1973a), Guinea 
baboons (Beck, 1973b) and pigtailed macaques (Beck, 1976) on a raking task. There 
was no sign of social influence on learning the tasks in the baboons. However, the 
dominant macaque male was influenced by the behaviour of the first solver and used 
the same technique he observed.  
Zuberbühler et al. (1996) found that a group of longtailed macaque (Macaca 
fascicularis) failed to imitate raking by one of the adult males although they had 
ample time to view him. Several monkeys were seen to manipulate sticks more when 
the tool user male raked in the fruit, implying an increase in general activity as a 
result of the observation. It took a year for one individual to learn the behaviour and 
almost another year for two other individuals. This can be attributed to individual 
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learning or perhaps stimulus enhancement as the three monkeys were peers from the 
same matriline and were able to be close to the model, who was tolerant of them. 
Experiments were carried out with apes to test  social influence on learning to 
rake. These experiments were designed more carefully and used suitable control 
groups. Tomasello et al. (1987) employed an extra control group, which viewed the 
demonstrator when she was not operating the apparatus. Results showed that the 
chimpanzees observing the demonstration learned to use the tool in only a few trials. 
Most of the subjects in the control group did not learn to use the tool. In both groups 
the chimpanzees manipulated the tool as often, thus ruling out stimulus enhancement. 
However, the chimpanzees in the experimental group did not copy or imitate the 
actual action they saw and used a variety of actions with the bar. As with the capuchin 
experiment previously mentioned, the chimpanzees learned the affordance of the tool 
and succeeded to solve the task through emulation. Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello 
(1993) further tested this process of emulation. Two groups of chimpanzees and two 
groups of human children viewed a human model demonstrating either an efficient or 
non-efficient way of using a tool as a rake. Results showed that the children had 
copied the model in both conditions while the chimpanzees, on the other hand, used 
the same method no matter which method they observed. Similar results were found 
with orang-utans (Call & Tomasello, 1994a).  The debate whether chimpanzees 
emulate or imitate (or both) has been going on ever since (Call et al. 2005). 
 
3. Puzzle box tasks without tools  
 Testing social learning with tool use tasks has its limits, as seen in the 
previous section, since these tasks may be difficult for the subjects to learn. Adams 
Curtis & Fragaszy (1995) and Adams-Curtis (1988 in Fragaszy et al. 2004) used a 
different approach and presented a multi stage apparatus to capuchin monkeys. 
Choosing a sequential task has its logic as it is accepted that imitation is more 
probable when the problem is too complex to be learned through individual learning. 
Furthermore, success on such tasks cannot be explained by social enhancement or 
stimulus enhancement. In these studies, a three-stage puzzle was given to twelve 
Cebus monkeys. Only one out of the twelve monkeys in the experiment solved the 
problem and hence acted as model for the other monkeys in the group. The 
researchers aimed to see whether the observers would contact the apparatus in the 
same order as they had seen. The authors concluded that there was no evidence that 
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the monkeys were matching the behaviour they had seen nor the order in which it was 
shown (see also Adams-Curtis, 1987 for similar results).  
More recently, de Resende & Ottoni (2002) gave their subjects a complex 
three-step task. The monkeys viewed a model open three bolts in a defined order. 
When the observers were given the box to open by themselves, two out of six subjects 
succeeded but did not use the same order of opening the bolts as they had witnessed. 
The mechanism enabling their learning was claimed to be stimulus enhancement. The 
authors stress that the two subjects who managed to open the box were those who 
were attentive to the demonstration.  
 
4. Two-action experiments  
From all their experiments mentioned above, Visalberghi, Fragaszy and 
colleagues concluded that there was no evidence for imitation in Cebus monkeys. 
Monkeys did benefit from viewing a model but made use only of environmental 
information, showing stimulus enhancement.  However, there are two more recent 
experiments carried out by these researchers, making use of better controls and using 
the two-method design.   
This design, first used by  Dawson & Foss (1965) with budgerigars 
(Melopsittacus undulates), compares two or more groups and presents the subjects 
with an apparatus, which can be manipulated in two or more different ways. It is 
suggested that if the subject then manipulates the apparatus using the action it was 
shown and not the other, non-imitative mechanisms such as facilitation and 
enhancement can be ruled out , hence making  the interpretation of imitation more 
plausible. In this method, the relative frequency of performing A after observing A is 
compared with the relative frequency of performing A after observing B. 
Gardner (1997, cited in Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002) replicated Heyes & 
Dawson's (1990) study with rats, which employed a two-method paradigm in which 
monkeys could obtain a reward by either sliding a door to the left or the right. Five 
monkeys in each group observed a conspecific demonstrator. Only two out of the ten 
observers copied the direction the door was opened. Those who did not copy the 
demonstrator's method were then put with the demonstrator in the same cage for 
phase 2, thus watching the door slide from the same direction as the model did. This 
time, seven out of eight subjects slid the door in the same direction as the model. The 
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results showed object movement re-enactment, as copying was only possible when 
observer and demonstrator saw the apparatus from the same side. 
Fragaszy et al. (2002, unpublished manuscript cited in Fragaszy et al. 2004) 
tested twenty juvenile Cebus apella. The monkeys could obtain juice from a dispenser 
by either turning a little wheel with their finger or pressing a lever. After a baseline 
phase designed to control for individual learning, the apparatus was placed in the 
group with one of the methods enabled. Most of the adult monkeys learned the 
enabled methods and thus served as demonstrators for the two different techniques.  
Most of the juveniles learned how to solve the problem after viewing the adults and 
used the same techniques they had witnessed also when approaching the apparatus, 
which was enabled for both methods. 
However, Fragaszy et al. (2004) do not regard these results as necessarily 
resulting from observing the adults and suggest a further test in which naïve juveniles 
without previous access to the apparatus should be compared to juvenile monkeys that 
did have such access. If these naive monkeys also quickly master the techniques it 
will be, they claim, evidence for imitation. 
It seems that the implications of these results have been underestimated. It 
may be true that monkeys were not learning the action of the model but rather 
showing object movement re-enactment. However, these results show more complex 
social influence on learning than the studies previously described.  On the other hand, 
even if a naïve group is tested, as the authors suggest, and shows rapid learning this 
could still be attributed to object movement re-enactment and not imitation. 
The two-method paradigm has been very useful in testing for social learning in 
other species of primates, too. Bugnyar & Huber (1997) tested marmosets on a bi-
directional task. They found that two out of their five subjects showed signs of 
imitating the direction in which the model opened a door to retrieve food.  In order to 
confirm their conclusions, a microanalysis was carried out to show that the probability 
of the marmosets behaving in the relevant combination of actions by chance was 
extremely low. Tomasello & Carpenter (2004) claimed that instead of imitation the 
marmosets could have learned the affordance of the box. Visalberghi & Fragaszy 
(2002) also suggested that the monkeys had learned to operate the box through object 
movement re-enactment and not through imitating the model’s action.  
A response to these criticisms was provided in a later study with marmosets in 
which Voelkl & Huber (2000) showed that marmosets that observed a model open a 
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lid either with hand or mouth clearly used the same body part they observed to open 
the lid themselves. Thus, object movement re-enactment or affordance emulation 
could not be taking place in this case. A different line of criticism to this study was 
that the learned behaviour was most probably already in the learner’s repertoire and 
thus could have been an example of response facilitation1 (Byrne & Russon, 1998). It 
was also argued (Mitchell, 2002) that opening with the mouth corresponded to 
attacking, while opening with the hand corresponded to exploring and this (i.e. 
general mood) was what the marmosets had learned from the observation and not 
what body action to perform.  This criticism could also apply to Caldwell & Whiten’s 
(2004) results with marmosets. 
The two-action design has not always yielded positive results with monkeys. 
Ham (1990) tested two groups of Macaca arctoides. The groups saw a model either 
twist or push a bar. No difference was found in the performance of the two groups. 
More recently, Rigamonti et al. (2005) tested 13 pig-tailed macaque (Macaca 
nemestrina) and 30 human infants (Homo sapiens), to probe for localized stimulus 
enhancement and object movement re-enactment. Four different puzzle boxes were 
used with two ways possible to solve each puzzle. Only very weak evidence for object 
movement re-enactment was found with one of the boxes. Children, on the other 
hand, showed clear evidence for choosing the method they had watched. 
 
Conclusions 
Although observations in the wild indicate social transmission of a variety of 
behaviours in Cebus monkeys, studies in the laboratory do not seem to show the same 
trend. Studies conducted to find complex social influence in the domains of food 
choice, object manipulation and tool use behaviour in capuchin monkeys have not 
yielded positive results. Visalberghi, Fragaszy and colleagues conclude that capuchin 
monkeys are not able to learn a new behaviour from observing a model: “for these 
monkeys, imitation of a model is indeed a very limited way to learn to use a tool” 
(Visalberghi & Fragaszy 1990a, p. 263). 
                                                          
1
 This is an important criticism to bear in mind when designing two - action experiments, since if the 
actions are indeed well in the subject’s repertoire the results can only be explained by facilitation 
effects. Thus, using a two - action design does not automatically fit the criterion of novelty for 
imitation discussed in Chapter 1.   
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There is only some evidence from their experiments for stimulus 
enhancement. However, they claim that “successful monkeys differed from others in 
their interest in the task, not in their talent” (Fragaszy & Adams-Curtis, 1991b pp. 
261).  
Results also showed some inhibiting effects of the group. Monkeys were 
usually more successful when trying to solve the tasks when other group mates were 
not close.  This inhibiting effect should be taken into account when designing new 
experiments. 
      The incoming data about traditions in groups of capuchins in natural environments 
imply that more complex social learning processes may be taking place than what is 
seen in laboratory experiments. And, indeed, signs of more positive results have been 
found when testing designs were changed, thus shedding a different light on the issue 
of the social influence on learning. Further experimentation should:  
a. Test simpler tasks, which can be mastered in short experimental periods 
(e.g. Brosnan & de Waal, 2004). 
b. Take into account the different effects of scrounging. Scrounging may 
inhibit learning when the reward is obtained from a locus not directly 
related to the tasks (e.g. rolls out of an apparatus; Giraldeau & Lefebvre, 
1987). Yet, it may facilitate learning as it allows the observer close contact 
with the apparatus (Caldwell & Whiten, 2003) and the possibility of 
making an association between the action and reward. Scrounging may 
inhibit the production, but not the learning, of a behaviour in a group 
setting. It may be needed, if possible, to test the observer individually for 
evidence of learning (Lefebvre & Helder, 1997).  
c. Use suitable controls. Controls are important for avoiding false positive 
results but at the same time may also help understand what information the 
monkeys do extract from the observation. Learning through observation is 
not an “all or none” process and subtle ways in which the monkeys are 
learning may be overlooked without such suitable controls. 
          Using a two-action design is one step in this direction and has already yielded 
interesting results, as shown in Fragaszy et al. (2002) and with marmosets (Bugnyar 
& Huber, 1997; Voelkl & Huber, 2000). 
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III. The Effect of Enculturation  
 
The concept of enculturation is a key issue as regards this dissertation since   
some of the capuchin subjects were raised by humans from the age of 8-10 weeks.  
The term enculturation is used to describe primates raised by humans in their homes 
in close relation with their human caretaker, almost the way a child would be raised 
(Tomasello et al. 1993b).   
Some authors use the term in a looser way to describe close relations with 
humans during infancy. This usage has its problems and it is important to differentiate  
“tame”, implying only human contact from “enculturated”. There is a difference 
between a primate that is familiar with humans and interacts with them (e.g. in zoo or 
laboratory environments) and raising the primate as a child, i.e. treating it very much 
as a child would be treated. This point was also made by Gomez (1993), who stressed 
that not all hand-reared primates are enculturated. This is manifested, for example, as 
Gomez points out, in Premack & Premack's (1983) results showing a difference 
between enculturated and hand-reared apes.  
Call & Tomasello (1996) describe five levels of human–ape interaction: 
"WILD. Apes that have spent their entire lives in their natural habitat. 
CAPTIVE. Apes in human captivity who have interacted directly with humans 
and their artifacts only minimally; this includes many zoo and some laboratory 
settings. 
NURSERY-RAISED. Apes raised from a young age with peer conspecifics 
and a good deal of contact with humans and their artifacts, but without human 
training aimed at specific behavioural outcomes. 
LABORATORY-TRAINED. Apes raised mostly in human captivity who have 
been trained in particular tasks, sometimes multiple tasks over many years 
(some of which might be symbolic). 
HOME-RAISED. Apes raised by humans in something like a human cultural 
environment (sometimes including exposure or training in symbolic skills); 
the environment need not literally be a home but must include something close 
to daily contact with humans and their artifacts in meaningful interactions”  (p. 
372). 
  
Call & Tomasello (1996) provide an extensive review of the effect of human-
ape contact on the behaviour and cognitive development of apes. They describe four 
different routes this influence may take, some of which can be achieved also without a 
high level of enculturation:   
1. Learning different tasks, which are usually carried out by humans; here the non - 
human primate (usually an ape), does not understand in any way what he is doing.  In 
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this case, the primates’ cognitive abilities are not elevated in any way. This could also 
be achieved with tamed primates. 
2. The human environment gives rise to abilities, which are in the range of the 
primate's capability but nevertheless are not evident in nature. Tool use is a good 
example. Tool use is not seen much in nature, except for chimpanzees, but in captivity 
with the access to different objects and artifacts, tool use and object manipulation is 
more widespread (McGrew, 1998; Tomasello & Call, 1997). This is apparent even 
without the close relation with humans that characterizes enculturation.  
3. Learning concepts, such as categorization through training. Here again the 
capability to learn is in the range of the primate but is latent and requires tutoring. 
4. The fact of being raised by humans channels the cognitive development of the 
primate in ways, which are not species typical. There may be a critical period for this 
to take place (Rumbaugh & Savage Rumbaugh, 1992). This could be achieved in 
several ways: 
a. Tomasello  & Call (1997) first suggested that through the process of 
enculturation, human- raised primates were treated as intentional beings (Kaye, 1982) 
and were rewarded for looking at and doing things with humans, engaging in activity 
that “presupposes a reciprocity of understanding” (p. 393). Thus humans, by acting in 
such ways, socialized the primate’s attention (Vygotsky, 1978) and through this 
process primates eventually were able to gain the understanding of others as 
intentional beings.  The enculturated primate “experiences social contingences, such 
as joint attention and intentional agency”, which in turn may “produce species-
atypical cognitive abilities”, which are manifested in higher imitative abilities (Bering 
et al. 2000; Bjorklund et al.  2000; Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello & Call, 1997; 
Tomasello et al. 1993).  
In such an environment, as opposed to the natural environment, the primates 
are “constantly interacting with humans, who show them things, point to things, 
encourage (even reinforce) imitation, and teach them special skills - all of which 
involve a referential triangle between human, ape and some third entity” (Tomasello, 
1999 p. 35). 
However, on the basis of new results showing that apes without close relations 
with humans also have some basic understanding of the fact that others have goals 
(Tomasello et al. 2003), Tomasello & Call have modified the idea of enculturation to 
– “…it is likely that human experience only serves to modify existing social 
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interactional and attentional skills rather than creating new ones” (Tomasello & Call, 
2004 p. 214). 
b. Enculturation involves an increase in attentiveness to social cues. According 
to Dewar's (2003) theory of social cue reliability, raising apes much the way human 
children are raised may make them more sensitive to social cues from humans and 
more motivated to duplicate the actions of humans, without actually altering the 
underlying cognitive operations involved in social learning in any significant way. 
c. Johnson (2001) claims that through the process of enculturation  primates 
are “being treated as if they could participate” (p. 8) with an emphasis on how the 
primate and human interact and coordinate behaviour. The context of interaction is 
the key to development. Fragaszy & Shaffer (1994) describe some of the contextual 
features that are influential in a human rearing environment.  Some of these include: 
“responsiveness of others to infant, provision of multiple and frequent affective 
signals, practice with taking turns, exposure to varied activities where others are 
clearly more competent, scaffolding of tasks for the infant by others”. 
        d. The apprenticeship idea of enculturation suggests that through enculturation 
the child or primate “is an apprentice who learns … through a guided process of 
participation and reinvention aided by scaffolding” (Miles, 1994 p. 256). Along the 
same lines Bering (2004) describes such ape-human relationships, in which the 
influence of enculturation may be explained in terms of learnt behavioural strategies 
towards new objects or situations by using the human agent, rather than influencing 
underlying cognitive ability. 
Some authors see the impact of human-primate contact in a simpler way. De 
Waal (1998) claimed “all that human-rearing does is affect the range of identification 
objects. Animals probably identify the easiest with the species they know best…. 
rehabilitant orang-utans and language-trained bonobos may see themselves as partly 
human. Rather than transforming cognitive capacities - as implied by the concept of 
‘enculturation’ - the simpler view is that rearing by another species increases the 
willingness to imitate this species”.  However, if that was the case, non-enculturated 
chimpanzees would imitate chimpanzees, the ones they are most close to, just as 
much as enculturated chimpanzees imitate humans. This, as we shall see, is not the 
case.  
This difference between human-reared and mother-reared chimpanzees 
(discussed in the following sections), some say, is not because the enculturation 
 60 
process has elevated apes’ social skills but rather that they have not lived in 
impoverished conditions such as those found in caged apes (Boesch, 1993a; Whiten, 
1993; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001). Thus, most authors would agree that:  
“enculturation cannot facilitate performance beyond a species' inherent limits 
but can help it reach its maximum potential…The immersion of chimpanzees 
in an artifact-laden human culture, with long-term, highly social, stable human 
relationships, affects the animals’ access to attentional resources in dramatic 
ways.  Such changes, in turn, can facilitate acquisition of complex cognitive 
concepts, encourage emergent skills, and can also override behavioural 
predispositions, which would preclude or diminish the chimpanzees’ ability to 
grasp new concepts or comprehend task demands” (Pepperberg et al. 1997, p. 
66). 
 
 
How is enculturation manifested in apes' behaviour? 
 Call & Tomasello's (1996) review of enculturation surveyed the different 
studies carried out with enculturated apes and apes with other human contact.  
The first domain explored is the physical domain, which includes the use and 
understanding of objects and artifacts. Studies show that object manipulation and tool-
use increase and are more sophisticated with the exposure to artifacts and objects. 
What apes learn through enculturation is the affordance of many objects and tools, 
thus making them more available for more complex behaviours. This may be due to 
the fact that enculturated apes are very attentive to what humans do. Carpenter et al. 
(1995) found that home raised bonobos and chimpanzees were more attentive to how 
humans were manipulating objects and engaged more in this triadic joint attention 
with humans than captive conspecifics.  
Through such exposure, affordance emulation, and training, apes may also 
learn more abstract properties of objects allowing for more sophisticated 
categorization abilities (Hayes & Nissen, 1971 for chimpanzee; Miles, 1990 for 
orang-utan; Patterson & Linden, 1981 for gorilla). 
However, on some level, mere exposure to objects can also contribute to more 
complex object manipulation behaviour. Thus, in this physical domain there is 
apparently only a quantitative difference in the behaviour of apes as a function of 
different levels of contact with humans.  
Pretend play or symbolic play seems to benefit from the enculturation process. 
Exposure to objects and learning their affordances may be part of the explanation. 
However, such play, although rare, has only been found in enculturated apes that have 
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learned symbolic language (Patterson & Linden, 1981, for gorilla; Hayes, 1951 for 
chimpanzee; Savage-Rumbaugh & McDonald, 1988 for bonobo). As with children, 
pretend play and symbolic communication may emerge together in enculturated apes 
along with “imitation, nonverbal referential communication, labelling, elaborate 
object manipulation and categorization” (Gomez & Martin-Andrade, 2005 p. 167). On 
the other hand, some anecdotes from non-enculturated apes might be interpreted as 
pretend play as well (Goodall, 1986). 
In the social domain, enculturation has a greater effect but not in all areas. 
Social attention and gaze following exist in all apes and close interaction with humans 
is not necessary (e.g. Brauer, Call & Tomasello, 2005). Yet, there does seem to be a 
strong effect of enculturation on the sophistication of this ability (see Itakura & 
Tanaka, 1998 for orang-utans; Peignot & Anderson, 1999 for gorillas). 
  Further, attention-getting behaviours do increase in enculturated apes. Gomez 
(1996) found that enculturated chimpanzees, more than other chimpanzees that were 
used to human contact, used attention getting behaviours to get food from an 
inattentive human, whose eyes were closed or was with his back to the chimpanzee. 
They used behaviours, such as touching or trying to make eye contact (see also 
Gomez, 1990 for gorillas; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986, for chimpanzees). 
Imperative pointing was also found to be influenced by enculturation (Miles, 1990 for 
orang-utans; Savage Rumbaugh et al. 1986) as well as in chimpanzees with close 
contact with humans (Leavens & Hopkins, 1999). Several studies also showed that 
enculturated apes understood human pointing better than other apes (Woodruff & 
Premack, 1979 for chimpanzees; Call & Tomasello 1994b for orang-utans; Inoue, 
Inoue, & Itakura, 2004 for gibbons; but see Yerkes & Nissen, 1939), as well as doing 
better on the “object choice” paradigm, which makes use of such behaviour (Itakura 
& Tanaka, 1998; Call et al. 2000). 
Declarative gestures were only found in enculturated apes although there may 
be other interpretations for this behaviour (Patterson, 1978, for gorillas; Carpenter et 
al. 1995 for bonobos).  
 
Imitation in enculturated apes 
In Whiten & Ham's (1992) review of imitation there are many anecdotes of 
ape imitation in enculturated apes. One of the earliest reports of imitation in great 
apes comes from Kellogg & Kellogg (1933), who raised a baby chimpanzee named 
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Gua with their son of a similar age. The project lasted only nine months and Gua 
learnt only a few behaviours through imitation. In the same short time, the human 
infant had imitated many of the ape's behaviours, stressing the point that humans are 
“imitation machines” (Tomasello, 1999). The Kellogs concluded “we are accustomed 
to regard the chimpanzee, as a splendid imitator... yet the child is a more versatile and 
continuous imitator than the animal” (Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933 p. 230).  
 
Imitation of action on objects 
Mignault (1985) described how young enculturated chimpanzees imitated 
humans using a variety of objects (such as a hair brush). Tomasello (1990) criticized 
this study as no control group was used. Further, an earlier study showed that 
chimpanzees can work out what to do with conventional human objects on their own 
(Schiller, 1957). 
Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh & Kruger (1993b) conducted a more 
systematic study of imitative skills in chimpanzees and bonobos. They compared 
mother - reared apes, enculturated apes and two - year old children on how they 
reproduced twenty-four different novel actions on objects. The mother-reared apes 
hardly reproduced any ends and means, thus there was no imitation. The enculturated 
apes and the children imitated, and there was hardly any difference between them, 
although Tomasello & Call (1997) stated later  that at least in some of the trials 
emulation and not imitation could have been taking place. 
 
 Arbitrary body movements 
Hayes & Hayes (1952) used the “Do as I Do” paradigm to test whether their 
human-raised chimpanzee Viki could learn to imitate various body movements and 
gestures. In general, after the twentieth item she had reproduced the task faithfully 
and quickly. Frantz, a chimpanzee that had not been raised the way Viki was, showed 
no signs of any type of social learning in this set of problem- solving tasks and usually 
needed more than ten demonstrations to solve the problem. 
 The interpretation of Viki's behaviour has been criticized. Heyes (1994) stated 
that the results could be outcomes of stimulus enhancement. Miklosi (1999) noted that 
some description of baseline behaviours is needed in order to determine imitation in 
this study, and reproduction of behaviours, such as nose touching, could be defined as 
response facilitation. 
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Custance, Whiten & Bard (1995) conducted a more rigorous study and 
reported similar abilities in two nursery-reared chimpanzees after they were trained 
for a period of several months in a manner similar to Viki.  
Eye blink was difficult for chimpanzees to imitate (Hayes & Hayes, 1952; 
Custance et al. 1995), but an enculturated orang-utan, Chantek, mastered this task 
(Miles et al. 1996). Chantek, a human-raised orang-utan, was also seen to imitate a 
number of arbitrary movements and gestures (Miles, Mitchell & Harper, 1992; Call & 
Tomasello, 1995). Call & Tomasello (1995) gave Chantek several arbitrary body 
movements to reproduce following the command “Do this” which Chantek managed 
to do (replicating Miles et al. 1996 findings). However, when Chantek was given the 
same request – “Do this” in a problem solving context - he failed. Chantek understood 
the mimicking game of “Do this” at the sensorimotor level of arbitrary body 
movements but could not apply this knowledge to a problem solving task.  
Tomasello & Call (1997) concluded that “the understanding of what another is 
doing in instrumental problem solving situations in a way that is relevant for one’s 
own problem solving attempts, requires an understanding of the intention of others, 
which apes may not be able to do without certain specific types of experience and 
training from humans, or at all” (p. 294). 
 
Communicative skills 
Perhaps the most impressive evidence involves the communicative skills of 
enculturated chimpanzees. This raises the question of language acquisition. 
Terrace et al. (1979) claim that signing apes can reproduce the previous 
(familiar) utterances signed by their human partners, but new signs are not learnt 
through imitation (Gardner & Gardner, 1969). Fouts (1972) showed that apes learn 
ASL easier through shaping and moulding than through imitation. Tomasello et al. 
(1985) did not find much evidence either to prove that chimpanzees were learning 
communicative gestures through imitation. Rather, gestures seem to be shaped 
through a process of conventionalization (Tomasello et al. 1985) or, as Tomasello & 
Call (1997) termed it, “ontogenetic ritualization”, in which primates learn to associate 
specific gestures with a particular outcome.  
Yet, some results do indicate an ability to imitate in this domain. Tomasello, 
Gust & Frost (1989) showed how young enculturated chimpanzees learned playful 
gestures through what seemed like imitation. Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1986) claimed 
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that Kanzi, the famous bonobo, began spontaneously demonstrating some lexigrams, 
which he had learned from observing his mother being trained by humans. The 
researchers concluded that Kanzi could only have learned the lexigrams through 
observational learning, but this has never been experimentally tested. 
 
Deferred imitation  
As mentioned earlier, deferred imitation is considered a complex mode of 
social learning, which requires the representation of the task and its components in 
order to reproduce it later. Parker & Gibson (1979) suggested the existence of 
deferred imitation in apes on the basis of anecdotal reports in the literature, such as 
those concerning home- reared chimpanzees who exhibited behaviours remarkably 
convergent with those of their human house mates (e.g. Hayes & Hayes, 1952). 
Orang-utans that were being   rehabilitated into the wild are reported to reproduce 
complex human actions commonly done by the workers at the camp such as chopping 
weeds and then piling them up neatly, tying a hammock between two trees, digging 
and weeding with a hoe (Russon & Galdikas, 1993, 1995). What exact mechanism 
underlies these behaviours is hard to say as this was not an experimental context with 
the needed controls (Stoinski & Whiten, 2003). Furthermore, the history of these 
orang-utans - what they had learned in the past - was not known.  
 Studies have shown deferred imitation in enculturated chimpanzees (Bering, 
Bjorklund, & Ragan, 2000; Bjorklund, Bering, & Ragan, 2000; Bjorklund et al. 
2002). Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh & Kruger (1993b) found that on the delay trials 
of their experiment, the enculturated chimpanzees significantly outperformed the 
mother- reared chimpanzees and human children. “We conclude from these results 
that a human-like socio-cultural environment is an essential component in the 
development of human-like social-cognitive and imitative learning skills for 
chimpanzees, and perhaps for human beings as well” (pp. 1688). Deferred imitation 
was found to increase over the juvenile period for enculturated chimpanzees 
(Bjorklund & Bering, 2003). The authors concluded that this could be a result of 
typical ontogenetic development (Boesch, 1996; Whiten et al. 1999) or a result of 
atypical development due to enculturation.  
If enculturated apes are able to imitate on a higher level than non-enculturated 
apes this implies that the ability is there and simply needs to be nurtured. The effect of 
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enculturation may suggest that “the learning processes may themselves be nurtured 
and shaped by the culture in which they are embedded” (Whiten, 2000 p. 485).  
 
 
In conclusion 
Given recent results showing at least rudimentary intention understanding in 
mother-reared apes, the core concept of Tomasello's enculturation process- 
understanding intentionality - has been toned down.  
It would appear that the more parsimonious perspective to take, for the time 
being, as regards enculturation is not how the human culture changes the ape but 
rather what the ape learns about humans and their artifacts. Through its very close 
interaction with humans, the ape learns not only the affordance of objects but also the 
affordance of the human as a (social) tool. The human is perceived as a worthwhile 
model, a good problem solver, not only allowing but encouraging the ape to be in 
very close contact, usually ready to share and even more, reinforcing the ape through 
their interaction. (This contrasts with the more competitive interaction between 
mother and infant chimpanzees while manipulating objects, e.g. Bard & Vauclair, 
1984). 
The enculturated ape may receive two-fold reinforcement: the first is its actual 
success in achieving the goal, and the second is the social reinforcement from the 
human for this success. This is supported by data showing better imitation in 
enculturated apes as well as for communicative skills and attention getting behaviour.   
 
Enculturation in capuchin monkeys 
Can capuchin monkeys also benefit from the process of enculturation by 
humans? Itakura (2004) claims that “the effects of enculturation are presumed to be 
emphasized in species with a greater degree of behavioural plasticity, such as great 
apes” (p. 220). No doubt capuchin monkeys can be placed in this category as well 
(Fragaszy et al. 1990; Fragaszy, Visalberghi & Fedigan, 2004). 
Furthermore, enculturation has its greatest effect when started in infancy. 
Capuchins are long-living monkeys (up to 42 years) with a long childhood and a 
relatively slower infant development than other Cebidae (Fragaszy, 1990b; Fragaszy 
& Adam-Curtis, 1991c) more resembling the slow development of apes ( Spinozzi, 
1989). Such slow development may lend itself more to the effects of enculturation. 
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Although capuchin monkeys have been kept as pets for hundreds of years, 
hardly anything has been written about the effect of enculturation on Cebus. Fragaszy 
(1990) compared the difference in development between a hand-reared and a mother-
reared capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), during the first six months of their lives. It 
was found that the hand-reared infant spent more time manipulating objects than the 
mother-reared one, and this behaviour also started earlier in age. Thus, the human 
environment had an effect on the ontogeny of manipulative skills' development.  
Gibson (1990) describes 'Andy', a male capuchin, who lived in her home for 
more than ten years. However, the nature of his upbringing in the first five years, in 
which he lived with a different owner, is not known. Also, the description of the years 
he spent at Gibson’s house does not provide much information about the type of 
human- monkey contact that was taking place. Andy showed little apparent imitative 
ability and Gibson concluded that most of his behaviour in this domain was probably 
due to stimulus enhancement.  
The first attempt to test imitative ability directly with enculturated capuchin 
monkeys was carried out by Hervé & Deputte (1993) who tested an eight month old 
infant capuchin monkey who was part of the French “Helping-Hands” program aimed 
at preparing monkeys to aid quadriplegics.  
The infant was given an array of objects to play with together with his human 
foster mother in order to see what influence the mother had on the objects the monkey 
chose to play with (social enhancement) as well as his actions on them (imitation). 
Results showed that the foster mother did influence the interest of the infant capuchin 
in objects. This was especially true for simple objects, which the monkey did not 
show an interest in to begin with, and which were manipulated more after the mother 
pointed to or manipulated the object. However, there were no signs of imitation in his 
behaviour.  
 Later, Hemery et al. (1998) and Fragaszy et al. (cited in Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy, 2002) applied the “do-as-I-do” paradigm with three of their enculturated 
capuchin monkeys from the same French project, who were older by now. The 
monkeys were first trained through reward to act upon an object or combine two 
objects in a familiar way. Both attention to the demonstration and fidelity of 
reproduction were coded on a four-point scale. Results showed that two of the 
monkeys contacted the same objects, which were contacted by the human in 60% of 
the demonstrations but the third monkey did so only in 30% of the demonstrations. 
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However, the monkeys seldom matched the actions they observed (only in 20%, 11% 
and 4.3% of the trials). Monkeys were more successful when they were more 
attentive. Also, actions involving objects were matched more than those involving the 
body alone.  
The best performing monkey was then moved to the second phase of the 
experiment, in which novel actions were demonstrated to him in between the familiar 
ones (it is not clear whether these were novel actions on the same objects, or novel 
objects as well). However, most of the novel actions demonstrated (36 out of 48) were 
not copied. Also, in the remainder of the demonstration, although the correct object 
was contacted, the action did not resemble the demonstrated one. Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy (2002) note: "the authors concluded that capuchin monkeys predictably 
contact objects that have been acted upon by the demonstrator, as found also in Hervé 
& Deputte (1993) and (with a much lower probability) they will move an object to 
achieve (or toward) a demonstrated movement or new position of object. However, 
except in this circumstance, capuchins do not match the action performed by others" 
(p. 12). 
 These studies highlight the salience of the human as a model for the 
enculturated capuchin. By watching and interacting with humans monkeys develop 
"an understanding of special relations about objects from the human's actions on those 
objects" (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002).  
Experiments conducted to this day have not demonstrated the enculturated 
monkeys' ability to attend to the action of the human model. The difficulty of copying 
actions on oneself as opposed to actions with objects has also been reported in 
chimpanzees (Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matuzawa, 1999).  
Nevertheless research perspectives dealing with the effects of enculturation on 
the imitation ability in Cebus monkeys are far from exhausted. Firstly, the 
experiments above tested infant (8 months old) and juvenile (4.5 years) monkeys. As 
the only longitudinal tests of imitative abilities in enculturated chimpanzees shows a 
development in the ability to imitate (Bjorklund & Bering, 2003) enculturated Cebus 
monkeys may also develop this ability with age. 
Secondly, a more systematic experimental design is needed in order to test 
what components the monkeys are capable of extracting from the demonstration, not 
only an "all or nothing" design.   
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Finally, only a very small number of subjects were tested in the experiments 
described in this chapter. Individual differences in behaviour, attention span and 
cognitive ability among capuchin monkeys are considerable and testing imitative 
abilities in a larger group of enculturated monkeys is needed.  This objective is met in 
the current thesis, which tested a larger group of enculturated monkeys from 
“Helping-Hands” Israel. 
 Israeli “Helping-Hands” capuchins were raised in homes by humans from the 
age of about 8-10 weeks. Foster families were instructed to raise them 'like a child' in 
the home where the monkey is part of the family in all aspects of everyday life. Just as 
described for chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys in the home participated together with 
humans in different activities on objects, were reinforced socially for paying attention 
to things humans did, and for social communication. The role of social reward for 
communicative and interactive behaviour with the human can for instance be seen in 
the way the enculturated capuchin monkeys seem to use the play-face more often than 
non-enculturated monkeys (personal observations). This is perhaps because of the 
social reward they received from humans from infancy for this behaviour - vocalizing, 
hugging, cuddling, smiling etc. Thus it may tentatively be inferred that social reward 
had an effect on other social behaviours of the monkeys as well. 
There has been only one systematic study of other cognitive abilities in this 
group of monkeys that tested their understanding of physical causality (Fredman, 
1995). Utilizing the data above for enculturated chimpanzees, a comparison can be 
made as regards communicative behaviour. Imperative gesturing has been seen in 
enculturated capuchins as well as different actions made by the monkeys to urge 
humans to act in a certain way for the monkey. These behaviours include taking the 
human’s hand, and bringing an object to be manipulated such as opening a bottle 
(personal observations). 
Thus, it may be expected that, like apes, enculturated capuchin monkeys have 
learned the affordance of tools as well as the affordance of humans, enabling them a 
more complex ability for social learning than mother-reared monkeys.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss the first attempt to test imitation carried out with 
this group of enculturated capuchin monkeys. This experiment which was carried out 
before this thesis was the starting point for the experiments in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 3  
 
THE ARTIFICIAL FRUIT BOX STUDY 
This chapter describes experiments with an artificial fruit box apparatus (AF) which was designed to 
test social learning in different species as it does not rely on tool using abilities. The experiments using 
the AF are based on the two-action paradigm, which was claimed in the previous chapter to be most 
suitable for testing social learning. The results for primate and non- primate animals are discussed in 
comparison to results from enculturated monkeys. The AF experiment was the first to elicit positive 
results in capuchin monkeys, and was the impetus for the empirical studies in this thesis.   
 
The two-action task has been shown to be a powerful method for studying 
social learning in human and non-human subjects (Dawson & Foss, 1965; Zentall, 
Sutton & Sherburne, 1996; Meltzoff, 1996; Moore, 1992). It has the advantage of 
ruling out stimulus enhancement explanations since both methods employ the same 
object but in a different way (see Chapter 2). It may also rule out general emulation 
explanations because in both cases the main end result is the same. 
These were the considerations that prompted the design of the Artificial Fruit 
box (AF) (Whiten et al. 1996) as a two-method apparatus simulating the complex 
food processing techniques animals may use when dealing with embedded food items 
in natural environments. Because opening the AF does not demand tool-using 
behaviours, the task can be tested on many different species and comparative issues 
can be dealt with.  
There are two aims to this chapter: 
1.  A discussion of the first experiment carried out with the enculturated group 
of capuchin monkeys (see Chapter 4 for information on subjects), which triggered the 
battery of experiments described in this thesis. 
2. A comparative examination. The AF experiment is the only social learning 
experiment to my knowledge which has been carried out with several species, thus 
allowing for tentative comparisons concerning social learning in the capuchin monkey 
and other primate and non-primate species.   
 
The artificial fruit box (AF) 
 
The AF is a Plexiglas box with two types of defences securing its hinged lid. 
Each type of defence can be removed using one of two alternative methods: 
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The bolt latch- two plastic rods are placed in two metal rings on the lid. The 
rods can be poked with the finger from the actor’s side outwards or twisted towards 
the actor while pulling them out (See Fig 3.1 a and b). 
The barrel latch - a T bar is slotted into a hollow barrel on the side of the lid 
with a wide lip which closes the lid. The T bar is secured by a pin. 
The pin can either be pulled out or spun out while the T bar can either be 
pulled out or turned allowing the lid to be opened (See Fig 3.1 c and d). 
If observers watching one method use this method significantly more than the 
subjects viewing the alternative method, their behaviour is thought to be based on 
imitation. It is important to note that the twisting actions of the bolt as well as the 
spinning actions of the pin are not necessary actions for moving these parts; thus 
copying these actions would be stronger evidence for action- centred social learning. 
 
 
 
 
 (Adapted from Custance, Whiten & Fredman, 1999) 
 
Figure 3.1 Actions performed on the artificial fruit box. They include (a) poking the front of 
the rod, (b) twisting the front of the rod (c) turning the handle, and (d) pulling the handle. 
 
Custance, Whiten & Fredman (1999) tested eleven enculturated capuchin 
monkeys, divided into two groups. Each group saw one of two methods of removing 
the bolts and one of two methods of disabling the barrel latch (only one type of 
defence was attached each time).  
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Two main types of analysis were carried out: 
1. Overall rating. Two independent coders, familiar 
with the task but having no knowledge as to which 
subject observed which method, were asked to 
estimate which method the monkey had seen in 
each trial.  
2. A microanalysis of the frequency of the actual 
movements the subjects performed.  
 
The results showed that there was no significant difference between the groups 
regarding their behaviour with the barrel latch. However the independent coders were 
able to differentiate between the two groups in terms of their behaviour on the bolt 
latch.  When trying to assess what factors influenced this perception it was found that 
although there was no significant difference between the groups in the amount of 
poking and twisting actions, there was a significant difference in more general actions 
on the bolts. All target-like behaviours related to poking, such as pushing the bolts 
while using different parts of the hand as well as the mouth, were plotted together. In 
the same way target-like behaviours related to twisting, including pulling out the bolts 
with the hand and mouth, were also plotted together. Comparing the groups on this 
level showed a significant difference between the groups.  
   Thus it was concluded that the social learning mechanism underlying the 
behaviour of the capuchin monkeys in this study was either object movement re-
enactment (OMR) in which the monkeys re-enacted the movement of the rods yet did 
so in mainly in their own way,  or a simple form of action imitation. More controlled 
testing to differentiate between the two was needed. 
Since this experiment, several others using the same AF or a slightly modified 
version of it have been carried out with other species (see Table 3.1). Together with 
the original experiments using the AF with chimpanzees and children (Whiten et al. 
1996, Whiten, 1998a) it is now possible to make some tentative comparative 
comments. 
 
1. Mother - reared capuchins     
Custance (1994) tested six group-housed capuchin monkeys. There was no 
significant difference in the behaviour of the monkeys towards either of the latches. 
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The author concluded that “although the capuchin data was not significant the general 
trend was in the predicted direction for imitation” (p. 200). 
 
 
2. Other species of monkeys 
 (a) Marmosets. 
Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) were tested on a simplified version of the AF 
(Caldwell, Whiten & Morris, 1999; Caldwell & Whiten, 2004) as it was found that the 
manipulative skills of this species would not be sufficient to open the original latches. 
The AF was scaled down in size for this study and only the handle was used. The 
monkeys first had to turn the handle which then enabled them to lift open the lid. It 
was not possible to train a model to open the box in two different ways so an 
additional group, which controlled for stimulus enhancement (SE) was used in which 
a model licked food off the lid. This experiment also included a third control group 
that only observed the box, without a demonstration of any kind.  
Although none of the monkeys managed to open the box, differences in the 
behaviours of the monkeys towards it were found as a function of what they had 
observed.  Monkeys who had observed the demonstrator open the box showed more 
exploratory actions towards the box than the SE group monkeys.  Furthermore, 
monkeys who had watched the demonstrator open the box manipulated the box more 
with their hands whereas the monkeys who had watched a conspecific lick the box in 
the SE group used their mouth more. This showed what the authors called a “crude 
level of imitation”- in which observers preferably use the same body part as they had 
witnessed (similar to results found in Zentall et al. 1996, for pigeons). However 
interpreting this behaviour as action imitation was challenged by Mitchell (2002), 
who claimed this could be explained by observational conditioning of the mood 
towards the box, in which foraging is associated with  the hand and attacking 
associated with  the mouth. Byrne (2002) claims this type of learning is not action-
centred social learning but rather context imitation, where the context in which to 
reproduce behaviours from the animals’ repertoire is learned socially. 
Although stimulus enhancement was controlled for in this study, localized 
stimulus enhancement was thought to be taking place because the monkeys were 
concentrating more on the different, specific parts of the box they had seen 
manipulated in the demonstration.  
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(b) Pig-tailed Macaques.  
Custance et al. (2006) tested pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) using 
only the bolt-latch. There was no significant difference between the groups for either 
of the behaviours. Independent coders were only able to differentiate between the 
groups on the first trial. It was impossible to isolate the factor which brought about 
this difference although the authors suggested that the mechanism of social learning 
was mainly object movement re-enactment. 
One of the reasons suggested for the lack of a significant effect of observation 
in these macaque monkeys was the small amount of attention they paid to the 
demonstration; they showed only “limited and sporadic attention” (p. 311).  
 
3. Great Apes 
 
(a) Chimpanzees 
In the first experiment using the AF, Whiten et al. (1996) tested 8 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Independent coders were able to differentiate between 
the two chimpanzee experimental groups for behaviours performed on the bolt-latch 
but not on the barrel latch. Although spinning the pin was only seen in the group 
viewing “spin”, this behaviour only rarely occurred. Behaviours on the rods were 
significantly different between the groups on the less rigidly defined 'target- like' 
behaviours.  
 The AF was also used to test imitation of a sequential structure (Whiten, 
1998a). In this study, both latches were present together and different sequences, as 
well as different methods to open the latches were demonstrated.  The results showed 
that in the third – final - trial the chimpanzees copied the sequence with statistically 
significant high fidelity, thus showing the first evidence for imitation at the sequence 
level in primates.  
 
(b) Orang-utans 
 Custance et al. (2001) tested 14 wild born orang-utans. The results showed no 
evidence for social influence on learning. The authors suggested this might be due to 
the young age of the subjects as two out of the four adult subjects did seem to match 
the method they had observed more closely, as well as being the only subjects that 
managed to open the AF. Further, most of the subjects had a traumatic history (they 
were orphans in a rehabilitation camp) which could have affected their cognitive 
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development. In this experiment, as with the chimpanzees (Whiten, 1998a) both 
latches were present and different sequences were demonstrated to the two groups. No 
evidence for imitation of a sequence was found. 
Stoinski & Whiten (2003) used the same paradigm on 15 older subjects with a 
more normal childhood than the orphans in the previous study. These subjects also 
had some experience with different experimental procedures; thus the authors thought 
they would reflect more faithfully the capabilities of orang-utans. Independent coders 
were able to differentiate between the experimental groups according to their actions 
on the bolt latch. Further microanalysis showed this was not due to a difference in 
poke vs. twist actions on the bolts or to general target–like actions. The significant 
difference was found in the direction in which the bolts were removed, thus indicating 
the work of an object-centred learning mechanism. 
  Further, this study incorporated a third control group which did not observe 
any demonstration. Seven out of the ten orang-utans in the experimental groups 
managed to open the box at least once but one out of five control subjects succeeded 
as well. Thus, having an additional control group provided evidence for the benefits 
of social learning. 
 
(c) Gorillas  
Stoinski et al. (2001) tested ten gorillas using the complete version of the AF. 
However the actions on the pin were modified and instead of demonstrating spinning 
of the pin, the pin was pulled out. Perhaps as a result, basic action-centred imitation 
was found regarding actions on the pin. However such interpretations should be made 
with caution as, at least for other species, pulling the pin was the typical way of acting 
on it. Object centred imitation was thought to underlie the actions towards the bolts. 
As for the orang-utan subjects, no imitation of sequence was found in this experiment.  
Thus, experiments testing great apes on the AF have shown a division between 
chimpanzees on the one hand, showing object and action centred imitation as well as 
imitation of sequence, and the orang-utan and gorilla subjects, for which only object 
focused social learning can be confidently attributed. 
 
4. Humans 
Studies with humans have included children and adults. Children are often 
tested in comparison to non-human primates with the idea that the ontogenetic 
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development of social learning may give insights into the processes underlying social 
learning, as well as other cognitive aspects of non-human primates.  
Whiten et al. (1996) tested 2, 3 and 4 year old children. Independent coders were 
able to significantly differentiate between the two experimental groups at each age. 
This was based on the actions on the bolts, which showed high fidelity copying, as 
well as on the actions on the handle of the barrel latch. 
Testing adults provides a different perspective to understanding the behaviour 
of subjects towards a given task. The ability of adults to imitate is not questioned; 
rather the level at which they choose to imitate, if at all, is tested.  Horowitz (2003) 
found that although the majority of adult subjects did imitate the method they 
observed, almost a third pulled the bolts out no matter what method they saw. Thus 
the adults were imitating less than the children in Whiten et al. (1996) who seemed to 
show high conformity in that they imitated even when it was not necessary (twisting 
the bolt). In adults, no significant effect of imitation was found for the pin, as with 
experiments with other species.  
In the Custance et al. (2006) experiment, adult subjects were tested and 
showed more faithful matching, even to the extent of matching the digit used. 
Nevertheless, although starting with the demonstrated method, the subjects very 
quickly invented their own. This was perhaps  due to the fact that the subjects saw 
more demonstrations (three as  opposed to one demonstration in Horowitz, 2003) and 
were paying more attention to the demonstration than subjects in Horowitz’ study in 
which some used the demonstration time to do other things. The significance of 
attention to imitation will be addressed later.  
 
5. Non- primate species 
Huber, Rechberger & Taborsky (2001) used a modified version of the AF to 
test social learning in New Zealand Keas (Nestor notabilis). Although there was no 
evidence for copying the action the keas viewed, results showed that subjects that 
observed a demonstrator were more explorative of the box and were more successful 
in opening its different locks. Further, an effect of localized stimulus enhancement 
was found, as with the marmosets (Caldwell & Whiten, 2004). Thus observing the 
model emphasized to the observer which part of the box was more important (Huber, 
1998) which led to higher rates of success. The authors suggest that the lack of 
imitation could be a result of  
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a. The two methods being too similar in the Keas' eyes.  
b. The model demonstrated very quickly and professionally, 
which is one of the common features problems of conspecific 
demonstration in such tests, as opposed to human 
demonstration  
c. Keas are known for their explorative and playful tendencies 
(Diamond & Bond, 1999), which might have overpowered the 
need to copy.  
 
Visual Attention 
 
One of the factors which may influence the extent and complexity of social 
learning is the amount of attention paid to the demonstration and more precisely to the 
different components of the demonstration. 
I further analyzed the data from the enculturated capuchin monkeys and found 
that the rate of attention to the demonstration was very high, with five monkeys 
showing maximum attentiveness and six others showing just a slight deviation. On 
average, the capuchins were attentive to the demonstration 97.67% of the time. 
 This is a higher rate of attention than the one found for the Macaque monkeys 
in Custance et al. (2006) study, that only watch 36% of the time. The results for the 
enculturated capuchins resemble those found for children and chimpanzees in Whiten 
et al. (1996) who were reported to attend to virtually the entire demonstration.  
Unfortunately, no comparable results are given for the orang-utan, gorilla or mother-
reared capuchin monkeys in the studies cited earlier 
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Table 3.1 Artificial fruit box experiments with eight different species. N= number of subjects. Model column indicates human or conspecific. 
Results are given for each latch as well as latency effects in studies which employed a control group.  
 
Species Reference N Model Bolts Pin Handle Control Latency benefit 
Whiten et al. 1996 8 Human Action 
centred  
No No - - Chimpanzee 
*Whiten, 1998 4  Human Action 
centred 
No No - - 
*Custance et al. 2001  
14  
Human No  No  No - - Orang-utan 
*Stoinski & Whiten, 2003  
15  
Human Object 
centred  
No  Yes Yes 
Gorilla *Stoinski et al. 2001 10 Human Object 
centred 
Action 
centred? 
No Yes Yes 
Macaque  Custance et al. 2006 11  Monkey  No - - - - 
Custance, 1994  6 Human No  No  No - - Capuchin 
Custance, Whiten & Fredman 1999. 11 Human Object 
centred 
No No - - 
●Marmosets Caldwell, Whiten & Morris 1999; Caldwell & 
Whiten, 2004 
12 Monkey  Not used - No Yes No 
● Kea Huber, Rechberger & Taborsky, 2001 5 Kea  Object 
centred 
Not used Not used Yes Yes 
Children 24 Human Action 
centred  
No Action 
centred  
- 
- 
2 year old 8  Yes No No   
3 year old 8  Yes No Yes   
4 year olds 
Whiten et al. 1996 
8  Yes No Yes   
Adults Horowitz, 2003  48 human Action 
centred  
No  Yes  Yes  
Adults Custance et al. 2006 24  Action 
centred   
  Yes Yes 
 * In these experiments both latches were attached to the box, thus testing for imitation of sequential structure was possible. 
• A modified version was used (see text for details).
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Discussion 
 
 The AF, to my knowledge, is the only apparatus tested on such a relatively 
large number of species. This makes it possible to put forward tentative suggestions 
about behavioural and cognitive similarities and differences between the species in 
terms of what information each species extracts from the demonstration and how it 
makes use of it in its performance. This, however, calls for caution, as the small 
number of subjects tested may not faithfully reflect a species' ability. Further, 
although the apparatus is similar, there may be differences between the species in 
aspects not related to their cognitive ability to learn socially which may confound 
with the results. An example of this may be seen in the fact that the orang-utans were 
more hesitant to manipulate the AF than the chimpanzees, capuchins, and children. 
This may “reflect underlying species differences in motivation, specifically in 
situations involving novelty” (Stoinski &Whiten 2003, p. 287). Caldwell & Whiten 
(2002), addressing this issue, identify additional problems in trying to compare 
species on cognitive tasks. Such pitfalls may include, amongst others, differences in 
motivation for a given reward, differences in social tolerance levels of the species, 
and the level of habituation to humans who often serve as models, as well as 
differences in motivation to copy them.  
Bearing all this in mind I now examine how the enculturated capuchin 
monkeys stand in comparison to the other species tested.  
 
Mechanisms of social learning  
 
None of the non-human primate species matched their behaviour on the barrel 
latch, except for the gorilla, yet the action demonstrated was different in that 
experiment from the others, rendering comparison difficult.   
This could be a result of: 
a. A difference in the saliency of each latch,  
b. A difference in the way the two latches are released. In the case of the 
bolts the two methods are mutually exclusive: poking outwards is not 
followed by twisting inwards, whereas with the pin both spinning and 
pulling could be used together. Subjects could recognize this, 
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incidentally, by very brief touching of the pin (Whiten et al. 1996). 
This is true for the handle, too. 
The fact that children did make the effort to copy the actions on the barrel 
latch shows a high fidelity of action-centred imitation not  seen in the non-human 
species or the human adults. 
The bolt latch is thus more useful in comparing different species. 
Chimpanzees and children were seen to use information about the action of the model 
on bolts yet children showed a higher fidelity in doing so (Whiten et al. 1996). 
Some of the enculturated capuchins faithfully reproduced the actions on the 
bolts, yet a significant difference was only found for the more general target-like 
actions. This may imply a low fidelity action centred imitation, but it is more 
parsimonious to conclude that the monkeys’ behaviour was based on object-centred 
imitation. This was the same type of imitation found for the gorillas and adult orang-
utans.   
 The macaque monkeys and mother-reared capuchins did not show significant 
signs of imitation.  
I further analyzed the data from the enculturated capuchin monkeys and found 
they were very quick at opening the box (median for first trial with bolt latch 45 
seconds compared to 390 sec for the mother- reared capuchins; chimpanzees 38 sec, 
two year olds 77 sec, three year olds 17 sec). Information is not comparable for the 
gorilla and orang-utan subjects, as they had to open both latches.  
One way to explain the difference in the enculturated capuchins' behaviour is 
to relate it to their rich experience with objects and tools. This may result in the 
absence of neophobia (noted in the orang-utans tested) as well as the relatively short 
time it took the monkeys to open the box. Nevertheless, such experience in itself 
cannot explain the difference in behaviour found between the two experimental 
groups.  The process of enculturation (see Chapter 2) could have influenced their 
behaviour. However, at least for the orang-utan subjects, enculturation did not make a 
difference between Chantek, the enculturated subject, and the performance of the 
other subjects in the study. 
The comparison of the enculturated monkeys with the mother-reared subjects 
in the Custance (1994) study requires caution. Therefore, further experimentation with 
mother-reared capuchin monkeys that are more relaxed in the experimental setting 
was included in my research and will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Emulation versus imitation  
Heyes (1998; Heyes & Ray 2000) and Tomasello (1996) claimed that the 
chimpanzees’ behaviour could better be explained as emulation learning. The 
chimpanzees, they claim, learned the affordance of the rods and more than children 
used their own methods to achieve the goal of opening the box. Emulating in this case 
was more adaptive as chimpanzees opened the box with the barrel-latch faster than 
children. Thus chimpanzees in these studies seem to imitate in a more selective way 
and emulate when it is more efficient. This trend was also found in Horner & 
Whiten’s (2005) study with chimpanzees. Whiten (2000) argues that “imitation and 
certain emulation effects should be considered a continuum and not dichotomous”. 
Others claim that attention to results, as seen in emulation, predominates over 
attention to action in social learning situations, and thus subjects, although capable of 
action imitation, may mainly reproduce results.   
 
Testing human adults on the same apparatus gives a different perspective on 
what the AF might be testing. In fact, as Horowitz (2003) claims, each behaviour on 
this task, as well as other tasks, may be subdivided into so many levels and when a 
subject is asked “which part of an act should be copied? The variation of adult 
performances indicates that subjects, and likely, species, answer this differently” 
(p.333). 
The AF, as it was used in these experiments, could not make the fine 
differentiation between low fidelity action-centred imitation, emulation or object 
movement re-enactment. Further control groups are needed in which different groups 
see the same movement produced on different sides of the rods. An additional control 
for object movement re-enactment versus action imitation should have a control group 
only see a demonstration of the intended action without the actual movement of the 
bolts, thus viewing for example an exaggerated twist action without moving the bolt, 
complemented by the end state of open box. 
Experiments employing a "ghost" condition in which the apparatus is seen 
moving without the model's intervention have been found useful in showing the 
importance of watching the model act, in order for copying to take place in 
chimpanzees (Hopper et al. 2007) 
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Although the idea of a two-method task is that the groups serve as a control 
for each other, the use of a control group in the studies cited, in which subjects  do not 
observe a demonstration at all, gives a better differentiation between social learning 
and individual learning, emphasizing the benefits of social learning, when latency to 
success is different.  
 
Sequence learning 
 Testing the imitation of a sequence has its values from different perspectives.  
Whiten (1998a)  proposed that a sequence can overcome the problem of novelty as the 
sequence may be based on behaviours from the subjects' repertoire but the distinct 
combination of the components into a sequence could be novel. The ability to imitate 
a sequence may also lend weight  to the Associative Sequence Learning theory (ASL) 
(Heyes & Ray, 2000), which claims that social learning is based on an imitation 
repertoire an individual acquires through experience, which is then used when 
imitating a novel sequence.   
The AF was found very useful in testing sequence level imitation. 
Chimpanzees but not the other primates tested showed the ability to copy a sequence. 
The ability to imitate the sequences implies that the chimpanzees were able to 
represent the “basic plan” of what they had seen (Whiten, 1998). 
The more striking results were that the orang-utan and gorillas did not show 
sequence level imitation, thus disconfirming Byrne & Russon’s (1998) claim that 
gorillas in nature learn complex leaf processing techniques through program level 
imitation rather than action-level.  
The ability to copy a sequence does not specify at what level its components 
are imitated. It is possible to imitate a sequence using object-centred as well as action-
centred imitation, which is what the chimpanzees did in so far as the imitation of the 
barrel latch was object-centred. 
Imitation of sequence in the AF has not yet been tested with monkeys.  As the 
capuchin monkeys showed the ability for object-centred imitation it may be possible 
that complex food processing in nature (Boinski et al. 2003, Panger et al. 2002) may 
be transmitted socially also on the basis of sequence imitation. This still has to be 
experimentally tested. Some support for this reasoning was found by Subiaul et al. 
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(2004) who showed that macaque monkeys were able to socially learn to tap on a 
series of pictures in the sequence they had watched another monkey apply.  
 
To conclude 
Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1996) claimed that capuchin monkeys only evidence 
stimulus enhancement. However the AF results showed that at least for the group of 
enculturated capuchins, higher levels of matching did not fall far short of results for 
great apes on this task. However it has already been shown (Anderson, 1996; 
Visalberghi, 1997) that although Cebus and Pan may seemingly behave in an 
identical fashion on some tasks, the underlying cognitive mechanisms behind the 
behaviour of the two may be different.  
In the following experimental studies in this thesis I explore the nature of 
capuchin social learning strategies and capabilities, also testing mother-reared 
capuchin monkeys living in a more naturalistic environment than the laboratory 
capuchin monkeys tested in the studies discussed up to now. Before these studies 
were carried out I conducted a survey of the object manipulation repertoire of these 
monkeys in order to have as much information about them as possible so as to avoid 
false positive interpretation of their behaviour in the social learning experiments I 
planned to carry out.  The results of this observational study will described after the 
following Subjects chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
SUBJECTS 
 
The Capuchin subjects were drawn from two different populations: a mother-
reared population and a hand–reared, enculturated population. 
The three groups in the mother-reared population were originally one large 
group living in a petting zoo on Kibbutz Maabarot north of Tel-Aviv. The group 
belonged to "Helping-Hands" Israel. Six monkeys were taken out of this group in 
1994 and housed in a separate cage, as aggression in the group was increasing at that 
time.   
In 1995, when Monkey Park opened, part of the group was brought to the Park 
and housed in a spacious enclosure. They were named the Enclosure group. Several 
months later, the six monkeys who had previously been separated from the group 
were also moved to Monkey Park.  They were housed on a separate small island thus 
giving them the name, the Island group. 
All the monkeys in the enculturated group, except for Cheppy, Cheppa and 
Cacao, were born in the original big group in the petting zoo. Cheppy and Cheppa 
came from outside Israel and Cacao was born in the enculturated group. 
 
Further information about each monkey is given in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. and 4.4. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Subjects in the petting zoo group. Name, gender, short known history and the 
experiments they took part in.  
 
 
Name Gender History  Fruit 
Box Std.  
Coffee 
Tin Std. 
Dipping 
Box 
Std. 
Do 
As I 
Do  
Blacky M Born 1999 to female in 
petting zoo group. Middle 
rank. 
 √   
Ktantan M Born 1997 to female in 
petting zoo group. Middle 
rank. 
 √   
Max M 
 
Born approx. 1982. Middle 
rank. 
 √   
Ziva F 
 
Born approx. 1980. High 
rank. 
 √   
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Table 4.2 Subjects in the Enculturated group.  Name, gender, short known history and the 
experiments they took part in.  
 
Name Gender History Fruit 
Box Std. 
 
Coffee 
Tin  
Std. 
Dipping 
Box 
Std. 
Do 
As I 
Do 
Cheppa  F Born approximately 1975. She 
was smuggled into Israel and 
lived as a pet until she was 
given to   "Helping Hands" in 
1984. She moved to my home 
in 1989. In 1997 moved with 
the group to the IPSF.  
√    
Cheppy  M Born 1983 in "Helping Hands" 
USA. Lived in foster families 
until 1989 then entered 
training and later placed with a 
quadriplegic. He returned to 
the group in my home in 1991. 
√ √   
Amy   F Born 1990 lived in foster 
family until 1990 then moved 
to the group in my home. 
√    
Sifu  F Born 1990. Lived in foster 
family until 1997 then moved 
to live with Adam and Koko 
in IPSF. 
√ √   
Viva  F Born 1988. Lived in foster 
family until 2000. 
√    
Koko  M Born 1990. Lived in foster 
family until 1995 then housed 
with Adam in IPSF. 
√ √ √  
Hezda  F Born 1991. Lived in foster 
family until 1994 then moved 
to live with the group at my 
home. In 1996 moved with the 
group to IPSF. 
√ √ √ √ 
Rusty  M Born 1990. Lived in foster 
family until 1994 then moved 
to live with the group at my 
home. In 1996 moved with  
the group moved to IPSF 
√ √ √ √ 
Mango  F  Born 1990. Lived in foster 
family until 2001. Then 
moved to the petting zoo 
group. 
√    
Kim  F Born 1990. Lived in foster 
family until 2001 then was 
housed with Koko and Adam 
in IPSF. 
√ √   
Lulu  F Born 1988. Lived in foster 
family until1999 then left 
Israel. 
√    
Adam  M Born in 1988. Lived in foster 
family until 1996 then housed 
with Koko in IPSF. 
 √ √ √ 
Cacao  F Born 1995, daughter of Amy 
and Rusty.  In 1996 moved 
with the group to IPSF.  
 √ √ √ 
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Table 4.3 Subjects in the Enclosure group. Name, gender, short known history and the 
experiments they took part in.  
 
 
Name Gender History  Fruit 
Box 
Std.  
Coffee 
Tin 
Std. 
Dipping 
Box Std. 
Do As 
I Do  
Scarface M Born 1975. 
Alpha male. 
 √   
Dark M Born 1991. 
Middle ranking. 
 √   
Dor M Born 1995. Eldest son of alpha 
female. 
 √   
Dali M Born 1998. Youngest son of 
alpha female. 
 √   
Dolche F 
 
Daughter of alpha female.  √   
Hozelito M Born 1997. Entered the group at 
the age of 10 months 
 √   
 
These subjects as well as the rest of the Enclosure group participated in the 
object manipulation observational study described in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Subjects in the Island group. Name, gender, short known history and the 
experiments they took part in.  
 
Name Gender History  Fruit 
Box 
Std.  
Coffee 
Tin 
Std. 
Dipping 
Box 
Std. 
Do 
As I 
Do  
Milky M Born in 1990 to a female in the 
petting zoo group. Alpha male 
 
 √ √  
Seffie M Born in 1991 to a female in the 
petting zoo group. Middle 
ranking. 
 
 √ √  
Shpigler M 
 
Born in 1990 to Dina (now 
alpha in enclosure group). Low 
ranking 
 √ √  
Zorba F 
 
Born in 1995 to Zed and Milky. 
High ranking. 
 √ 
demons
trator 
√  
Zed 
 
F Born in 1990 to Ziva in the 
petting zoo group. Alpha female 
 √ √ 
innovator 
 
Duba 
 
F Born in 1991 to Dina (now 
alpha in enclosure group). Low 
ranking 
  √  
Drorit 
 
F Born in 1996 to Duba and 
Milky. 
Middle ranking. 
  √  
 
 All the island group subjects participated in the object manipulation 
observational study described in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
 
OBJECT MANIPULATION AND TOOL USE IN THE ISLAND AND                   
ENCLOSURE GROUPS 
A survey of object manipulation and tool-use behaviour was carried out on the Island 
and Enclosure groups. This was done in order to verify that the groups were similar enough in 
this domain to be used as two equivalent experimental groups for testing social learning. An 
ethogram of actions with objects was defined for the monkeys. Between and within group 
differences and similarities are discussed.   
 
Introduction 
Capuchin monkeys are one of the few species of primates that have been seen 
to use tools in nature (van Schaik, Deaner & Merrill, 1999). In a captive environment 
their tendency to manipulate objects and use tools is even more widespread and more 
varied (Visalberghi, 1990). 
 
1. Object manipulation and combination  
Eye-hand coordination develops early in Cebus, and varied precision grips are 
observed by 13 weeks of age (Costello & Fragaszy, 1988). Infant Cebus monkeys 
start manipulating objects after six month of age (Fragaszy & Adams Curtis, 1991; 
Natale, 1989) and do so considerably more than infants of other species (Poti & 
Spinozzi, 1994).  According to Gibson these are “species-typical infantile behaviours 
that help to channel intellectual development in particular directions” (Gibson, 1990, 
p. 215). Through this complex manipulation of objects these monkeys may learn 
about the properties of the objects, facilitating adult tool use behaviour (Byrne, 1995). 
Comparative studies have found that as adults, capuchin monkeys show a 
higher tendency to manipulate objects than other primates (Torigoe, 1985) and do so 
using a wider variety of manipulatory responses than most other animals in terms of 
the variety of actions observed, the way they combine objects and the body parts they 
use (Fragaszy at al. 1990, Glickman & Sorge, 1966; but see Parker, 1974). In nature, 
capuchin monkeys have been observed pounding fruits on trees (Izawa & Mizuno, 
1977), demonstrating a case of skilful object manipulation which may be enhanced by 
Cebus' high tendency to “explore and manipulate familiar objects and substrates 
persistently and routinely engage in many actions. This can allow them to discover the 
consequence of actions, combining objects and surfaces” (Fragaszy, Visalberghi & 
Fedigan, 2004 p.177).  
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In captivity this behaviour is even more prominent. Capuchin monkeys show a 
high degree of curiosity towards objects (Jalles-Filho, 1995), even towards novel 
ones, something that wild animals tend to avoid at first (Visalberghi et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, Cebus in captivity may continue to show interest in the object over time 
(Visalberghi, 1988; Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1985). 
 
2. Tool use  
Beck (1980, p. 10) defines tool use as: “The external employment of an 
unattached environmental object to alter more efficiently the form, position, or 
condition of another object, another organism, or the user itself when the user holds or 
carries a tool during or just prior to use and is responsible for the proper and effective 
orientation of the tool”. Such tool use is thought to be a sign of higher cognitive 
abilities and used to be considered as the trait differentiating humans from other 
animals (See Beck, 1980 for a review). 
Table 5.1 Capuchin monkeys’ tool use in nature and captivity. 
Purpose Description In Nature  Reference In Captivity Reference 
Using a stone or hard object 
such as a hammer to open 
hard husked fruits or oysters  
de Oviedo, 1526/1990 (in Fragaszy et al 
2004); Fernandes, 1991; Struhsaker & Leland, 
1977; Boinski et al. 2000; Rocha et al. 1998*; 
Langguth & Alonso, 1997; Ottoni & Mannu, 
2001; Jalles-Filho et al. 2001; Oxford, 2003; 
Fragaszy et al. 2004a. 
Erasmus ,1794*; Nolte, 1958; 
Vevers & Weiner, 1963; 
Anderson, 1990; Antinucci & 
Visalberghi, 1986; Westergaard & 
Suomi, 1993b; Romanes 1883 
Stones as spades to dig in 
the ground  
Moura & Lee, 2004.  
Stones as knives  Westergaard & Suomi, 1994a; 
Westergaard & Suomi,1995b; 
Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1987a. 
Stick for probing for insects 
or liquids 
Chevalier Skolnikoff, 1990. Romanes, 1883; Westergaard & 
Fragaszy, 1985; Westergaard et al. 
1997. 
Stick for raking in out- of -
reach object 
 Romanes, 1883; Harlow & 
Settlage, 1934; Kluver, 1937. 
Stacking boxes to reach 
suspended food 
 Harlow & Settlage, 1934; Kluver, 
1937. 
Tools for 
foraging 
Leaves to scoop up water Philips, 1998.  
Tools as 
weapons 
Throwing at enemies. Boinski ,1988; Chapman, 1986; Boinski, 
1988; Chevalier Skolnikoff, 1989; Panger, 
1997. 
Romanes 1883; Cooper & Harlow, 
1961; Vitale et al. 1991; Fredman, 
personal observations. 
Tools for 
treatment  
  Westergaard & Fragaszy 1987b; 
Ritchie & Fragaszy, 1988; Renan, 
Fredman & Eizenberg, 2006. 
 
Table 5.1 lists the variety of tool use actions cited in the literature for capuchin 
monkeys living in nature and in captivity. This table by no means aims to cite all the 
references for tool use behaviour in capuchin monkeys but rather gives examples of 
the main purposes for which capuchin monkeys have been seen to use tools. 
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3. Tool making by Cebus monkeys 
Some researchers go even further to claim that capuchin monkeys not only use 
tools but also manufacture them. 
Beck (1980) defines tool manufacture as “any modification of an object by the 
user or a conspecific so that the object serves more effectively as a tool” (pp. 11-12). 
This includes actions such as: ‘detach’, ‘subtract’, 'combine’, and ‘reshape’. 
Cebus have been seen to detach branches from a tree and  subtract the twigs 
and leaves, in order to prepare twigs for probing (Anderson & Henneman, 1994; 
Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1987a; Westergaard et al. 1997; Westergaard & Suomi 
1994c; 1995a), and combine and re-shape leaves and paper in order to create effective 
sponges (Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1987a). 
Westergaard & Suomi (1994a) described how their subjects prepared flaking 
tools by combining two tools to create chisels and hammers using three different 
striking techniques. These techniques, the authors claim, resemble stone flaking 
techniques which pygmy chimpanzees use as well as those used by Oldowan hominid 
tool-makers.  
However it is unclear from their report whether the monkeys understood what 
was wrong with the tool and modified it accordingly, or whether failure prompted the 
monkeys, perhaps in frustration, to break or bite on the stick, perhaps even making it 
less suitable, for example breaking it when in fact a longer stick was necessary? 
Capuchin monkeys are often observed biting and breaking twigs and branches without 
using them, or behaving in such a manner in what seems to reflect mere frustration or 
excitement such as while waiting for food to be brought by the keeper (personal 
observation). 
 
Goals of the observational study 
The object manipulation and tool use tasks employed in this thesis were 
designed to test social learning.  It was therefore important to obtain answers to the 
following questions before planning the tasks and starting the experiments:  
1. What were the subjects of the studies already doing with objects they 
had in their home areas? This was important to know in advance for two 
reasons:  
a. In order to design a task which did not include a learned, 
commonplace action with objects.  
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b. In order to design a task within the monkeys' capabilities. 
 2. Were the different groups similar enough in the domain of object 
manipulation and tool use for valid comparisons about social learning? This 
was important as the groups were living in very different environments. 
Further, it was not possible to select subjects randomly from the different 
groups for the different experimental conditions. 
 
Subjects: 
Two groups were observed: the  Enclosure  group (N=25 ,  fourteen females 
and eleven males,  age range 2-28 years)  and the Island group (N=7, three females  
and four males age range 2.5-8 years) (see Chapter 4 and  Tables 5.2. and 5.3 ). The 
Petting Zoo group monkeys (see Chapter 4) were not observed as they were living in 
a very impoverished cage with no toys or natural objects in it.  
The Enculturated group (see Chapter 4) subjects could not be extensively 
observed, but Table 5.6 describes the actions they were known to do in their foster 
families. These data were obtained through interviews with the families during the 
time "Helping-Hands" was still in existence. For six of the monkeys who had lived in 
my home, the behaviours were personally observed.  
Three years after the Enclosure group monkeys were first observed, a second 
period of observations was conducted on young monkeys who were born in the 
enclosure during that period.  These subjects were thus termed Enclosure Stage 2 
group (N=9, five females and four males age range <1-3). 
 
Table 5.2 Monkeys in the Island group. Names in Italics indicate the offspring of the female 
in the row above. 
 
Monkey  Gender Age At Testing 
Milky Alpha Male 8 
Seffie Male 7 
Shpigler Male 7 
Zed Alpha Female 7 
     Zorba Male  3.5 
Duba Female 8 
    Drorit Female 2.5 
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Table 5.3 Monkeys in the Enclosure group. Names in Italics indicate the offspring of the 
female in the row above. Stage one = first observation. Stage two= second observation carried 
out three years later on the monkeys born in the enclosure during that period. 
 
Stage One Stage two 
Monkey Gender Age at 
testing   
Monkey Gender Age at  
testing 
Scarface  Alpha Male 25    
Dark Male 9    
Sami Male 9    
Samba Male 7    
Dvash Male 7    
Hozelito Male 3    
Layla Female 8    
      Lymon Male 2 Leachy Female 3 
Diki Female 28    
     Kokus Male 4 Kiwi Female 2 
    Cinamon Female 2    
      Kunts Female 3 Tsupchik Male 1 
Lachats Female 8    
      Chets Female 2 Chamsa Male 2 
 
  Chanita female 1 
Dina  Alpha Female 27    
       Dor Male 4    
      Domino Female 3    
 
  Nuni Male Less than 1 
year 
       Dulche Female 3    
       Dali Male 2    
Yafa Female 13 Yukatan Female 3 
     Yogly Male 3    
    Yoffee Female 7    
 
  Ponsho Female 3 
    Yuli Female 2    
Mimi Female 6 Mango Male 3 
Ginger Female 8    
 
Procedure:  
Each monkey was observed for six sessions lasting twenty minutes each in 
which all incidences of object manipulation and tool use were recorded. Sessions 
were carried out twice at three different times of the day, morning, mid - day and 
afternoon. 
An action was recorded as one instance from the moment the monkey moved 
an object until it changed direction of movement or broke contact with an object or 
between the object and a surface or second object.  
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For example one instance of “Scratch” (see Table 5.4) was recorded from the 
moment the monkey moved the stick on the surface until it changed the direction of 
movement or broke contact between stick and surface.  
 
Results 
I. Modes of action and their frequency 
 
1. Frequency of actions on objects. 
In order to compare the frequency with which the monkeys manipulated 
objects in the groups, the average number of actions used per session was 
calculated for each monkey (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4 Frequencies of action on objects in each group; N= number of subjects. 
 
 Enclosure  
Group 
Stage 2  
Group 
Island 
Group 
N 25 9 7 
Mean 5.033 8.13 6.31 
Median 4.33 9.17 4.67 
Std. 
deviation 
3.71 4.86 3.43 
Range 0.50-15.67 1.50-16.0 3.67-13.17 
 
 
A one way ANOVA test was carried out in order to test whether there was a 
difference in the frequency of actions with objects between the three groups. The 
difference was not significant; df(2) f =2.084 p=0.138. Thus, monkeys in the three 
environments were similarly active with objects. 
 
2. Number of modes of actions observed.  An ethogram of twenty five different 
modes of action on objects was identified in the Enclosure group which was observed 
first (see Table 5.5). Twenty one of these action modes were also seen  in the Island 
group. One of the modes not found in the Island group was "rake" as there is no mesh 
on the island and no need to rake-in out-of-reach objects. The fact that three other 
modes were not seen in the Island group may be due to the much smaller number of 
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monkeys in that group compared to the Enclosure group (7 and 34 respectively). 
There were no actions observed in the Island group which were not seen in the 
Enclosure group and thus the 25 modes were used for comparison between the 
groups.  
One session for each monkey was videotaped. A correlation between the 
coding from the video and the coding carried out while observing the monkeys using 
a checklist of behaviours was significant (N=25, r= 0.99, p=0.0). 
3. Most frequent actions. Although the two groups live in different enclosures it 
is evident that the main modes of actions used on objects are similar, and actions 
which are frequently used in one group are also frequently used in the other (see 
Table 5.4). The most frequently used action was "pounding" with different objects 
either on the surface or on a second object. This was followed by "carrying", "hitting"  
"probing", and "raking". The frequency of each of the 25 different modes of action 
was ranked for each group. A Spearman rank correlation test shows that there was a 
high similarity between the Enclosure and Island groups in the frequency at which the 
different modes were used (N= 25, rs = 0.550, p = 0.004). There was also a high 
correlation between the two stages of the Enclosure group (N= 25, rs = 0.509, p = 
0.009). 
4.         Distribution in the group. Actions were also coded by the number of monkeys 
using the action in the group.  McGrew & Marchant (1997) classified four levels of 
tool-use. These are: anecdotal, idiosyncratic, habitual, and customary.  
"Anecdotal reports show the possibility of an act, but are always subject 
to the alternative interpretation of being an accident, an observer's error, 
or a subject's mistake. Thus, anecdotes alert us to the potential of an organism, 
especially in striking cases" (p. 790). 
 
"Idiosyncratic cases are performed repeatedly by only one individual. 
Such uniqueness may indicate an innovator or a genius and, so, cannot be 
 generalized as explanations for a population or species" (p. 791). 
 
"Habitual events are those repeated by several individuals over time….in      
captivity limited results may be due to context-specific constraints, such as 
having only one experimental device for a group of subjects, so that one or a 
few can monopolize it" (p. 791). 
 
"Customary events are enacted regularly or predictably by all appropriate 
members of a group or population. Lack of universality may result from 
seasonality of resources or age- or sex-specific influences, and there may 
be intergroup or population differences" (p. 791). 
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 Applying this classification to the data gathered in this study regarding object 
manipulation and tool use, the following definitions were made: 
Anecdotal - only one incident seen. 
Idiosyncratic - only one monkey in the group seen using the mode of action. 
Customary - 90% or more of the monkeys seen using the mode of actions (22 or 
more monkeys in the Enclosure Group, 8-9 monkeys in the Stage 2 Group and 6-7 in 
the Island group). 
Habitual - the remaining 2-21 monkeys in the Enclosure Group, 2-7 in the Stage 2 
Group  and  2-5 monkeys in the Island Group)  (see Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5 A description of modes of action with objects found in the Enclosure group and the 
Island group. The first column for each group gives the percentage for each action/total 
number of actions for each group. The second column gives the number of monkeys in the 
group which were seen using the action.   
                                Enclosure group  Enclosure Stage 2 Island group 
Action % of total 
group 
actions 
monkeys 
acting 
% of total  
group 
actions 
monkeys 
acting 
% of total  
group 
actions 
monkeys 
acting 
Pound. Pound object with one or two 
hands on surface or on a detached 
object. 
18.01 22 (c ) 56.7  8 (c) 47.5 7 ( c ) 
Carry. Carry object with hand, mouth 
or tail.  
12.97 23 (c ) 5.11 4 (h) 11.7 6 (c) 
Hit. Hold one end of stick and hit the 
distal end on surface or object. 
10.46 22 (c ) 1.46 1 (i) 4.9 3 ( h ) 
Probe. Probe stick in hole. 9.27 14  ( h ) 2.43 2 (h)  7.55 5 (c ) 
Rake. Use stick to rake out- of- reach-
object. 
7.15 9 ( h ) - - - - 
Rub. Quickly move object on surface, 
detached object or body with one or two 
hands. 
5.43 20  (h ) 7.3 5 (h) 6.07 3  ( h ) 
Throw. Throw object on surface or 
other object/animal using one or two 
hands. 
4.9 10 ( h ) 0.97 2 (h) 4.5 4  ( h ) 
Hide. Put object on head or hold with 
mouth while covering eyes. 
4.37 10 ( h ) 0.49 1 (i) 1.13 2  ( h ) 
Roll. Roll object on surface, body or 
detached object with one or two open 
hands. 
4.11 14 ( h ) 0.24 1 (i) 4.9 5 (c ) 
Scratch. Move stick up and down 
surface while holding it upright with one 
or two hands and /or mouth.  
3.05 10 ( h ) 4.9 2 (h) - - 
Shake. Quickly move either detached 
object in the air or connected object with 
one or two hands. 
2.91 10 ( h ) 5.11 4 (h) 0.76 2  ( h ) 
Soak. Soak food in water. 2.78 9  ( h ) 0.73 2 (h) 1.51 2 ( h ) 
Grate. Grate food on edge of object 2.65 1 ( i )  4.6  2 (h) 1.1 2 ( h ) 
Lever. Insert stick in hole or under 
object. Pull up the stick or sit on it. 
2.51 3 ( h ) - - 1.13 1 (i)  
Bounce. Bounce object on surface with 
one or two hands. 
1.6 8 ( h ) 2.43  2 (h) 0.76 2 ( h ) 
Rest. Place food or object on surface or 
on second object and bite it.  
1.46 6 ( h ) 2.25 5 (h) - - 
Dig. Use object to dig in the ground. 1.46 5 ( h ) - - 2.26 2 ( h ) 
Spin. Hold object at its middle and spin 
on surface.  
1.06 4 ( h ) 1.22 2 (h) 0.37 1 (i ) 
Play with sand. Collect or push away 
sand either with hands or with object. 
1.06 4 ( h ) 0 0 1.13 3( h ) 
Draw. Use object to make circle around 
self. 
0.66 2  ( h ) 2.19 1 (i) 1.51 1( i ) 
Self treatment. Use twig to insert in 
nostril or penis or for self grooming. 
0.66 3  ( h ) - - - - 
Contain. Use object to contain water or 
food.  
0.4 3 ( h ) 0.97 1 (i) 0 0 
Look through. Put transparent object on 
eyes. 
0.4 1 ( i ) 0 0 0.76  1 ( i ) 
Press/mash. Place food or object on 
surface and push with force.  
0.4 3 ( h ) 0.73 1 (i) 1.13 2 ( h ) 
Toy. Initiate social play by pulling 
object or splashing water.  
0.27 1 ( i )  - - 1.13 2 ( h ) 
       a = anecdotal,  i= idiosyncratic, c = customary, h = habitual.  “-“= absent 
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Table 5.6 Comparison of the results of the present study, as well as information for the 
Enculturated group, to the survey of studies of Cebus apella described in McGrew & 
Marchant (1997). In italics is the way the action was observed in the subjects of this study.  
 
Mode Mcgrew & 
Marchant 
Summary 
Island   
& Enclosure 
Groups 
Enculturated 
Group 
1. Absorb/sponge c h c 
2. Bait a - - 
3. Balance/climb a - - 
4. Brandish/flail a h c 
5. Club a - i 
6. Contain a h c 
7. Dig h h c 
8. Drag (carry) h c c 
9. Drape (wear on head)  h h 
10. Drop  c - - 
11. Hammer/pound a c c 
12. Ladder c - - 
13. Probe a h c 
14. Prod/jab a - - 
15. Pry/lever (to break 
tool) 
h h  - 
16. Reach/rake a h c 
17. Stack - - - 
18. Swing h - - 
19. Throw (aimed) - h c 
20. Throw (unaimed) h h c 
21. Wipe - - c 
22. Cushion - - h 
23. Toy - h (island) h 
24. Groom a h h 
25. Cut/pierce h - h 
26. Chisel a - - 
27. Grind h h h 
a = anecdotal,  i= idiosyncratic, c = customary, h = habitual.  “-“=absent  
 
II. Differences between monkeys – gender and age.  
 
As seen above, there was no significant difference between the 
groups; thus the enclosure in which they were living did not have an 
influence on their activity. However, were there differences within the 
groups? 
 
1. Gender differences: There was a difference between males and females in the 
frequency of interacting with objects. Males in the Enclosure group (mean=7.24) 
manipulated objects significantly more than females (mean =3.30) (t (23) =3.07, p = 
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0.005). Males in the Island group (mean =6.92) also manipulated objects more than 
females (mean =5.50) but this difference was not significant (t (5) = 0.506, p = 0.635). 
There was no gender difference between the Stage 2 monkeys in the Enclosure group: 
males (mean =8.125) manipulated objects just as often as females (mean = 8.13). 
(t(8)=-0.002, p=0.998) This may be related to the fact that all monkeys were juvenile 
and gender differences in activity levels may reveal themselves more with age  
However, when comparing all subjects together, the difference between genders was 
significant (male mean=7.36; female mean=4.70, t (39) =2.201, p =0.034) (see Table 
5.7).  
 
Table 5.7 Gender differences in frequency of actions on objects in each group. 
N= number of subjects. 
 
 Enclosure Group Stage 2 Island Group All 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male  Female Male Female 
N   11.00 14.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 19.00 22.00 
Mean 7.24 3.30 8.13 8.13 6.92 5.50 7.36 4.70 
Median 6.67 2.83 7.83 9.19 5.42 4.17 6.50 4.17 
Std. deviation 4.18 2.13 4.77 5.49 4.29 2.46 4.09 3.65 
Range 0.83-15.67 0.50-7.67 2.83-14.00 1.50-16.00 3.67-13.17 4.00-8.33 0.83-15.67 0.50-16.00 
 
 
2.        Age differences: Two age groups were considered: Juvenile (1-5 years) and 
Adult (over 5 years). As there was only one infant (under one year) in the group at the 
time of testing, its results were added to the Juvenile group. The juvenile monkeys 
manipulated objects significantly more than older monkeys  
(Island: adult mean=4.54, juvenile mean=10.75, t (5) =4.215 p=0.008; Enclosure adult 
mean= 3.00, juvenile mean= 7.24, t (23) =3.44 p= 0.002). This effect was also found 
when comparing all subjects including the Stage 2 juvenile monkeys (adult mean= 
3.43, juvenile mean=7.91, t (39) =4.16, p = 0.00) (see Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.8 Age differences in frequency of actions on objects in each group. 
N= number of subjects.  
 
 Enclosure Group Stage 2 Island Group All 
Age adult juvenile juvenile adult juvenile adult juvenile 
N 13.00 12.00 9.00 5.00 2.00 18.00 23.00 
Mean 3.00 7.24 8.13 4.54 10.75 3.43 7.91 
Median 2.17 6.50 9.16 4.17 11.01 3.17 7.67 
Std. deviation 2.41 3.67 4.86 0.98 3.80 2.20 4.13 
Range 0.50-7.50 3.00-15.67 1.50-16.00 3.67-6.17 8.33-13.70 0.50-7.50 1.50-16.00 
 
 
III. Complexity of manipulation. 
 
 Matsuzawa (1996) presented a system to describe different levels of actions 
on objects (similar to Greenfield's 1991 system for the development of tool- use and 
language). The system first identifies the objects involved in the action and then the 
actions upon these objects. Using a tree structure it is possible to identify the 
hierarchical organization of object manipulation.  This system has already been used 
by Westergaard (1999) to analyze reports on tool use in Cebus apella in the wild and 
in captivity. The levels can be described as follows: 
Level 0 - manipulating one object. 
Level 1 - manipulating an object on a surface. 
Level 2 - manipulating two objects and surface. 
Level 3 - manipulating three objects. 
 
The hierarchical level of the action is characterized by the organization of 
nesting clusters. The data collected in this survey were analysed using this 
hierarchical system (see Table 5.9). 
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Table 5.9 Complexity of Manipulation. Results for all subjects combined were analyzed 
according to level of hierarchical organization. The percentage of the actions out of the total 
number of actions in the survey is in brackets. 
  
 Structure Level  0 Structure Level  1 Structure Level  2 
Pound     Pound object on surface 
(27.6%)  
Pound object on object; 
Pound object on object 
while holding them in both 
hands (6.5 %) 
Carry   (10.5%)   
Hit   Hit hand with stick 
(0.3 %) 
Hit surface or body with 
object (6.3%) 
Hold object in hand and hit 
it with a stick (0.2%) 
Probe     (7.0%)  
Rake    (3.8%)  
Rub  Rub on body 
(0.1%) 
Rub object on surface 
(6.2%)  
 Rub object on object while 
holding both objects  
(1.0%) 
Throw   Throw sand in the air 
(0.4%) 
 Throw object at other 
object/animal; splash water 
at duck (3.4%) 
 
Hide    (2. 5%)   
Roll   Roll object from arm to 
palm; between two 
hands; on inner thigh 
(1.6%) 
 Roll object on surface or in 
paddle (1.5%) 
 
Scratch   (2.3%)  (1.4%) 
Shake   (2.6%)   
Soak    (1.7%)  
Grate     (1.7%)  
Lever   (1.5%)  
Bounce  (0.5%)  (1.7%)  
Rest    (1.1%)  Stand stick in sand then 
rest food on it (0.3%) 
Dig  
 
  (1.2%)  
Spin  
 
 (1.0%)   
Play with 
sand 
 Pull or push sand with 
hands (0.2%) 
 Using a stone to pull or 
push sand (0.5%) 
 
Draw    (1.3%)  
Self treat    (0.3%)   
Contain    Use object to contain water 
(0.5%) 
 Put object in object and 
carry (0.1%) 
Look 
through  
 (0.3%)   
Press/mash   (0.6%)   
Toy   (0.3%)  
 
20.9 % 69.6 % 9.5 % 
 
 
Most actions observed were of Level 0 (20.9 %) and Level 1(69.6%).  The 
higher percentage of Level 1 manipulations than Level 0 is in line with previous 
 99 
accounts of the high tendency of Cebus monkeys to bring objects in contact with other 
objects or surfaces (e.g. Fragaszy & Adams Curtis, 1991).  
 
Level 3 actions were observed, but very rarely (see Table 5.10)  
 
Table 5.10  Level 3 actions. The first column for each group gives the number of instances an 
action was observed.  
 
 Enclosure Group Island Group 
Action Number of 
occurrences 
monkey Number of 
occurrences  
monkey 
Soak pellets then crush them 
by pounding stone 
3  Mimi  
 
2 Zorba 
 
Put pellets in container then 
put container with pellets in 
water to soak  
1 Yogly 
 
- - 
 Break stick then probe in hole  4 Domino 
 
- - 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Juvenile monkeys manipulated objects more frequently than adult monkeys. 
This finding is similar to earlier accounts of Cebus apella (Jalles-Filho, 1995; 
Visalberghi, 1988). Gender differences were found only in the Enclosure 
group with males manipulating objects more frequently than females.  
 
2. The most important result for the studies in this thesis is that the Island and 
Enclosure groups were similar in terms of activity levels and frequency of 
using the different action modes. This justified using these groups as the two 
experimental groups in the study despite the differences in group size and 
environments. 
 
3. Most actions with objects observed in the monkeys were Level 0 and Level 1. 
Thus, tasks to test social learning involving these levels should be designed to 
be in the range of capability of the monkeys.  A task using Level 2 actions 
could be used to test the strength of social learning over individual learning as 
this level of action on objects is not usually seen in these monkeys' activity but 
is still within their capacity. This level was used in the Dipping-Box task (see 
Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 6 
OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING FROM TOOL USING MODELS BY 
HUMAN-REARED AND MOTHER-REARED CAPUCHIN MONKEYS 
(Cebus apella)2 
Studies of wild capuchins suggest an important role for social learning, but 
experiments with captive subjects have generally not supported this. Here we report 
social learning in two quite different populations of capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella). In experiment 1, human raised monkeys observed a familiar human model 
open a foraging box using a tool in one of two alternative ways: levering versus 
poking. In experiment 2, mother-raised monkeys viewed similar techniques 
demonstrated by monkey models. A control group in each population saw no 
model. In both experiments, independent coders detected which technique 
experimental subjects had seen, thus confirming social learning. Further analyses 
examined fidelity of copying at three levels of resolution. The human-raised monkeys 
exhibited fidelity at the highest level, the specific tool use technique witnessed. The 
lever technique was seen only in monkeys exposed to a levering model, by contrast 
with controls and those witnessing poke. Mother-reared monkeys instead typically 
ignored the tool and exhibited fidelity at a lower level, tending only to re-create 
whichever result the model had achieved by either levering or poking. Nevertheless 
this level of social learning was associated with significantly greater levels of success 
in monkeys witnessing a model than in controls, an effect absent in the human-reared 
population. Results in both populations are consistent with a process of canalization 
of the repertoire in the direction of the approach witnessed, producing a narrower, 
socially shaped behavioural profile than among controls who saw no model. 
 
Introduction 
 Capuchin monkeys are renowned for their tool using ability, which among 
non- human primates in the wild is surpassed only by chimpanzees (Beck 1980; 
Visalberghi 1990). Capuchin (spp) monkeys have been seen using a stick to club a 
snake (Boinski, 1988; Chapman, 1986) drop or throw objects at conspecifics and 
intruders (Chapman, 1986; Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1990; Klein, 1974), crack oysters 
with a hard object (Fernandes, 1991; Hernandez-Camacho & Cooper 1976), pound 
palm-nuts together to crack them open (Struhsaker & Leland, 1977) and use leaves to 
scoop out water from tree cavities (Philips, 1998). More recent reports have described 
use of a branch to crack open nuts (Boinski et al. 2000), using stone hammers for a 
similar purpose (Langguth & Alonso, 1997; Ottoni & Mannu, 2001;  
                                                          
2
  This chapter is based on a paper published in Animal Cognition: Fredman, T. & 
Whiten, A. (2008). The nature and consequences of observational learning from tool 
using models in human-reared and mother-reared capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). 
Animal cognition, 11, 295-309.  
The introduction for this paper repeats much of what is said in the earlier review 
chapters. 
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Fragaszy et al. 2004a) and using stones to dig up roots and sticks for various probing 
tasks (Moura & Lee, 2004).  
In captivity, where capuchin monkeys may have contact with a larger set of 
objects and more “leisure“ time to manipulate them, they have been reported to 
exhibit an even broader range of object manipulation and tool use behaviours (Beck, 
1980; Gibson, 1990; Visalberghi, 1990; Fragaszy et al. 2004). 
Capuchin monkeys, especially the young, show attentiveness to the actions of 
other group members in captivity (Fragaszy et al. 1997) as well as in the wild 
(Boinski et al. 2000, 2003) and other free-ranging environments (Ottoni & Mannu 
2001; Ottoni et al. 2005) raising the question of what the observers are able to extract 
from watching the behaviour of others. Nishida (1987) suggested that the 
sophisticated food-processing behaviour of capuchin monkeys in the wild may imply 
cultural learning. More recently, systematic comparisons across three field sites 
supported this, identifying variations in processing methods for 20 of 61 foods eaten, 
and demonstrating a correlation between dyadic proximity and shared techniques 
(Panger et al. 2002). Further evidence that capuchins sustain local traditions has come 
from studies of social behaviour (Perry et al. 2003). However in the wild, it is 
extremely difficult to disentangle the various social and individual learning processes 
that may be responsible for regional differences in behaviour patterns. In the case of 
functional foraging techniques, it is particularly difficult to be sure that environmental 
constraints do not channel individual learning to produce the variations observed. 
Discriminating between different grades of social learning is even more challenging.  
For these reasons we have examined social learning of tool use 
experimentally. Because authorities including Tomasello (1990) and Galef (1992) 
have emphasized imitation as a potentially crucial mechanism permitting cultural 
transmission, and because Custance et al. (1999) found tentative evidence of imitation 
in one of the populations of capuchin monkeys available to us for the present study, 
we designed our experiments to identify any imitative fidelity occurring, but also 
examined subjects' behaviour for evidence of other kinds of social and non-social 
learning. 
Visalberghi, Fragaszy and colleagues have tested social learning of tool use in 
an extensive series of studies with capuchins, Cebus apella (e.g. Antinucci & 
Visalberghi, 1986; Westergaard & Fragaszy, 1987a; Visalberghi, 1987, Fragaszy & 
Visalberghi, 1989 Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; reviewed by Visalberghi & Fragaszy 
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1990, 2002). Results did not support the hypothesis that these monkeys were 
imitating. For example, capuchin monkeys were unable to learn, through observation, 
the use of a stick to push a reward out of a horizontal transparent tube (Visalberghi, 
1993). Based on many similar results, Visalberghi & Fragaszy (1990, 2002) have 
concluded that the capuchin monkeys they studied do not acquire tool use through 
imitation, although more basic social learning processes such as stimulus 
enhancement may influence manipulative behaviour.  Whereas imitation requires 
learning “some aspect(s) of the intrinsic form of an act” (Whiten & Ham, 1992) from 
a model, stimulus enhancement involves only the drawing of attention to relevant 
items. Visalberghi and Fragaszy noted evidence of stimulus enhancement in the tube-
task, where monkeys observing a proficient tool user would be more likely to touch or 
manipulate the stick and tube; however, they did not imitatively integrate the objects 
into a copy of the expert’s technique.  
By contrast, Custance et al. (1999) reported more evidence of matching in a 
study employing capuchin monkeys that had been reared by humans and exposed to 
human home environments, in readiness for induction into a ‘Helping Hands’ 
program for quadriplegics. In this study, the model was a human caretaker. Each 
monkey saw bolts that held shut an “artificial fruit” box either pulled and twisted out, 
or poked out. The monkeys later tended to make the bolts move in the same way as 
had their human model. Custance et al. concluded that this indicated either a crude 
level of imitation, or ‘object movement re-enactment’, in which the movements of the 
bolts themselves were copied.   
These results raised the question of whether, if faced with one of two 
alternative methods of employing a tool, more evidence of tool-use copying would be 
obtained with this population of monkeys than others studied elsewhere.  This 
question was addressed in Experiment 1, below. For Experiment 2, utilising a 
different population of capuchins, we trained monkey models to perform each of the 
same two techniques in front of other group members, all of whom had been reared by 
their mothers, rather than by humans. Potential contrasts in social learning in these 
human-reared and capuchin reared populations is of interest in relation to 
controversies about  
the issue of ‘enculturation’ (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner 1993; Bering 2004; 
Tomasello & Call 2004). This issue has hitherto centred on evidence that apes reared 
in intimate interaction with humans appear to have heightened powers of social 
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cognition that include imitation. One of the populations of capuchins we studied could 
be considered ‘human enculturated’: would it behave differently in relation to social 
learning of tool use? 
We note that an ideal experimental design for teasing apart factors influencing 
social learning in these different populations would involve four conditions, generated 
by the combination of human versus capuchin rearing, and human versus capuchin 
models. Insufficient subjects were available to achieve this. We judged that, given this 
constraint, it would be a valuable first step to perform two separate parallel 
experiments. For one of these, it made obvious sense to use capuchin models for the 
capuchin-reared subjects. In the second, since the human-reared capuchins were 
primarily familiar with, and indeed apparently bonded to, a human caretaker, we 
thought it logical to make this person the model for that population. However, it is 
important to stress that the resultant multiple differences between the circumstances 
of the two experiments significantly constrain conclusions we can draw about causes 
of any differential results. They are better thought of as two complementary windows 
upon social learning propensities of capuchins. 
For each population, the two-action design (Dawson & Foss, 1965) outlined 
above was supplemented by addition of a control group of monkeys that did not view 
a model open the box, but instead found the box baited and in its final, already-
opened state; they also witnessed the tool tapped on the apparatus, to provide some 
stimulus enhancement. Thus we wished to know if watching either of the modelled 
techniques had an effect over and above this combination of stimulus enhancement 
and opportunity to learn from the end state normally achieved in a modelled episode. 
 
Experiment 1: Enculturated Capuchins Observing a Human Model 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were ten hand-raised capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella); four males 
and six females with a mean age of 8.25 years (range from 3.5 to 14 years). All were 
raised in a close relationship with human foster families for at least their first 3 years  
of life as part of a "Helping Hands" project in Israel, which prepared capuchin 
monkeys to aid quadriplegics (Willard et al. 1982). 
Six of these subjects were still with their human foster families at the time of 
the study. Only one of them, Cheppy, had been systematically trained and had worked 
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with a quadriplegic. His training was based on behavioural shaping (for a description 
of the tasks he had learned, see Custance et al. 1999). 
 
Apparatus   
 
The centre of a lid (5 cm diameter) of a coffee tin was cut out and thick paper 
was glued across this hole. The entire lid was then painted with brown paint so as to 
give the impression of a homogeneous surface. The inside of the tin was padded so 
that the monkey could easily reach the reward once the lid was opened. To change the 
overall appearance of the tin, a class of object that subjects might have seen while 
living with the foster family, it was embedded in a wooden box (18 x 18 x 10 cm). A 
screwdriver was attached to the box by a nylon cord approximately 60 cm long (see 
Fig. 6.1).  
 
 
a                                                                b 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The apparatus. Two methods of using the tool in order to gain the 
reward were: (a) poking through the centre of the lid (b) levering open the lid 
at its rim 
 
Procedure 
 
Two alternative techniques to obtain the reward were demonstrated by T.F., 
who was familiar to all the subjects: 
Poke technique: The screwdriver was held in the right hand and was used to poke a 
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hole in the centre of the lid, by stabbing down twice. After the second stab the 
screwdriver was not raised again but was used to enlarge the hole made in the paper in 
the centre of the lid by moving it twice from side to side. The reward (raisins) was 
thus visible and the hole was big enough for the subject to put its hand in and obtain 
the reward. 
Lever technique:  The screwdriver was held in the right hand and its distal edge was 
inserted between the rim of the lid and the top of the tin. The lid was then popped off 
by pulling down the handle of the screwdriver and using it as a lever. 
The monkeys were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups 
(observe poke vs. observe lever) or to a control group. Each group had a mixture of 
ages and genders (see Table 6.1). 
 
 
Table 6.1 Assignment of Human-Raised Subjects to Experimental and Control Groups.  
 
Name Gender Age (Yr)  Condition  
Rusty Male 8 Poke 
Cacao Female 3.5 Poke 
Viva Female 10 Poke 
Hezda Female 7 Lever 
Kim Female 8 Lever 
Cheppy Male 14 Lever 
Adam Male 10       Control 
Koko Male 8 Control 
Sifu Female 8 Control 
Mango Female 9 Control 
 
Each monkey was tested individually by TF, with the monkey's foster parent  
required to sit entirely passively to the rear of the monkey. Tin opening was 
demonstrated to the monkeys in the experimental groups three times before their first 
trial and then once before each of their second and third trials. This procedure is 
comparable to that used by Whiten  (1998a) in a study with chimpanzees. The 
monkeys were allowed to take the reward after the demonstration (Caldwell & 
Whiten, 2003 found that marmosets learned more in such a scrounging context). Each 
demonstration lasted approximately 6 s and monkeys were typically attentive.TF 
made no vocalisations whilst demonsrtating. The tin was reloaded out of sight and the 
subjects were then allowed two minutes to manipulate the box.   
The subjects in the control group were shown the open tin with a reward in it. 
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The lid was torn in the centre and placed next to the box.  Thus, the monkeys were 
given clues to both kinds of end results experienced by animals in the experimental 
conditions; torn in the middle as by "Poke", and detached from the tin as resulting 
from "Lever". In addition, the screwdriver was handled for several seconds, as for 
experimentals, and tapped onto the tin and lid. This was a control for stimulus 
enhancement in the experimental groups. Each session lasted for no more than twenty 
minutes. All sessions were videotaped and subsequently coded by TF and two 
independent judges, as explained in different sections of the results. 
Because of small sample sizes, principal pairwise comparisons between the 
two experimental groups, and between these and controls were tested through Mann-
Whitney U tests. For each variable so tested, we first provide a Kruskal Wallis test 
across the three groups. However, even where this test did not attain the level of p = 
0.05 or below required to offer confidence in the pairwise statistics, we report all of 
these because the overall pattern of marginal significant trends may be instructive 
(Table 6.3). One tailed p values are  reported as  the predictions are clearly uni-
directional  that watching a method will enhance  the success of using it. 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation of Tool  
 Given the tool had been handled by an experimenter during demonstration 
and also while presenting the apparatus to the control group subjects to control for 
stimulus enhancement, it was predicted that if stimulus enhancement occurred, all 
subjects would manipulate the tool in some way or other when tested.  
There was indeed no difference between the number of subjects in the 
experimental groups and the control group in whether the tool was handled (Fisher 
test, p = 0.6). All monkeys handled the tool, with the exception of one in the “Lever” 
group. 
 
Influence of type of model: human coders’ overall judgments. 
Did the monkeys learn through observation how to use the tool? If so, we 
would expect to see a difference between the two experimental groups in the way they 
used the tool to solve the task. In order to test for such a difference, two independent 
judges first viewed the behaviours of the ten subjects without knowing what each 
monkey had seen. The coders were also unaware of the fact that a control group was 
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included in the study. 
Judges scored the behaviour of the subjects on each trial on a scale from one 
to seven: 
A score of 1 indicated that they were confident that the monkey had seen a “Poke” 
technique, whereas a score of 7 indicated that they were confident the monkey had 
seen the “Lever” technique. A score of 4 meant the judge could not tell by the 
behaviour of the monkey what technique that subject had seen. Each monkey’s scores 
were averaged across trials. The independent coders showed a high degree of 
agreement in their scores with a Spearman’s Rank correlation of Rs(10)=0.85, 
P=0.002.  
There was a significant difference in the scores across the three groups 
(Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=6.162, p<0 .05).  Scores were significantly higher in the 
Lever group (median=6.15) than the Poke group (median=2.0); (Mann–Whitney test, 
U=0, n1=3, n2=3, p=0.05); see Fig. 6.2. Thus, viewing the overall behaviour of each 
monkey, the judges were able to correctly determine which of the two techniques the 
subjects in the experimental groups had seen. There was also a significant difference 
between the Control (median=4.19) and Poke (median=2) groups (U=0, n1=4, n2=3, 
p=0.029) but not between the Control and Lever group (U=3.5, n1=4, n2=3, p=0.229); 
(see Fig. 6.2.) 
 
   Figure 2 
1
2
3
4
5
6
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        Poke           Control              Lever
lever  
                                                        
poke
 
Figure 6.2 Mean scores of the two independent coders’ confidence ratings 
for each hand-reared monkey that had witnessed models poke or lever, or as 
controls saw no model. A score of 1 indicates that the coders were confident 
the subject had observed Poke. A score of 7 indicates that the coders were 
confident the subject had observed Lever.  A score of 4 indicates the coders 
were not able to decide what method the subject had observed.  
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Influence of type of model: behaviour counts. 
Which components of the demonstration were monkeys copying? To answer 
this question, twenty five different modes of behaviours were identified and coded by 
T.F.  (See Table 6.2). Additionally, a naive observer coded one trial, taken at random, 
for each monkey. There was a high degree of agreement between the two sets of 
codings across subjects and behaviour categories. (rs250 = 0.93,   P=0.001). A 
behavioural profile was produced for each monkey by calculating the percentage of 
times each of the twenty-five movements was used out of the sum total of movements 
used by that monkey. These behavioural profiles enabled an analysis of Behaviour 
Modes and Orientation of Behaviours, explained further below.  
 
1. Behaviour Categories  
A. “Poke” versus “Lever” tool-use behaviour. To first measure the extent to which a 
monkey tended towards being a “leverer” or a “poker”, behaviours most related to 
either  “lever” or “poke” demonstrations were summed (categories 
2+4+5+7+10+18+19=Lever; categories 1+8+9+22+23+24=Poke; see Table 6.2)  The 
sum of all Lever behaviours was divided by the sum of all Lever and Poke 
behaviours, generating an index of the tendency to behave in one way as opposed to 
the other. An LP-index of 1 meant the monkey was a consistent “leverer” whereas an 
LP index of 0 meant the monkey was a consistent “poker”. 
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Table 6.2 Coded Behaviour Categories. A = High fidelity matching with tool; B = General 
manipulation of tool; C = Low fidelity matching, no tool; D = Non-tool manipulation. 
Exp. 1= testing the enculturated monkeys; Exp. 2= testing mother-reared monkeys;  
Exp. 3= retesting a subgroup of the enculturated monkeys. 
  
Behaviour 
Categories 
Description EXP. 
1 
 
EXP. 
2 
  
EXP. 
3 
 
 1. Poke Pick up tool and bring it straight down on centre 
with/without piercing paper. 
√ √ √ 
 2. Lever Insert tool under rim and pull down handle of 
tool. 
√  √ 
 3. Scratch  Move tool from side to side while the point of the 
tool is in contact with centre of the lid. 
√   
 4. Lever gap Insert tool in gap between tin and box and pull 
down the tool. 
√   
 5. Lever centre Pierce centre with tool and pull it down in a 
levering movement. 
√ √  
 6. Lever near centre 
edge  
Pierce paper close to the edge with tool and pull it 
down in a levering movement. 
√  √ 
 7. Insert tool in rim Place tool in rim without levering movement. √  √ 
 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Poke gap Pick up tool and bring it straight down into the 
slight gap between the box and tin. 
√   
 9. Poke box Pick up tool and bring it straight down on wooden 
box. 
√  √ 
10. Lever box Push edge of tool into wooden box and pull down 
tool handle. 
√   
11. Scratch box Move tool from side to side while the point of the 
tool is in contact with the wooden box. 
√   
12. Bang tool Hold tool horizontally and bang it on apparatus 
with one or two hands. 
√ √  
13. Roll tool Roll tool horizontally on apparatus with one or 
two hands. 
√   
14. Handle object with 
tool  
Bring unconnected object in contact with tool. √   
15. Bang tool on 
ground 
Bang tool horizontally/ vertically on ground.  √  
16. Move tool Move tool away from apparatus.   √ √ 
 
 
 
 
W 
 I 
T 
H 
   
 
 
 
      
T 
O 
O 
L 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
17. Hold or bite tool Hold tool with one or two hands or bite tool √ √ √ 
18. Pull rim with teeth. Hold rim with teeth and pull upwards. √ √  
19. Pull rim with 
fingers 
Insert fingers under rim and pull upwards. √ √ √ 
20. Scratch near rim Scratch lid on inner side of rim with index finger.  √  
21. Scratch centre Scratch centre of lid with index finger  √  
22. Touch/tear centre 
with mouth 
Place lips or teeth on centre and lick or bite. √ √  
23. Push centre with 
hand 
Push centre with fingers or palm of hand. √ √  
24. Tear centre with 
hand 
Tear centre with fingers. √ √ √ 
C 
25. Put object on lid Put unconnected object on lid. √   
26. Pull tin Hold edge of tin and try to pull out of wooden 
box. 
√ √  
27. Push/pull  box Turn the wooden box. √ √  
28. Object on box Put unconnected object on wooden box. √   
29. Scratch box Scratch box with index finger   √  
N 
O 
 
 
T 
O 
O 
L 
 
D 
30. Bite box Bite or lick wooden box. √ √  
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Overall, differences in the LP index across the three groups were not 
significant (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=5.378, P=0.068). However, the LP index was 
significantly higher for the Lever group (median=0.83) than the Poke group 
(median=0.0) (U=0, n1=3, n2=3, p=0.05); see Figure 6.3.  This is consistent with the 
conclusions from the overall judgements above, that the two groups were behaving 
differently towards the apparatus as a function of seeing different models. 
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Figure 6.3 LP (Lever/Poke) Index of overall behaviour for each monkey in 
each condition. An LP-index of 1 indicates the subject was a consistent 
“leverer” whereas an LP index of 0 indicates the subject was a consistent 
“poker”. 
 
The control group produced intermediate LP indices, overlapping the 
distributions of both Lever and Poke groups (P>0.05) in both cases (see Fig. 6.3)  
The LP index was based on a large range of behaviours. Further analysis was 
needed in order to tease out precisely where the difference lay. To this end, behaviour 
counts were analyzed at three different levels of potential matching:  
Level 1: Target behaviour - using the specific behaviour demonstrated (categories 2 
for Lever and 1 for Poke: see Table 6.2).    
Level 2: Target-like behaviour - using a similar tool-use behaviour to that seen but 
used on different parts of the apparatus (categories 4+5+7+10 for Lever and 8+9 for 
Poke). 
Level 3: Outcome-aimed behaviours- behaviours appropriate for the outcome 
witnessed but not using the tool (categories 18+19 for Lever and 22+23+24 for Poke). 
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Two subjects did not use the tool at all (although one of these did manipulate 
and bite it) and were therefore excluded from the analysis of the first two levels. 
Sufficient sample sizes for analysis were here achieved by combining controls with 
the experimental group who had not witnessed each act, as explained in the sections 
that follow. Median ranges and statistical results for these analyses are summarised in 
Table 6.3). 
1. Target behaviours. There was a significant difference between the groups on Lever 
acts (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=6.857, P=0.032). In fact, Lever acts were found only 
in the Lever group (Table 6.3). This difference between the Lever and the two other 
groups combined was significant (U=0, n1=2, n2=6, p=0.036); see Fig. 6.4a.  
Poke behaviour was found in all three groups (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=4.5, 
P=0.105), but more frequently in the Poke group than in the two other groups 
combined (Poke vs Control + Lever, U=0, n1=2, n2=6, p=0.036); see Fig. 6.4b. 
Four monkeys in the two experimental groups very closely reproduced the 
behaviour they had observed. Two appeared to be "locked" exclusively onto the 
behaviour they had seen even when they did not succeed. Not being successful on 
their first attempt they stopped responding, but on seeing an additional demonstration 
they responded again using the same action that they had observed. 
 
Figure 4a 
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Figure 6.4 (a) Percentage of lever-target behaviours used by each subject.  
(b)  Percentage of poke-target behaviours used by each subject.  
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2. Target-like behaviour. A comparison between the groups in displaying Lever 
target-like behaviours showed that there was no significant difference (Kruskal  
Wallis χ²(2)=4.38, P=0.11). The difference in Poke target-like behaviour across the 
groups was not significant: Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=5.44, P=0.066. Both Poke and 
Lever groups had higher values than Controls, but likewise this failed to reach 
significance (U=0, n1=2, n2=4, P=0.067 for both comparisons). 
A closer look at the behaviour of the subjects in the control group showed that 
there was no difference in the tendency to use general poking as compared to general 
levering. Both behaviours were equally common in their repertoires (Wilcoxon test,   
N=4, T = 2, p = 0.59). 
3. Outcome-aimed behaviours. If all that the monkeys had learnt from the 
demonstration was how the lid moved or opened they could have tried to re create this 
end result without necessarily using the tool. Thus, if the monkeys in the Poke group 
had recognised only that in order to gain the reward it was necessary for the lid to be 
pierced, we might expect behaviours aimed towards this outcome such as pushing the 
centre of the lid with the hand or tearing the centre with hand and teeth. The tendency 
to use these modes of behaviour was compared between the groups.  This analysis 
was done including the two non tool-using subjects. 
There was no significant difference between the groups in the tendency to use 
poke-outcome behaviours (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=1.612, P=0.45; see Table 6.3). 
In the same vein, it was expected that if the monkeys in the lever group were 
focused on the movement of the lid they would tend to use behaviours such as pulling 
open the lid from the rim with the hands or teeth. A significant difference in the 
tendency to use lever-outcome behaviours was found between the groups (Kruskal 
Wallis test, χ²(2)=6.636, P=0.036; see Table 6.3). There was a significant difference 
between the two experimental groups (U=0, n1=3, n2=3, P=0.05). Comparing subjects 
who had seen Lever with all those who did not also showed a significant difference 
(U=1, n1=3, n2=7, P=0.017); see Fig. 6.5. Subjects in the Poke group were not using 
these behaviours at all and a comparison between them and the monkeys in the other 
two groups shows a significant difference (U=1.5, n1=3, n2=7, P=0.033). Viewing one 
technique thus had a negative effect on the probability of behaving in other ways.  
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Figure 6.5 Percentage of lever-outcome-aimed behaviours used by each 
subject. 
 
Monkeys in the Control group were using both sets of outcome behaviours 
almost equally (Wilcoxon N=4, T=4, p=0.71).  
 
B. Range of behaviours.  An index of “behavioural range” was calculated by awarding 
each monkey one point for each behaviour category recorded up to a maximum of 25.  
The comparison of interest here is between the two experimental groups combined 
(median 6.5) and the control group (median 12). The control group generated a wider 
range of behaviours than the experimental groups (U=2, n1=6, n2=4, P=0.014; see Fig. 
6.6). 
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Figure 6.6 Number of behaviour categories (see Table 6.2) recorded for each 
monkey: its ‘behavioural range index’. 
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Table 6.3 Human reared study, summary results. Medians (in bold), range (in brackets, rounded to whole numbers except behavioural index) and differences 
with p<0.1 (<0.05 in bold). Dashes indicate p>0.1. 
 
 Lever Control Poke L vs. P L vs. C C vs. P L vs. P+C P vs.L+C 
Observer’s judgment 
 
 
6.15 
(4 –7) 
4.19 
(3-5) 
2 
(1-3) 
P = 0.05 - P = 0.029 Na na 
Lever 
 target behaviour 
 
 
10 
(0)-35) 
0 
(0-0) 
0 
(0)-0) 
- - - P = 0.036 - 
Lever-like, 
 with tool 
 
 
17.3 
(0)-39) 
10.15 
(0-31) 
0 
(0)-0) 
- P = 0.071 
 
- - P = 0.09 
Lever-outcome   
no tool 
 
28.6 
(19-39) 
10.95 
 (0-24) 
0 
(0-0) 
P=0.05 P = 0.057 - P = 0.017 P = 0.033 
Poke target  
behaviour 
 
 
0 
(0)-7) 
5.95 
(2-9) 
37 
(0)-45) 
- - P = 0.064 - P = 0.036 
Poke-like, 
 with tool 
 
 
0 
(0)-7) 
8.6 
(8-33) 
0 
(0)-5) 
- P = 0.067 P = 0.067 - - 
Poke-outcome  
no tool 
 
0 
(0-63) 
8.75 
(0-15) 
33.4 
(7-52) 
- - - - - 
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C. Orientation of behaviours 
 For another comparison between controls and the two experimental groups, 
points were summed across behaviours oriented towards the target parts of the 
apparatus (i.e. the lid of the tin, categories 1-7+18, 19, 22-24, 25). The experimental 
subjects were more orientated towards these target parts of the apparatus (U=2, n1=4, 
n2=6, p=0.019) 
A comparison of the specific part of the lid to which the subjects were 
orientated (categories 2+7+18+19=Rim, categories 1+5+22+23+24=Centre) showed a 
significant difference between the groups (Kruskal Wallis χ² (2)=7.469, p=0.024). The 
subjects in the Lever group were significantly more orientated towards the rim of the 
lid than the subjects in both the “Poke” group (U (3, 3) = 0, p=0.050) and the Control 
group (U (3, 4) = 0, p=0 .029). 
A comparable analysis of the difference between the groups in orientation 
towards the centre of the lid was not significant (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=2.230,  
p=0.328). In summary, monkeys were in general more orientated towards the centre 
of the lid, but subjects in the Lever group showed a strong orientation towards the 
rim, which was absent in the Poke group subjects. 
 
D. Benefit of Social Versus Individual Learning. 
It has been established thus far that the behaviour of the monkeys that had 
viewed the model was influenced by what they had seen: they differed from each 
other and from controls. We assessed if these effects were beneficial to the 
experimental groups by comparing them to controls on two measures: rate of success 
and latency to success.  
Success rate: Two of the subjects in the experimental groups did not succeed in 
obtaining the reward. One did not appear to be motivated at all; the other tried, but did 
not exert enough force into the movement. Two of the subjects in the control-group 
did not succeed either, although they manipulated the entire apparatus.  A Fisher test 
showed no difference between the control and the experimental groups in whether 
individuals were successful (Fisher test, p=0.43). 
Latency:  The difference between the groups in the latency to first success was also 
not significant (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=3.11, P=0.211) (subjects that did not 
manage to retrieve the reward during the three two-minute trials were coded as taking 
361 sec). 
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Sample size and Bonferroni corrections 
When several multiple comparisons are carried out on the same set of data  
there is a risk of making  Type 1 errors, rejecting H0 when it is true (e.g. it is 
statistically  likely that one out of 20 comparisons will be significant at 0.05 by 
chance). The Bonferroni correction is a conservative way to safeguard against this 
mistake, by lowering the alpha value to account for the number of comparisons 
being performed. Thus, if there were n dependent or independent hypotheses tested, 
then the statistical significance level that should be used for each hypothesis 
separately is 1/n times what it would be if only one hypothesis were tested. 
Using the Bonferroni correction does on the other hand dramatically increase 
the risk of making Type II errors, not rejecting a H0 when it is false. 
It is true that were Bonferroni corrections applied in the statistical analysis of 
the data of Experiment 1, most comparisons would have been statistically 
insignificant, especially as the sample size was very small. A significantly larger 
sample size is ideally needed, however such numbers of enculturated monkeys do not 
exist and the results do raise important issues discussed in the following section.  
 
Discussion: Experiment 1 
 
The  following discussion  is  based  on results obtained from  uncorrected p 
values for multiple comparisons, and thus can be  regarded as trends that will require 
larger sample sizes to rigorously test in future.  
Viewing one behavioural method as opposed to another had a definite 
influence on the way observing monkeys later behaved, that was apparent at a global 
level to the independent coders. Quantitative analysis showed that watching a model 
was effective in influencing orientation of subjects even when not using a tool, 
towards the specific part of the apparatus contacted by the model (the lid) whereas 
control group subjects were orientating their behaviour towards all its parts. 
Furthermore, watching the model influenced the orientation to a very specific part of 
the lid, i.e. the rim for the Lever group. Since these analyses were concerned with 
actions not using a tool, the effect documented is not due to the monkeys simply 
replicating what they saw, but is better characterized as a highly localized stimulus 
enhancement effect. A similar effect has also been shown in marmosets (Caldwell & 
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Whiten, 2004). 
Yet, localized stimulus enhancement can not in itself account for the different 
behaviour of the groups. Analyzing the subjects’ behaviour on three different levels of 
fidelity to the model enabled us to see that the third level of outcome-aimed 
behaviours played a role too, consistent with what previous taxonomies of social 
learning have called ‘emulation’ (Tomasello, 1990) or more specifically, ‘result 
emulation’ (Whiten et al. 2004).  However, whereas lever-outcome-aimed behaviours 
contributed to the difference between the groups, with monkeys pulling at the rim 
with hands and teeth instead of the tool, poke-outcome-aimed behaviours did not. In 
addition, subjects in the Lever group tended to use a levering movement when trying 
to pop open the lid using the tool, whereas the Poke group subjects, like controls, did 
not display this behaviour at all. First level behaviours were thus a prominent 
difference between these groups. 
Several subjects were very persistent in using the observed movement 
although they were not always successful. The fact that they hardly (one subject) or 
never (two others) shifted to other movements from their wide potential repertoire (as 
indicated by the controls) emphasizes a strong influence of observation on the 
behaviour of the monkeys. But were they imitating? 
 
Imitation, novelty and response facilitation 
Target levering in the current study appears to meet Whiten and Ham’s 
definition of imitation quoted earlier. Subjects produced very similar behaviours to 
the one they had watched the model perform. The fact that the subjects tried again and 
again to use the technique – in the case of levering, carefully inserting the screwdriver 
under the rim of the lid and levering despite lack of success, suggests a strong effect 
of social learning. Moreover, levering did not occur spontaneously in the control 
group. To this extent it is not part of these monkeys’ repertoire (Helping Hands 
monkeys were not allowed to handle screwdrivers, knives or other similar objects that 
could be used as levers, nor is lid opening part of their training), and so not easily 
dismissed as mere facilitation of existing habits. The two target behaviours in the 
present experiment bear some resemblance to broad categories of  "poke" and "lever" 
action schemes, which in a general sense are “in the monkeys' repertoire”, as was seen 
in the behaviour of the subjects in the control group. However, several authors have 
acknowledged that an imitated behaviour is unlikely ever to be “totally novel”, 
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suggesting that it must suffice for some aspects of the behaviour to be novel (Whiten 
& Ham, 1992), or organized in a different way (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a) in 
order to imply imitative learning. In the present study, using a lever behaviour in a 
very precise way to pop open the lid was not in the repertoire of the monkeys. 
Subjects in the control group did not even try to use it. The type of general levering 
seen in controls was similar to that which is often used to break a piece of wood with 
a levering action (personal observations).  
This was not true of the Poke technique, which was eventually used by two of 
the subjects in the control group. It is perhaps more parsimonious to argue then that 
target-poke behaviour was facilitating an existing response, although the present 
experiment nevertheless involved learning to direct it to a specific location on a novel 
task. 
   
Canalization 
Whatever conclusions are drawn on evidence for imitation specifically, our 
results indicate the operation of significant social learning. It seems that observing the 
behaviour of a conspecific may work as a "sieve": sifting out the inappropriate 
responses and concentrating on those functional for the task. In this study control 
animals were using a wide variety of actions towards the apparatus, whereas the 
monkeys in the experimental group were using a much smaller set of actions. 
Although capuchin monkeys may poke and lever in different ways and for different 
purposes, they are influenced by observation to use one of the movement types 
available to them rather than an alternative and to use it in a particular way and for a 
specific purpose, at the expense of alternative actions.  
Boesch (1996) describes how young wild chimpanzees use only a subset of 
behaviours available in their repertoire when learning how to crack nuts by watching 
others. This subset is limited to the actions they observe when adults in their group 
crack nuts. Chimpanzees in Zurich Zoo, given the same materials, produced a greater 
range of actions.   Boesch calls the focussing process “canalization”; “In nut cracking 
behaviour, social canalization through imitation is at work and it confines the 
individual learning possibilities to the different types of objects that could be used to 
pound the nuts" (Boesch, 1996 p.257). A somewhat similar process of canalization 
seems to be taking place in the capuchins we studied.  Control group subjects were 
using many movements in their repertoire whereas the experimental group subjects 
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chose mainly, and sometimes only, the movement they observed. 
Thus, through a process of localized stimulus enhancement the monkeys are 
able to receive information about very precise parts of the object to be dealt with. If, 
in addition, viewing a conspecific canalizes specific behaviours from a wide 
repertoire, then these two processes acting together could be highly influential in 
learning a new task in a social environment. 
 
Social vs. Individual Learning  
A clear advantage of social learning over individual learning was not seen in 
this study. Overall, monkeys who had not observed a model were just as successful in 
gaining a reward as were those who saw a demonstration.  
The process of social learning through canalization may appear to be 
potentially beneficial in avoiding the necessity to try out different behaviours in the 
repertoire, saving time. On the other hand, canalization may have a blocking effect, as 
seen with the persistence of some subjects in using the observed behaviour although it 
was not working for them. In a case like this it could have been more beneficial for 
them to try a different way of solving the task, and indeed one of the subjects (Kim) 
did this.  This monkey, although observing the "Lever" technique, seemed to have 
guessed right from the beginning that the lid was not solid and tore through it with her 
teeth no matter what she saw and without using or touching the tool.  
However, conclusions about functional issues should not be over emphasized 
in this particular experimental setting. In a captive environment, where manipulating 
objects and tools is a playful occupation and not necessary for survival, time saving 
considerations may be a less important factor. Since the subjects were tested alone 
there was also no competition with conspecifics. These factors may partly explain 
why lose-shift strategies appeared uncommon.   
 
Enculturation 
Visalberghi & Fragaszy (1990a) concluded that as far as tool-use behaviour is 
concerned, their capuchins did not show evidence of learning to perform a task from 
observing the performance of skilful others. The results of this study and of a previous 
study carried out with many of the same monkeys (Custance, Whiten & Fredman, 
1999), imply that the capuchins we studied are showing a higher degree of social 
learning than others tested elsewhere.  One possible explanation is that the subjects in 
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the present experiment and in Custance et al. (1999) were brought up in a special 
environment with a very close relationship with a human care taker. Experiments with 
hand reared chimpanzees have suggested that these chimpanzees were more inclined 
to imitate than mother reared chimpanzees (Tomasello et al. 1993b). Call and 
Tomasello (1996) suggested that imitative abilities, among other skills, are a result of 
human raised chimpanzees being treated as intentional beings, as with human infants 
(Kaye, 1982). 
During such interaction with a human, capuchin monkeys too may learn to be 
more attentive to the behaviour of the human “significant other”. It has not been  
established that capuchins understand the intentions of others, but monkeys may learn 
to be attentive to the behaviour of the familiar human through recognizing their utility 
as "social tools" without necessarily understanding their intentions (Bering, 2004). 
The behaviour of Cacao, one of the subjects in this study, illustrated this tendency. 
She tried to gain the reward using the action she had observed ("Poke") but was not 
using enough force to pierce the thick paper. She then consistently (10 times) tried to 
get help by taking the experimenter’s hand and putting the tool in it. When the 
experimenter did not react to her request she poked the lid gently with the tool and put 
it in the experimenter’s hand again.  Similar behaviours are found in human raised 
chimpanzees who use imperative gestures to gain human attention when requesting 
(Call & Tomasello, 1996).  
In addition, the fact that the human raised capuchins are almost always 
tolerated and close to the human while learning a new task enables them to benefit 
from the skilled human. Visalberghi & Fragaszy (1990a), while discussing the way 
young  chimpanzees learn from their mothers, suggested that this "coaction of a 
skilled model and learner, in which the model allows the learner to participate 
intimately in its actions, is probably the most effective setting for learning a novel 
motor skill in nonhumans"  (p.267). Possibly the special social context of our own 
studies encouraged such a tendency. 
However, the influence of human rearing cannot be seriously addressed 
without testing mother-reared capuchin monkeys on the same task. This is the subject 
of the next experiment.  
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Experiment 2: Mother-Reared Capuchins Tested Socially 
 
Our second experiment was designed to test social influence on the acquisition 
of the same tool use task as in Experiment 1 but in a more naturalistic environment. 
The monkeys in this experiment were mother-reared capuchin monkeys living in 
social groups. They were tested after observing conspecific models.  
These monkeys did not have as much experience manipulating and using tools 
as the hand-raised monkeys; nevertheless, they have had access to natural objects 
such as sticks, stones and pieces of wood, which they occasionally manipulated and 
used as tools (e.g. using a stick to rake in out-of-reach objects, or a stone to break 
open hard-shelled food items).  
Methods 
 
Subjects   
The subjects were 14 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella); 11 males and 3 
females (age range 2-25 years) living in three different groups, which used to 
constitute one big group. Two of the groups live in a Monkey Park near Tel Aviv in 
open outdoor enclosures (one of 80 m2, the other 500 m2). The third group lives in a 
large cage (120 m2) in a nearby zoo.  
 
Apparatus  
 
The same task as in Experiment 1.  
 122 
 
Table 6.4 Assignment of mother–raised subjects to experimental and control groups.  
 
Name Gender Age (Yr) Condition 
 
Housing 
Seffy Male 8 Poke Enclosure 1 
Shpigler Male 9 Poke Enclosure 1 
Milky Male 8 Poke Enclosure 1 
Zed Female 9 Poke Enclosure 1 
Blacky Male 5 Lever Cage 
Ziva Female 20 Lever Cage 
Max Male 17 Lever Cage 
Ktantan Male 3 Lever Cage 
Scarface Male 25 Control Enclosure 2 
Dark Male 9 Control Enclosure 2 
Dor Male 5 Control Enclosure 2 
Dali Male 2 Control Enclosure 2 
Dolche Female 3 Control Enclosure 2 
Hozelito Male 3 Control Enclosure 2 
 
 
 
Procedure  
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1 but with four differences:  
1. The groups, not the individual monkeys, were assigned to either one of two 
experimental groups or a control group (see Table 6.4). Due to different housing 
conditions, the group housed in the cage was assigned to one of the experimental 
groups and not the Control. This was done in order to make sure that their somewhat 
more barren housing, that might lead to less target behaviours overall, would not be 
confounded with the control condition. 
2. The monkeys were not tested individually, but rather together with other members 
of their group. Separating these monkeys from their companions caused them to be 
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nervous. (The hand–raised monkeys were used to being alone).  Several task boxes 
were used simultaneously in order that all subjects could gain access to the task.  
3. The demonstrator was a high ranking (but not alpha) group-mate male likely to 
gain attention (these monkeys were not accustomed to being in close contact with 
humans, unlike the hand-raised monkeys).    
4. The monkeys viewed all the demonstrations before being tested on the task 
themselves. They shared the reward with the model monkey. This was done since it 
was estimated that once the subjects would have the chance to try the box themselves 
it would be difficult to have the model demonstrate again. In the one group, the 
monkeys observed the model in an adjacent cage; in the second, the model was with 
the subject monkeys in their enclosure 
The two monkey models were taught the different methods through shaping.  
 Monkey models performed actively with the observer present, like the human model 
taking just a few seconds to open the tin, and observers appeared to attend well, 
perhaps encouraged by the opportunity top gain food at this time. 
The procedure for the control group was similar to that in Experiment 1. The 
subjects were presented with both end states of the open tin: the lid was torn in the 
center and placed next to the box. The screwdriver was handled by the experimenter 
(familiar to the monkeys and known to sometimes show interesting objects) for a few 
seconds and tapped onto the tin and lid. Subjects were then allowed to take the reward 
out of the open tin.  Each subject had three consecutive tests after five such 
experiences. 
All sessions were videotaped. 
 
Results            
Occurrence of Tool Use and Tool Manipulation  
Eleven of the fourteen subjects (78%) manipulated the tool, but only one of 
them used it as a means to open the lid. This monkey, Milky, had witnessed some of 
the training trials for the model and thus his behaviour should be treated with 
reservation. He used the tool to pierce through the lid as soon as the trial began. He 
used a poking movement as well as a levering movement on the paper covering the 
centre of the lid. By watching the model learn to use the tool this monkey had 
possibly learnt the behaviour but of course we cannot be sure. There was no 
significant difference between the number of subjects in the experimental groups and 
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the control group in the tendency to handle or manipulate the tool (Fisher test, 
P=0.15)  
 
Influence of Type of Model: Overall Judgments 
Although tool-using behaviour was scarcely seen, the question still remained 
whether the groups differed in behaviours reflecting what they had seen. 
Two independent judges viewed the behaviour of the subjects in the same way 
as in Experiment 1, so that scores of 1 and 7 corresponded to Poke and Lever 
respectively. The independent coders showed a high degree of agreement in their 
scores, with a Spearman's Rank correlation of Rs(14)=0.89, P=0.05. The difference in 
the behaviour of the monkeys in the three groups was tested using the mean score 
given by the two coders.  
The overall differences between the groups on this score did not achieve 
significance (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=5.316, P=0.07), although scores were higher in the 
Lever group (median=5.73) than in the Poke group (median=2.75) (Mann Whitney 
test, U= 1.5, n1=4, n2=4, P =0.043).  There was a significant difference between the 
Control (median=4.77) and Poke groups (U=2.5 n1=4, n2=6, P=0.024) but not 
between the Control and Lever groups (U=9.5, n1=4, n2=6, P=0.32); see Fig. 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Mean scores of the two independent coders’ confidence ratings for each mother-
reared monkey that had witnessed models poke or lever, or as controls saw no model. Scores 
as for Figure 6.2. 
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Influence of Type of Model: Behaviour Counts 
The monkeys in this experiment were not using as many behaviours as those 
in Experiment 1. On the other hand there were four extra non-tool use behaviours 
identified by TF for this group of monkeys (categories 15,16, 20, 21, 29; see Table 
6.2). 
A naive observer coded one random trial for each monkey. There was a high 
degree of agreement across subjects and behaviours between the two codings 
(Rs238=0.99, p=0.001).  
A behavioural profile was produced for each monkey, as in Experiment 1. As 
no tool use behaviour was seen (except for the one subject) analysis was carried out 
only on the third level, outcome-aimed behaviours. 
 
Outcome-aimed behaviours. All behaviours appropriate for the outcome witnessed, 
either Lever (categories 18+19) or Poke (categories 1+21+22+23+24) were summed 
producing an index of outcome-aimed behaviours for each monkey.  
The difference between the groups in lever outcome-aimed actions was 
significant (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=9.74, P=0.01). Subjects in the Lever group 
(median=54.1) scored significantly higher than the Poke group (median=0.0) (U=0, 
n1=4, n2=4, P=0 .014); see Fig. 6.8.  As in Experiment 1, subjects in the Poke group 
did not use this method at all. There was no significant difference between the Control 
and Lever groups in this behaviour (U=4, n1=4, n2=6, P=0.057). 
Poke outcome-aimed behaviours were also significantly different between the 
three groups (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=6.214, P=0.045). The Poke group scored 
significantly higher on Poke outcome-aimed behaviours (median = 58.0) than the 
Control group (median=28.2) (U= 0, n1=4, n2=6, P=0.005, see Table 6.5) 
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Figure 6.8 Percentage of lever-outcome-aimed behaviours used by each monkey  
 
The difference between Poke (median=58.0) and Lever (median=5.0) groups 
was not significant, principally because one of the subjects in the Lever group mainly 
pierced the lid (U=3, n1=4, n2=4, P=0.08). However, the Poke group showed more 
Poke outcome-aimed behaviours than Control and Lever combined (U= 3, n1=10, 
n2=4, P=0.007). 
There was no significant difference in the tendency of the control group 
subjects to use Lever versus Poke outcome-aimed behaviours (Wilcoxon test n=6 T = 
1.153, P=0.156). 
 
B. Range of behaviours. An index of “behavioural range” was calculated as in 
Experiment 1. Each monkey was awarded a point for each behaviour category 
recorded up to a maximum of 16.  The difference between the groups on this score 
was significant (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=9.491, P= 0.01). A comparison of this index 
between the two experimental groups combined (median=4) and the control group 
(median=7.5) showed a significant difference (U=5, n1=8, n2=6, P=0.001); see Fig. 
6.9. Thus the subjects in the experimental groups were focused on a smaller set of 
behaviours than the controls.   
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Table 6.5 Mother reared study, summary results. Medians (in bold), range of behaviour 
counts (in brackets, rounded to whole numbers) and differences with p<0.1 (<0.05 in bold). 
Dashes indicate p>0.1. 
 
        
 Lever Control Poke L VS. 
P 
L VS. 
C 
P VS. 
C 
L+C 
VS P 
P+C  
VS L 
Observers'          
judgment 
 
5.72 
(3- 7) 
4.77 
(4-6) 
2.75    
(2-4) 
P = 
0.043 
- P = 
0.024 
 
- 
 
- 
Lever  
Outcome 
 
54.1 
(26-91) 
14.15 
(10–67) 
0 
(0-0) 
P= 
0.014 
P = 
0.057 
P = 
0.005 
 
- 
P= 0.012 
Poke 
Outcome 
 
5 
(0-74) 
34.5 
(18-42) 
58 
(44–100) 
 
- 
 
- 
P = 
0.005 
P=0.007  
- 
 
 
 
C.  Orientation of behaviours.  Orientation towards the target area (the lid) did not 
show an overall difference between the groups (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=4.92 P=0.085), 
but a significant difference was found in testing only between the Control group 
(median=55.7) and the two experimental groups combined (median=92.9) (U=7, 
n1=8, n2=6, P=0.015). 
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Figure 6.9 Number of behaviour categories (see Table 6.2) recorded for each monkey: its 
‘behavioural range index’. 
 
 
Benefit of Social vs Individual Learning. 
It has been established thus far that the behaviour of the monkeys viewing the 
model was influenced by what they had seen. Two measures for benefits of social 
learning were tested. 
Success:  Although only one applied the tool to the task, seven of the eight monkeys 
in the experimental groups were successful in obtaining the reward compared to only 
two of the six in the control group. A Fisher test showed a marginally significant 
difference in success rate between the control and the experimental groups combined 
(Fisher exact test, P=0.06). 
 Latency:  Comparing the latency to first success showed a significant difference 
between the groups (Kruskal Wallis χ²(2)=7.26, P=0.027). Subjects in the control 
group (median=361 sec) were significantly slower gaining the reward compared to the   
subjects in the two experimental groups combined (median=26 sec) (U=4, n1=6, n2=8, 
P=0.003). 
 
 
Discussion: Experiment 2. 
 
Imitation, Emulation, and Object Movement Re-enactment 
The monkeys did not learn tool using behaviour from watching the model, but 
experimentals were nevertheless faster and more successful than controls in opening 
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the lid. There are several possible explanations for these results. One is that the 
observers had recognized a desirable result in the models’ opening of the lid and were 
trying to attain this using their own method.  This corresponds with Wood’s (1989) 
definition of learning through emulation, later called result-emulation by Whiten et al. 
(2004). Being orientated to this outcome, many of the monkeys perhaps saw the tool 
as an obstacle rather than a means to reach their goal and so moved it aside. However, 
learning through result-emulation implies that only the end-state of the stimuli is 
learned whereas monkeys in the control group were also presented with the end-state 
of the apparatus taking the reward from the opened box, yet were less successful in 
later opening the box by themselves. This means that some aspect of what the model 
performed was important in order to produce successful goal orientated behaviours 
and not just the mere end-state of the object.  
Several different aspects of this performance could have been important for 
learning. As discussed for Experiment 1, the difference in outcome-aimed behaviours 
implies greater matching to the results attained by the model than mere stimulus 
enhancement. Perhaps then, the monkeys were re-creating the movement of the lid, 
which they observed in the demonstration, a form of emulation sometimes called 
affordance learning (Whiten et al. 2004). Alternatively, the monkeys may have 
perceived the tool as an extension of the demonstrator’s hand and roughly copied the 
action of the “tool-and–hand” on the apparatus, using their own hand but without a 
tool. This could be interpreted as a low – fidelity form of imitation. Differentiating  
such alternative explanations would require further experiments designed explicitly to 
do so such as ‘ghost’ conditions in which only the objects move (Tennie, Call & 
Tomasello, 2006).  
 
 
Canalization 
The process of canalization was evident for this population of monkeys as it 
was in Experiment 1. Monkeys who viewed a demonstrator used a much smaller set 
of actions than the ones who had not seen the demonstrator. Furthermore, although 
both sets of outcome aimed behaviours were in the repertoire of the monkeys, as 
demonstrated in the behaviour of the control group, monkeys who viewed one method 
hardly used any behaviours related to the other method. This effect was strong for the 
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 Poke group but less so for the Lever group (one of the subjects in this group mainly 
used poke actions).   
 
Social versus individual learning 
In this experiment, as opposed to Experiment 1, social learning had a strong 
influence on the success rate. Monkeys who had not seen a model were less 
successful in gaining the reward than those who had. The two control subjects who 
did succeed in gaining the reward did so an order of magnitude more slowly than 
subjects in the experimental groups. As this experiment was carried out in a group 
environment, competing with conspecifics may have resulted in the subjects being 
more focused, attempting quickly to gain the rewards rather than playing with the 
apparatus as the subjects in Experiment 1 were perhaps more prone to do. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Canalization 
In this context of social learning, canalization refers to a focusing or sculpting 
within the behavioural repertoire, neglecting potential responses to a situation that has 
not been witnessed, whilst strengthening, adapting and /or copying aspects of the 
actions observed to be performed by others. Canalization appears to be a strong 
underlying process of social learning in the capuchin monkeys we studied, although it 
took somewhat different forms in the two populations. 
 
Hand Raised vs. Mother Reared Monkeys 
The behaviour of the monkeys in both populations showed that they were 
definitely influenced by observing a model skilfully open the box. However, this 
influence was manifested in different ways, mainly in that the mother reared monkeys 
typically did not use the tool. As noted in the introduction, the feasibility of 
explaining such differences is constrained by the fact that multiple factors 
differentiate the groups. However of these, we judge two are relatively implausible. 
First, the human may have offered a clearer model, but even so, the capuchin models 
were assiduous tool users, so tool use was amply present in the displays witnessed. 
Second, the mother reared monkeys were tested in a group; yet again, they had ample 
opportunity to watch a tool-using model and use the tool if they wished. Accordingly 
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we suggest that some other explanations are more worthy of discussion and further 
study, relating to either technical experience or cognitive abilities. 
 
a. Experience in Tool Using 
The human-raised monkeys had extensive experience with different objects 
and tools. During their lives they may have learned about the properties of these (Call 
& Tomasello, 1996), rendering it easier for them to socially learn relatively new ways 
to utilize a tool.  This could be tested by supplying mother-reared monkeys with a 
richer variety of objects in the long term, offering tool and material experiences that 
human reared monkeys have typically had, then testing for imitation of tool use. 
 
b. Different Cognitive Processes  
Enculturation  may alternatively have the effect of elevating some cognitive 
processes, which may facilitate imitation or other relatively sophisticated social 
learning mechanisms. If so so we might expect to find evidence for other cognitive 
abilities such as perspective taking or sensitivity to other’ intentions in this 
population. 
 
c. Perceiving humans as social tools 
A third possibility is that the monkeys had learned to use humans as a "social 
tool", using a familiar human for help (as when we observed them handing over an 
object to receive help in manipulating it) as well as benefiting from carefully 
watching his/her behaviour. This would imply that a capacity for complex social 
learning is in the range of Cebus cognitive ability, being manifested when the monkey 
lives in a social environment that emphasizes and rewards close attention to a 
competent other. Discussing ape-human relationships, Bering (2004; see Tomasello & 
Call 2004, for a reply) described this as the ‘apprenticeship hypothesis’ and our 
results appear consistent with it. Further studies as indicated above will be needed to 
discriminate amongst these forms of ‘enculturation’ effect.  
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Experiment 3: Reversal of previous habits 
Experiment 1 was carried out with a small number of subjects, as there are 
very few enculturated monkeys. In an attempt to override this limitation, four subjects 
were tested again after several years. Adding the results of this experiment to those of 
the corresponding experimental groups in Experiment 1 increases the sample size for 
statistical analyses. If the monkeys are more inclined to use the method demonstrated 
to them in Experiment 3, despite having seen and tried the other method in 
Experiment 1, this would strengthen the evidence for high fidelity social learning in 
the enculturated monkeys.  
 
Method 
 
Subjects   
The subjects were two females, Hezda and Cacao, and two males, Adam and Rusty 
(see Table 6.6.). 
 
Table 6.6 Assignment of enculturated subjects to experimental conditions. 
 
Gender Age(Yr) Condition Ex. 1 Condition Ex. 3 
Hezda Female 15  Lever Poke 
Adam* Male 18 Control/Lever Poke 
Cacao Female 11  Poke Lever 
Rusty Male 16 Poke Lever 
 
* It should be noted that Adam was part of the control group in Experiment 1 but later 
was taught “Lever” as it was planned he would serve as a model  in Experiment 2. 
Thus, for the sake of this experiment he was considered to have seen Lever in the past 
and therefore was shown Poke in Experiment 3. However the result of his behaviour 
in Experiment 1  is representive of  the control group he was assigned to. 
 
Apparatus  
The same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Procedure  
The same as in Experiment 1. 
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Results 
 
Influence of type of model: human coders’ overall judgments. 
Independent judges scored the behaviour of the subjects on each trial on a 
scale from one to seven: 
A score of 1 indicated that they were confident that the monkey had seen a “Poke” 
technique, whereas a score of 7 indicated that they were confident the monkey had 
seen the “Lever” technique. A score of 4 meant the judge could not tell by the 
behaviour of the monkey which technique the subject had seen. Each monkey’s scores 
were averaged across trials. 
Unfortunately, there was no significant agreement between the independent 
coders (Spearman’s Rank correlation of Rs (4) =0.4, P=0.6). This disagreement 
appeared to be a result of ranking Rusty’s trials since he used elements of both 
methods together. Eliminating Rusty’s trials results in a perfect correlation between 
the coders Rs (3) =1. Accordingly, these results were used together with the averaged 
results of the two coders for Rusty.  
The results of the independent coders in Experiment 3 were then added to the 
corresponding results from Experiment 1 providing altogether 5 data points for each 
experimental condition. This involves using data from certain individuals twice. To 
this extent, these pairs of data points are not statistically independent. However, for 
the present analysis, the reversal of the demonstration type (e.g. from poke in 
Experiment 1 to lever in Experiment 3) means that the duplicated use of these subjects 
weights the study against finding statistically significant effects, rather than 
artifactually creating them. Thus below, the data are treated as if independent and a 
Mann-Whitney test applied.  
There was a significant difference in the scores across the three groups 
(Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=6.45, P=0 .04).  Scores were significantly higher in the 
Lever group (median=5.33) than the Poke group (median=3.0); (Mann–Whitney test, 
U=0, n1=5, n2=5, P=0.016). Thus, the new results strengthen the conclusion that by 
viewing the overall behaviour of each monkey, it is possible to correctly determine 
which of the two techniques the subjects in the experimental groups had seen. There 
 was also a significant difference between the Control (median=4.19) and Poke 
(median=3) groups (U=2, n1=4, n2=5, P=0.032) but not between the Control and 
Lever groups (U=6.5, n1=4, n2=5, P=0.23) (see Table 6.7). 
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Influence of Type of Model: Behaviour Counts 
The monkeys’ behaviour was coded using the categories in Table 6.2 . A naive 
observer coded one random trial for each monkey. There was a high degree of 
agreement across subjects and behaviours between the two codings (Rs=0.96, 
P=0.001).  
In order to  measure the extent to which a monkey tended towards being a 
“leverer” or a “poker”, behaviours most related to either  “lever” or “poke” 
demonstrations were summed (categories 2+4+5+7+10+18+19=Lever; categories 
1+8+9+22+23+24=Poke; see Table 6.2)  The sum of all Lever behaviours was 
divided by the sum of all Lever and Poke behaviours, generating an LP index of the 
tendency to behave in one way as opposed to the other. 
The LP  behavioural index was then calculated for each monkey. An LP-index 
of 1 meant the monkey was a consistent “leverer” whereas an LP index of 0 meant the 
monkey was a consistent “poker”. These results were then added to the results of 
Experiment 1 in order to obtain  a larger pool of data for this population of  monkeys. 
Overall, differences in the LP index across the three groups were now 
significant (Kruskal  Wallis test, χ² (2) =7.49, P=0.024). The LP index was 
significantly higher for the Lever group (median=0.66) than the Poke group 
(median=0) (U=0, n1=5, n2=5, p=0.004). The difference in the LP index between the 
control group and each of the experimental groups did not reach significance even 
with the addition of these subjects (see Table 6.7). 
 The difference of the LP between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 is 
illustrated in Fig. 6. For Hezda and Adam, who saw Poke in Experiment 3, the sum of 
1-LP was calculated for each experiment. For Rusty and Cacao who saw Lever in 
Experiment 3 LP was plotted as it is (see fig. 6.10). 
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Figure 6.10 Change of LP for each monkey from Ex. 1 to Ex. 3. 
For Hezda and Rusty who saw Poke in Ex. 3 (1-LP) was calculated. 
 
 
Table 6.7 Enculturated monkeys' summary results. Medians (in bold), range of 
behaviour counts (in brackets, rounded to whole numbers, except for indexes) and differences 
with p<0.1 (<0.05 in bold). Dashes indicate p>0.1. 
 
 
       N = 
Lever 
5 
Control 
4 
Poke 
5 
L VS. 
P 
L VS. 
C 
C VS. P L VS. 
P+C 
P VS. 
+C 
Observers’ 
judgment 
 
 
5.33  
(4 –7) 
4.19 
(4-5) 
3 
 (1-4) 
P= 
0.016 
- P =  
0.032 
NA NA 
LP index 0.66 
 (0.31-
1) 
0.52 
(0-0.72) 
0 
(0-0.29) 
P= 
0.004 
- -   
Lever 
Target 
Behaviour 
14 
(0)-35) 
0 
(0-0) 
4 
(0)-15) 
P= 
0.014 
 
P=0.014  
- P= 
0.011 
NA 
Poke 
Target 
Behaviour 
7 
(0)-26) 
5.95 
(2-9) 
37 
(0)-64 
P= 
0.029 
- P= 
0.014 
NA P= 
0.011 
 
 The four monkeys in this experiment were very focused on the target using 
only a few actions to reach it. Thus, only the level of Target behaviours was analyzed 
for these subjects. 
 
Target behaviours. There was a significant difference between the groups on Lever 
acts (Kruskal Wallis test, χ² (2)=7.538, P=0.023). The difference between the Poke 
(median = 4) and Lever (median = 14.35) groups was significant (U=0  n1=4, n2=4 
p=0.014) (see Table 6.7) as well as the  difference between the Lever group (median = 
14.35) and Control group (median = 0) was significant (U=0 n1=4, n2=4 p=0.014). 
The addition of subjects in this experiment resulted in a significant difference 
between the groups in Poke behaviour (Kruskal Wallis test, χ²(2)=6.731, P=0.035). 
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Monkeys in the Poke group (median =41) were significantly more focused on Poke 
than monkeys in the Lever group (median= 15) (U=1, n1=4, n2=4, p=0.029) as well as 
more than monkeys in the Control group (median= 5.95) (U=0, n1=4, n2=4, p=0.014). 
The difference in percent of target behaviour between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 3 is shown in Fig. 6.11a and b. 
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Figure 6.11 A comparison of the percent of target behaviour out of all coded behaviours for 
each monkey in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3. a) Lever target behaviour b) Poke target 
behaviour (In Exp. 3 -Hezda and Adam saw Poke, Cacao and Rusty saw Lever). 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment support the results of Experiment 1: 
enculturated capuchin monkeys show a higher fidelity of copying  a demonstrator  
than has been seen in previous studies. The results of this experiment have an even  
stronger implication for this ability in the capuchin monkeys, as the four  subjects 
have  observed a different  method in the past and used it with some degree of 
success.  
The way Rusty combined both methods while trying to open the lid  is 
interesting since there was no causal  connection between  the two parts of his 
behaviour; namely, punctuing  a hole in the lid and taking the lid off. It was a 
combination of information  Rusty gleaned from  past  experience together with the 
new information obtained from the current demonstration. Thus, Rusty’s  behavour 
may be a good  illustration  of how new information acquired socially can be 
intergrated with previous information  to create a change in the observer’s behaviour. 
Adding more trials  might have shown the course of change as by the third trial Rusty 
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was already  trying to insert the tool into the rim of the lid, which is required when 
using  the Lever method.  
The two subjects  who saw  “Poke” after having seen  “Lever”  in Expeiment 1 
produced the Poke  action  as of the first trial. Hezda did show one instance of 
inserting the tool in the rim of the lid but did not pursue this method, which she had 
done so well in Experiment 1. However this does not mean that the monkeys were 
better imitators, as it  has already been established  in Experiment 1 that poking is an 
easier method for  capuchin monkeys. This was seen in the fact that the control 
subjects  in Experiment 1 also poked, whereas none of them levered.  
Thus, poking may not need  much practice in order to be used  successfully.  
 
Requesting help 
As in Experiment 1, Cacao showed gestures for requesting help. Interestingly, 
these gestures were only seen in the last trial, the only trial where she tried to insert 
the tool in the rim, associated with lever target behaviour.  
 
Conclusion 
The results of Experiment 3 support the claim for high fidelity action copying 
in the enculturated monkeys.  
The ability to switch from a known method to a different new one, as has been 
shown in this experiment, is the basis for cultural change through social learning. In a 
different situation, an animal may acquire a new behaviour which is based in some 
aspect of the old familiar one but has a new, advantageous element. This is the 
essence of cumulative culture learning which will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
 
TESTING FOR CUMULATIVE CULTURE IN CAPUCHIN MONKEYS 
 
Cumulative cultural evolution is considered to be one of the characteristics of 
human culture. Only a few examples of such learning processes have been described 
in non- human animals.  It has been already shown  (Coffee Tin study, Artificial Fruit 
study) that two different variants  of a behaviour seeded in two groups can result in 
socially transmitted behaviour of low fidelity in mother reared monkeys but higher 
fidelity in the enculturated subjects. The present study was designed to test whether 
these populations of monkeys could show cumulative social learning. In Experiment 
1, seven mother reared capuchin monkeys were given a box with jam inside it. One of 
the monkeys retrieved the jam by inserting a stick into a little gap in the box, after 
which 5 other monkeys showed the same Gap behaviour.  Next, they observed a 
monkey model demonstrate a more complex yet more efficient Poke method to obtain 
the reward. Five out of the seven monkeys who had demonstrated the Gap method 
switched to the new Poke method. In the next phase, the same model demonstrated an 
even more efficient Complex method. None of the monkeys managed to switch to this 
method although some behaviours related to the Complex method were seen.  
In Experiment 2, four enculturated capuchin monkeys observed the same 
model. One monkey discovered the Poke method on his own during the baseline 
trials. The other three learned this method after observing a model. They were also 
able to switch to the Complex method after the same model had demonstrated this 
method. 
Possible relevant differences between the two populations are discussed 
regarding the capacity for cumulative culture.  
 
Introduction 
 In recent years there has been a vast amount of  new findings on behavioural 
diversity   among capuchin groups in their natural habitat in South America. In 
Chapter 3 of this thesis I reviewed these findings in detail. A range of behavioural 
domains  has been observed including different food processing techniques (Panger et 
al 2002) substrate use (Boinski et al 2003), tool use (Ottoni & Mannu 2001) and 
hunting behaviour (Perry et al  2003; Rose et al 2003) as well as a diversity of social 
conventions between different groups (Perry 2003).  Such diversity has been termed 
"tradition", implying that the difference in behaviours between the groups is based on 
social transmission and is not a result of ecological or genetic factors (McGrew, 
1998).  
However two issues still need to be addressed. Firstly, most of these 
observations of traditions in capuchin societies in nature have not enabled researchers 
to determine the mechanism underlying their spread since data on such a process are 
not usually available in natural conditions.  
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Secondly, in Chapter 3, I claimed that using Whiten & van Schaik's (2007) 
criteria for culture it is possible to portray the wealth of Cebus traditions as culture. 
However culture, as seen in human societies, is characterized not only by its 
behavioural diversity between different groups but also by the way it evolves 
cumulatively, by placing a new brick of knowledge upon an old one that usually 
results in  more efficient behaviour.  Some researchers have argued that high fidelity 
imitation is a prerequisite for this ratchet- like process of cumulative social learning 
(Tomasello et al 1993; Tomasello, 1999) since the behavioural variants must first be 
copied before they can be altered over the course of generations. Thus, such a 
cumulative learning process leads to an evolution of complex behaviours, which a 
single individual could not learn alone (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Social facilitation, 
which could account for traditions in different communities, cannot account for a 
cumulative effect (Alvard, 2003).  According to these authorities this is why only a 
very few suggestive examples of cumulative social learning have been found in non- 
human animals (Tomasello et al 1993; Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Tomasello, 1999). 
Such examples include nut cracking, parasite manipulation and well- digging by 
chimpanzees (Boesch, 2003), and tool manufacture in New Caledonian crows (Hunt 
& Gray, 2003).  
On the other hand, McGrew (2004) put forward the idea that lower fidelity 
processes such as local enhancement can also be the basis for cumulative social 
learning. He argued that the change  Japanese monkeys made to washing sweet 
potatoes in salty water after having washed them previously in sweet water is an 
example of cumulative learning through local enhancement. Matsuzawa (2003) states 
that the behaviour of pool making by Japanese macaque monkeys is an example of the 
ratchet effect in these monkeys. After the behaviour of washing sweet potatoes and 
rice had spread, a new behaviour started, which made use of the acquired one. 
Monkeys made little pools by digging in the sand until they got to the water. Then 
they would use these pools to wash the potatoes or throw wheat in the pools.   
Thus cumulative social learning, according to McGrew and Matsuzawa, may 
be found in a species which does not necessarily show evidence of high fidelity 
imitation. It has been already shown (Coffee Tin study in Chapter 5, Artificial Fruit 
study, Custance, Whiten & Fredman, 1999) that two different variants of a behaviour 
seeded in two groups can result in socially transmitted behaviour although of low 
fidelity in mother reared monkeys and higher fidelity in the enculturated subjects. 
 140 
Considering this, it is reasonable to predict that a naive monkey observing a new 
behaviour, without having been first exposed to another variant of it, could learn the 
behaviour through social learning. However, can the intermediate generation, those 
monkeys who are already accustomed to using a certain behaviour, appreciate a more 
advantageous variant and switch to the new behaviour after observing an inventor or 
immigrant monkey use it? 
The following "Dipping- Box" study was carried out in order to address this 
question as well as others: 
a. Would a new behaviour seeded in a group of capuchin monkeys spread to the rest 
of the group, and more importantly, how?  
b. Can capuchin monkeys make use of knowledge learned socially in a cumulative 
way? Can a new tradition brought in by an immigrant monkey overpower an old 
established one or does the old one continue to exist?  If a new tradition spreads, does 
each monkey continue to use both methods, or are the two traditions kept in the group 
with different subgroups using them? 
In Experiment 1 of this study the Island group monkeys served as subjects to 
answer these questions. 
 In Experiment 2 of this study, the Enculturated monkeys were tested on the 
same Dipping-Box apparatus with the aim of answering the following questions: 
a. As in Experiment 1, is social learning strong enough to evoke a quick shift from 
one method to the more effective other one? 
b. In the Coffee-tin experiment we inquired whether the enculturated monkeys who 
showed the ability to copy the behaviour of a human model would also be able to do 
so if the model were a conspecific. In Experiment 2 of this study the model was a 
monkey so as to further explore this question.  
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Experiment 1: The mother-reared monkeys 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
The subjects in this study were the monkeys of the Island group (see Chapter 
4): four males and three females. However, by the time this experiment was carried 
out, these monkeys were not living on the island any more, but had moved to a 6 x 6 x 
3 meter cage divided into 3 parts.  The monkeys had access to all three parts of the 
cage. 
 
Apparatus  
The apparatus was a small Plexiglas box measuring 9 x 6 x 6 cm designed 
after Marshall-Pescini & Whiten (2008). On the top of the box was a little sliding 
door and on the side of the box there was a little hole, containing a bolt which locked 
the lid in place (Fig. 7.1a). 
There were two planned methods by which a monkey could obtain the food 
placed inside the box: 
Poke Method.  The sliding door on the top of the box was opened with the finger of 
one hand, and while keeping the door open, a stick was inserted through it with the 
other hand and dipped into the jam at the bottom of the box. While the door was kept 
open with one hand the stick was taken out, and it was possible to lick the jam which 
stuck to it (Fig 7.1b). 
Complex Method. This was a more complex method but also more efficient in terms 
of the amount of food obtained each time. By poking a stick into the little hole on the 
side of the box, the bolt was moved and the catch released (Fig.7.1c). Then, the 
sliding door on the top of the box was opened with a finger and the stick inserted with 
the other hand. It was then possible to open the lid of the box using the stick as a 
lever, obtaining all the jam that was in the box (Fig.7.1d). 
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Figure 7.1 The Dipping-Box apparatus. (a) the unopened box (b) Poke Method –opening the 
sliding door with the finger and inserting the stick with the other hand.  
(c) Complex Method: unlocking the bolt by poking the stick in the bolt hole and then (d) 
inserting the stick through the sliding door to pull open the lid.  
 
Procedure. 
The monkeys both viewed the demonstrator, and were tested, in a group 
setting in order to simulate as natural a context as possible. 
 
The design had four phases: 
Phase one:  First Baseline. Six exploration sessions. 
Phase two: Poke Method. Learning sessions in which the model demonstrated the 
Poke Method three times, then the monkeys were given  2 boxes to manipulate 
themselves, followed by  two more single demonstrations. This phase was terminated 
when at least 5 out of the 7 monkeys used the Poke Method for at least two sessions. 
If this criterion was not met after 10 sessions, the phase was also terminated.  
Phase three: Second Baseline. Three sessions allowing the monkeys extra time to 
discover the Complex Method by themselves. 
a  b  
c  d  
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Phase four: Complex Method. Learning sessions in which the model demonstrated 
the Complex Method as she did for the Poke Method.  
 
Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes and was videotaped for further 
analysis. 
The monkeys in this experiment saw a considerably greater number of 
demonstrations than in the previous Coffee-Tin or Artificial-Fruit experiments. This 
was done for two reasons: 
(a). Monkeys in a natural environment most probably see more than just 3-4 
demonstrations of a new behaviour: they may also observe more than one monkey 
using the new behaviour as it spreads in the group. 
 (b). Marshall- Pescini & Whiten (2008) found that some of the chimpanzees 
in their experiment needed many trials in order to learn the task. It was assumed that 
the capuchins would not learn faster than chimpanzees.   
 
Phase one: First Baseline 
The monkeys were given the box with some jam in and on it. Appropriate 
sticks and twigs were placed on the board to which the box was connected. This was 
done in order to give the monkeys enough opportunity to solve the task themselves as 
would happen if this group encountered unfamiliar fruit which was processed by 
another, in the natural environment.  
In these first six sessions the monkeys showed neophobia towards the box, 
threatening it while standing on two legs, or touching it and running away. It was thus 
decided to leave the box longer until the monkeys were more relaxed and would start 
to manipulate it. 
In the seventh session the monkeys started to manipulate the box. However, 
the box had a very thin gap on the side, which to human eyes, as well as to 
chimpanzee eyes (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten 2008) was apparently not salient. Yet, 
for the capuchin monkeys in this study, this gap was big enough to insert a very thin 
twig and obtain the reward. Size differences between capuchin monkeys and apes or 
humans may explain this difference in perception. This phase, which was then termed 
the "Gap-method" phase, continued until all subjects had at least contacted the box in 
some way. 
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Coding: 
 All the behaviours of the monkeys towards the apparatus and related to it were 
recorded. The behaviours were divided into seven levels (see Table 7.1 for a detailed 
description of these behaviours).  
1. Target behaviours. 
2. Incomplete Target behaviours with a tool (relevant for Poke Method & Complex 
Method). 
3. Target- aimed behaviours without a tool. 
4. Target- locus orientated behaviours without a tool. 
5.  Behaviour with a potential for social learning: these behaviours were coded as they 
had a potential for socially influencing later behaviours.    
6. Non target behaviours on the apparatus.  
7.  Non-target tool-use behaviour: these behaviours included using tools on different 
objects or loci while another monkey was manipulating the box. This was 
done in order to check for some general tool use activation as result of 
watching a conspecific use a tool.  
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Table 7.1 Behavioural categories coded for each monkey in the different phases. 
  
Behaviour categories Description 
Gap Method   
Target behaviour 
Insert stick in Gap with one or both hands. 
Modify stick then insert in Gap. 
Target- aimed no tool Lick Gap, Poke finger in Gap and lick. 
Poke Method  
 
 Target behaviour 
Open door with finger - Insert stick. 
Modify stick and then use the Poke method. Insert stick using 
one or two hands without first opening it with finger. 
Incomplete                                                       
target behaviour  
Insert stick with mouth; Poke door- no success. 
Try to insert stick into wrong side of door.  
Take out stick with mouth.  
Move stick forward and backwards in door then leave. 
Move stick up and down in door, then leave. 
Target–aimed no Tool Open door with finger, insert other finger with/without licking 
finger. 
Open door with one or two fingers without inserting other. 
Open door with one or two fingers then look in box. 
Open door with mouth. 
Target- locus 
orientation 
Lick door, touch door then lick 
Complex Method  
Target behaviour 
Inset stick in bolt hole then lever lid with stick. 
Insert stick in bolt hole open lid with finger. 
Incomplete target 
behaviour 
Insert stick in bolt hole then do nothing. 
Lever box with stick without first inserting stick in bolt hole.  
Target –aimed no tool Pull lid with finger in door. 
Pull lid elsewhere. 
Poke bolt hole with finger. 
Target –locus 
orientation 
Touch, lick, or look in bolt hole.    
Behaviours with 
potential for social 
learning 
Watch other manipulate box. Scrounge: stick, gap or door 
Non- target 
behaviours on 
apparatus 
 
Put object on box, use stone on box, pound stick in door with 
stone, poke stick on wood to which the box is connected poke 
stick into close object, bite stick. 
Actions on box: Hold, shake, threaten, touch, lick, smell, and 
bite.   
Actions on board to which box is connected - shake, turn. 
Non- target tool use Pounding a stone, probing a stick on different loci of the cage 
while another monkey was manipulating the box. 
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Results 
Target behaviour 
The first monkey to obtain the food using the Gap method was Zed, the 
dominant female. Not only did she discover that the food could be obtained by 
inserting a very thin twig into the gap, she was also observed taking sticks and tearing 
off parts of them with her hand or mouth, modifying them to fit the gap. Drorit was 
also observed modifying sticks in the last session of the Gap method phase. 
Most of the other monkeys were seen to observe Zed and thereafter four of the 
remaining monkeys were seen using little twigs to obtain the food from the box 
through the gap. Figure 7.2 shows the onset of performing the Gap method by each 
monkey. The connecting lines indicate that the monkey was watching Zed use the 
Gap method before s/he started using the method too. 
 
 
Milky
Seffie
Drorit
Duba
Zed
1
2
3
4
5
6
 
 
Figure 7.2. Order of Gap method acquisition. Lines indicate  monkeys observing Zed. 
 
Target-aimed behaviours without a tool 
 There were very few non-tool-use behaviours. Duba tried to poke the gap 
with her finger on the fourth session (on the fifth, she solved the task).  
 
Target locus orientated behaviours without a tool 
There were very few other behaviours which were orientated towards the 
significant locus, the Gap. Milky and Drorit were seen trying to look in the box 
through the gap on the sixth sesion.  
Thus most of the behaviours towards the gap were target behaviours. 
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Behaviour with potential for social learning 
a. Observing other monkeys solve the task. 
A behaviour was recorded as an  instance of observation when a monkey was 
seen watching the manipulation of the box  while positioned no more than  two meters 
from the box.  Once the monkey moved away or moved his head, this was considered 
to be the end of the coded instance. It is of course possible that monkeys were also 
watching from furher away, but this was difficut to assess as well as capture on video. 
Clear instances of  monkeys observing a conspecific manipulate the box were 
recorded (see Table 7.2). Observing another monkey was recorded as one instance 
from the moment the monkey began watching a conspecific operate the box from a 
meter or less, until the observer  moved his gaze away  from the box or moved to 
another location. Seffie was observed watching  a monkey manipulate the box, but 
this was seen a session after he had first solved the task. However, observing from 
further away  before solving the task cannot be ruled  out. 
 Shipgler was not observed watching other monkeys from a close distance at 
all. Zorba, on the other hand, showed the most bouts of  observing  other monkeys 
obtaining the reward (22 times). He was tolerated near the box as he is Zed's son. 
However, he did not try to obtain the reward himself . 
 
Table 7.2 Number of instances in which a monkey was observed closely watching a 
conspecific manipulating the box using the Gap method. The last column indicates the 
percentage of these behaviours out of all coded behaviours for the monkey during the entire 
Gap phase. The shaded squares indicate the first session the monkey used the Gap method. 
 
 
Session 
 
            Name 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Sum % Of All 
Behaviours 
Duba 2   2*   4 12.12 
Shpigler       0 0 
Seffie      1 1 5.26 
Zorba 8 7 3 3  1 22 66.67 
Drorit 4   5   9 18 
Milky 7   2  1 10 22.72 
Zed     1 1 2 4.88 
* In this session Duba showed general gap actions - poking finger in Gap  
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 b. Scrounging 
Scrounging was only rarely observed (see Table 7.3). Zorba was seen to take a 
used stick and lick it, or lick the gap after jam had been taken out of it. However, 
Drorit and Milky, who solved the task, were seen to scrounge just as much. 
Scrounging, then, does not seem to explain a lack of manipulation of the box, as in the 
case of Zorba. 
 
Table 7.3 Number of instances in which a monkey was observed scrounging. The last column 
indicates the percentage of these behaviours of all coded behaviours for the monkey during 
the entire Gap phase. 1-6 = sessions in the Gap phase. 
 
Session 
 
           Name 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Sum  % All 
Behaviours 
Duba 
 
      0 0 
Shpigler       0 0 
Seffie       0 0 
Zorba 1 2     3 9.1 
Drorit 1   3   4 8 
Milky  1  1   2 4.5 
Zed       0 0 
 
 
Non-target tool-use behaviour 
One of the alternative explanations of results claiming to show imitation in 
animals is that the subjects are showing response facilitation (Byrne & Russon, 
1998a). If this is so, we might expect to find more general probing behaviour after 
viewing a monkey use a twig to probe in the gap and obtain the reward.  
Inserting a twig elsewhere (i.e. in rocks or trees near the apparatus) was seen 
in only two of the monkeys in the group, Milky (2 instances) and Drorit (4 instances), 
in the second and fourth sessions respectively. Thus seeing other monkeys use a twig 
to insert in the gap did not significantly facilitate this response on other objects in the 
monkeys' environment. Milky was observed to perform other non-target tool use 
behaviour. This included manipulating stones or sticks next to the box while Zed was 
getting the reward out of it with the stick. It seems that this was a type of  
displacement behaviour as Milky was not looking at the stones he was 
manipulating.  
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Discussion 
Although the Gap method was not originally planned as such, it provided an 
answer to the first question as to whether a new behaviour in a group of capuchin 
monkeys can spread and how.   
The new behaviour did spread in the group; 5 out of 7 monkeys were observed 
using it in a period of six sessions.  
What mechanisms could underlie the diffusion of the behaviour? Inserting 
sticks into cavities is part of the capuchin repertoire in captivity as well as in nature. 
Thus, it would be most parsimonious to conclude that just as Zed figured out the Gap 
method on her own, the others with time could have achieved that too. However 
observing Zed might have accelerated the process by a combination of:  
a. Social facilitation - once the first monkey Zed got the courage to approach the box 
the others quite quickly joined her.  
b. Localized stimulus enhancement (Caldwell & Whiten, 2004) - the monkeys were 
attracted to the Gap after watching Zed.   
As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to determine how Seffie solved the task as he 
was not observed to closely watch one of the solvers before solving the task himself. 
Seffie and Drorit each showed a one- time interest in the sliding door, 
corresponding to the Poke Method, but did not pursue this direction and conformed to 
the Gap method which the others were using.  
 The Island group monkeys invented their own method, the Gap method, 
which was unintended in the design of the study but was just as relevant for the 
experiment. This could also be used as a basis for the second question mentioned 
earlier: Is social /imitative learning strong enough to change an established successful 
behaviour? Could a new invention spread in the group and replace the old, less 
efficient one? 
In the original plan it was intended to demonstrate a more complex yet more 
efficient method after the monkeys  learned the first one (door sliding ). 
The intended Poke method was expected to be more efficient than the Gap 
method the monkeys had adopted. As the sliding door on the top of the box was 
bigger than the gap, a larger stick could be poked in and more food could be taken out 
each time. Just as in the planned procedure, the Poke method was also more complex 
than the Gap method in that it demanded a two-hand action; namely, opening the door 
with one hand while poking the stick in with the other. Thus from the point of view of 
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the experimental questions the situation the monkeys created was just as appropriate 
to the original plan. 
 
Phase two: the Poke Method 
Cacao, the enculturated monkey who lived next to the Island group, served as 
the model for this phase. Cacao spent a great deal of time next to their cage every 
afternoon. She shared food with these monkeys and played with some of them. 
Therefore it was possible for her to act as the model for these monkeys. She 
demonstrated in front of the whole group and then the box was placed in their cage. 
It took three sessions of a maximum of 15 minutes each to bring Cacao, 
through shaping, to use the Poke method proficiently so that she could be a reliable 
demonstrator.   
The demonstrations were carried out in eight sessions, one a day, lasting no 
more than 30 minutes each. Cacao demonstrated three times, and then the boxes were 
placed in the cage for the group to manipulate. She then made two extra single 
demonstrations in between which the monkeys were given the boxes for 
manipulation. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Non- parametric tests were used due to the small number of subjects. A 
Wilcoxon T test was used for within group comparisons between the different phases 
to determine whether the monkeys changed the method they used in the different 
phases. One -tailed P values are reported as the predictions that watching a method 
will enhance the success of using it is clearly unidirectional. 
 
Results 
The results showed that the monkeys started to use the Poke method 
behaviours immediately after viewing the demonstration in the seventh session. 
Further, the use of the Gap method during the Poke method phase decreased. Using a 
Wilcoxon test, a comparison was made of the average percent of Gap behaviours out 
of all actions each monkey exhibited in the Gap phase (median=25) compared to the 
Poke method phase (median=5.635). This comparison showed a significant decrease 
(N=7 T = -2.023, p = 0.031) (see Table 7.4). 
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Table 7.4 Average percent of Gap behaviours for each monkey in the Gap phase and the Poke 
method phase. 
 
phase 
         name 
Gap 
phase 
Poke phase Direction 
Duba 25.00  6.25 Reduced 
Shpigler 0.00 0.00 -  
Seffie 52.78 13.52 Reduced 
Zorba 0.00 0.00 -  
Drorit 37.43 5.02 Reduced 
Milky 6.22 0.00 Reduced 
Zed 44.05  28.41  Reduced  
 
A comparison of the use of Gap behaviour alone is not enough to determine 
whether a switch between the methods was made.  In order to test which method the 
monkeys were using more in each session a Method Index (MI) was obtained by 
calculating  Poke method behaviours divided by the sum of Poke method behaviours 
+ Gap behaviours: MI=  Poke Method  
                                                         Poke Method + Gap   
Thus, MI
 
= 1 indicates that the monkey was only using Poke method actions, 
whereas MI= 0 indicates that the monkey was only using Gap actions. This MI index 
was used throughout this study to determine whether a monkey was using one method 
predominately over the other. The comparisons were carried out on a different level 
each time; by comparing target behaviours, incomplete target behaviours, or target 
aimed behaviours (see Table 7.1). 
 
 
Target behaviour 
As of the first session of the Poke method phase two monkeys, Zed and Drorit, 
used the complete target behaviour of this method to obtain the reward.  Zed however, 
returned to using the Gap method. Only by the fifth session of this phase did other 
monkeys use the complete Poke method. Table 7.5 shows the MI in each session for 
the two target behaviours alone. 
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Table 7.5 MI of target behaviours alone for each monkey in each session of the Gap phase 
(sessions 1-6) and the Poke method phase (sessions 7-14). MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that 
the monkey only used Gap target behaviour. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey 
only used Poke method target behaviours. 
 
 
 Gap phase sessions  Poke phase sessions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Duba     0.00 0.00       0.00  
Shpigler            1.00   
Seffie   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.50 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Zorba               
Drorit    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50    0.11 0.92 0.66  
Milky 0.00 0.00          1.00 1.00  
Zed 0.00 0.00  0.00   1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  
 
 
Comparing the average MI
 
of target behaviours for each monkey in the Gap 
phase (median=0) with that in the Poke phase (median = 0.1875) shows a significant 
difference (Wilcoxon test N=7 T = -2.032, p = 0.031) (see Table 7.6). 
 
 
Table 7.6 Average MI
 
of target behaviours for each monkey in the Gap phase and the Poke 
phase. 
 
phase 
         name 
Gap 
phase 
Poke phase  
Direction 
Duba 0.00 0.00 - 
Shpigler - 0.12 Increased  
Seffie 0.00 0.44 Increased 
Zorba - - - 
Drorit 0.00 0.27  Increased 
Milky 0.00 0.25  Increased 
Zed 0.00 0.12  Increased 
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Incomplete Target behaviours  
Incomplete target behaviours of the Poke method (see Table 7.1) were 
frequently used during the Poke method phase (see Table 7.7). 
 
Table 7.7 Percent of incomplete Poke method behaviours in the Gap phase  
(sessions 1-6) and the Poke method phase (sessions 7-14).  
 
 
 Gap phase sessions  Poke phase sessions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Duba              22.58 
Shpigler 
            16.67 73.33 
Seffie 
  16.70     54.50 40.00     25.00 
Zorba 
              
Drorit 
   8.30   76.90    11.53  85.40  
Milky 
       25.00     37.50  
Zed 
      50.00      35.90  
 
 
In the simpler Gap phase, this level of analysis could not be done as there was 
only one tool-use related behaviour, namely inserting the stick in the Gap. Instead, a 
comparison was made between the phases on target-behaviours combined with 
incomplete-target, showing a strong switch from the Gap method to the Poke method 
(see Table 7.8). 
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Table 7.8 MI for target + incomplete target behaviours in the Gap phase (sessions 1-6) and 
the Poke method phase (sessions 7-14). MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only 
used Gap target + incomplete behaviours. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey 
only used Poke target + incomplete behaviours. 
 
 Gap phase sessions  Poke phase sessions  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Duba     0.00 0.00       0.00 1.00 
Shpigler            1.00 1.00 1.00 
Seffie   0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.80 0.80  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Zorba               
Drorit    0.02 0.00 0.00 0.97    0.33 0.92 0.97  
Milky 0.00 0.00      1.00    1.00 1.00  
Zed 0.00 0.00  0.00   1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.82  
 
 
 
Comparing the average MI
 
for target + incomplete target behaviours for each 
monkey in the Gap phase (median = 0.0) with that in the Poke phase (median = 0.375) 
showed a significant difference (Wilcoxon test N=7 T = -2.023 p = 0.031) (see Table 
7.9). 
 
Table 7.9 Average MI
 
for target + incomplete target behaviours in the Gap phase and 
the Poke phase. 
 
phase 
        name 
Gap 
phase 
Poke 
phase 
 
Direction 
Duba 0.000 0.125 Increased 
Shpigler - 0.375 Increased 
Seffie 0.083 0.575 Increased 
Zorba - - - 
Drorit 0.028 0.399 Increased 
Milky 0.000 0.375 Increased 
Zed 0.000 0.228 Increased 
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Target-aimed behaviours without a tool  
Testing only target aimed behaviours without a tool shows that the move from 
one method to the other was mostly manifested in target aimed behaviours related to 
the Poke method (e.g. opening sliding door with finger and looking inside). Seffie 
showed Poke method non-tool behaviour in one session in the Gap phase but 
conformed to what the others were doing in the following sessions (see Table 7.10). 
 
 
Table  7.10  MI for target -like behaviours without a tool in the Gap phase (sessions 1-6) and 
Poke phase (sessions 7-14). MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only used Gap 
target – like behaviour. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey only used Poke target 
– like behaviours.  
 
 Gap phase sessions  Poke phase sessions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Duba    0.0     1.0   1.0 1.0  
Shpigler         1.0  0.0 1.0    
Seffie   1.0      1.0     1.0 
Zorba               
Drorit        1.0       
Milky        1.0    1.0 1.0  
Zed               
 
 
Comparing the average MI for this level of behaviour between the Gap phase 
(median = 0.0) and Poke phase (median =0.25) using a Wilcoxon test showed a 
significant difference (N=7 T = -2.032, p = 0.031) (see Table 7.11). 
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Table 7.11 Average MI for target-like behaviours without a tool in the Gap phase and the 
Poke phase.  
 
phase 
        name 
Gap 
phase 
Poke 
phase 
Direction 
Duba 0.000 0.375 Increased 
Shpigler - 0.250 Increased 
Seffie 0.170 0.250 Increased 
Zorba - - - 
Drorit - 0.125 Increased 
Milky - 0.375 Increased 
Zed - - - 
 
Target locus orientated behaviour 
Comparing the average MI for target locus orientated behaviours in the Gap 
phase (median =0.0) and the Poke phase (median =0.13) showed no significant 
difference (Wilcoxon test N=7 T = -1.826, p = 0.063) (see Tables 7.12 and 7.13). 
Thus, this level of behaviour did not change between  phases.  
 
 
Table 7.12 MI for locus orientated behaviours without a tool in the Gap phase (sessions 1-6) 
and Poke phase (sessions 7-14). MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only used 
Gap target- locus behaviours. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey only used Poke 
target – locus behaviours. 
             
 
 Gap phase session                                      Poke phase sessions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Duba         1.00   1.00 1.00  
Shpigler 
        1.00  0.00 1.00   
Seffie 
  1.00      0.33     0.50 
Zorba 
              
Drorit 
     0.00 0.00 1.00   0.00    
Milky 
     0.00  1.00    0.50 1.00  
Zed             0.00  
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Table 7.13 Average MI for target locus orientated behaviour in the Gap phase and Poke 
phase. 
 
phase 
        name 
Gap 
phase 
Poke  
phase 
Direction 
Duba - 0.38 Increased 
Shpigler - 0.25 Increased 
Seffie 0.17 0.10 Decreased 
Zorba - - - 
Drorit 0.00 0.13 Increased 
Milky 0.00 0.31 Increased 
Zed - 0.00 - 
 
Behaviour with potential for social learning 
a. Observing other monkeys solve the task 
Two types of behaviours were recorded:  
a. The percent of Cacao's demonstration each monkey watched. As a group, the 
monkeys watched an average of 78% of Cacao's demonstrations. 
b. The number of instances monkeys watched their conspecifics manipulate the boxes. 
All the monkeys were seen closely watching a conspecific operate the box (see Table 
7.14). 
In this phase, as in the Gap phase, Zorba spent most of the time (75% of all his 
coded behaviours in this phase) watching others work, yet he did not solve the task 
himself. 
b. Scrounging 
Scrounging was hardly seen in this phase.  Duba and Milky were each seen 
scrounging in two instances, and Zorba was seen doing this once.  
 
 
Unrelated tool use behaviours   
 Seffie was seen poking the stick on the board on which the box was fixed. 
Five of the monkeys were seen going to bring a stick, returning with it but then 
leaving it without using it (Duba, Shpigler and Drorit once each, Seffie and Zorba 
twice each).The monkeys were also seen biting the stick, perhaps to modify it, but 
then dropping it and not using it (Duba, Seffie, Zorba once each, Drorit six times and 
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Zed three times).The monkeys were not seen probing sticks in other objects during the 
sessions. 
Table 7.14 Attention towards models. In the top part of each row is the percent of Cacao's 
demonstrations each monkey watched. In the bottom part of each row in italics is the number 
of instances each monkey observed a conspecific manipulate the box. The last column 
indicates the percent of these behaviours out of all coded behaviours for the monkey during 
the Poke phase. 
 
Session 
           Name 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum  % Of 
Total 
Behaviours 
Duba 60 60 
2 
80 60 0 
3 
60 
5 
100 80 
4 
 
14 
 
20 
Shpigler 100 80 100 60 60 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
80 
 
5 
 
5.3 
Seffie 100 60 
2 
80 80 40 0 100 100 
2 
 
4 
 
3.7 
Zorba 100 
4 
100 100 100 
5 
*(gap) 
100 
5 
80 
3 
80 
4 
100 
 
21 
 
75 
Drorit 100 100 100 100 60 
3 
100 100 80 
 
3 
 
1.9 
Milky 100 80 
3 
80 100 100 100 100 
2 
60 
 
5 
 
7.0 
Zed 100 100 
1 
0 80 100 
2 
80 80 80 
 
3 
 
3.4 
* Zorba was watching a conspecific use the Gap method. 
 
 
Phase Three:  Baseline for the Complex Method  
The monkeys had three additional sessions to manipulate the box, without 
watching a model, in order to see whether more time to manipulate the box would 
lead to discovery of the Complex method, or parts of it, on their own. The subjects did 
not show any behaviour related to the Complex method during these sessions. The MI 
for these sessions shows the monkeys primarily used the Poke method behaviours 
during the three sessions of this Baseline phase (see Table 7.15). 
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Table 7.15 MI for target + incomplete target behaviours in The Poke phase (sessions 1-8) and 
Baseline (sessions 9-11) MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only used Gap target 
+incomplete target behaviours. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey only used 
Poke target +incomplete target behaviours. 
 
 
Poke phase sessions            Baseline phase 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Duba        1.00    
Shpigler      1.00 1.00 1.00    
Seffie  0.80 0.80  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80   
Zorba            
Drorit 0.97    0.33 0.92 0.97  1.00 0.85 1.00 
Milky  1.00    1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Zed 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.82  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
A comparison of the MI for these levels of behaviours between the Poke phase 
(median =0.378) and Baseline phase (median = 0.46) using a Wilcoxon test showed 
no significant difference (N=7 T = -0.524 p = 0.344) (see Table 7.16) 
 
Table 7.16 Average MI for target + incomplete target behaviours in the Poke phase and 
Baseline. 
 
Phase 
         name 
Poke 
phase 
Baseline 
phase  
Directions 
Duba 0.13 0.00 Reduced 
Shpigler 0.37 0.00 Reduced 
Seffie 0.57 0.27 Reduced 
Zorba - - - 
Drorit 0.40 0.95 Increased 
Milky 0.38 0.67 Increased 
Zed 0.23 1.00 Increased 
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Phase Four: The Complex Method. 
Once again Cacao was the demonstrator for the group. As in the Poke method 
demonstrations, she sat next to the observers' cage and demonstrated to the whole 
group, and then the box was put in their cage. There were 6 sessions in this phase 
lasting no more than 30 minutes each. 
 
Results: 
 Although the monkeys had many opportunities to observe and learn, none of 
the Island group subjects performed the complete Complex method behaviours.  
However, behaviours related to the Complex method were used in this phase by four 
of the subjects: Zorba, Milky, Zed and Drorit even though this constituted a very 
small percentage of their overall behaviours. 
 
Testing the different levels of behaviours used by the monkeys showed that 
most of these behaviours were Target-locus orientated (see Table 7.17) in which the 
monkeys touched, licked, or tried to look into the bolt hole. 
Incomplete Complex behaviours included inserting the stick in the bolt hole 
but not continuing to do something with it, or trying to lever open the lid with the 
stick. Target aimed behaviours without a tool included trying to pull open the lid with 
the fingers. 
 
Table 7.17 Average percent of the Complex method related behaviours out of the total 
behaviours coded during the Complex phase.  
 
 
Behaviour                  
 
          Names                             
Incomplete 
Target  
Target 
Aimed No 
Tool 
Target 
Locus 
Orientated 
Duba 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Shpigler 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seffie 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Zorba 2.08 0.42 4.18 
Drorit 0.00 0.00 1.85 
Milky 3.42 0.43 19.48 
Zed 1.85 0.00 3.52 
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A Friedman test was used to compare the average percent of the Complex 
method related behaviours in the Complex phase to the average percent of these 
behaviours in the Gap phase and Poke + Baseline phases. This comparison only 
revealed a significant difference for the incomplete Complex behaviours (Friedman 
test p = 0.05).  
Thus, although the capuchins in this study did not show a shift from the Poke 
method to the complete Complex method they did indicate significant attempts (see 
Table 7.17). 
Three explanations of the monkeys' difficulty to switch to the Complex 
method were then examined: 
a. The bolt-hole on the side of the box could have been rather similar to the 
Gap the monkeys had previously used and this may have confused them. If 
this were so, we would expect to find more Gap method behaviours during 
the Complex method phase than during the Poke method phase and the 
Baseline phase that followed it.  
 
A comparison between the average Gap behaviour for each monkey in the Poke 
phase + Baseline Phase (median= 4.33) with the Complex method phase (median= 
1.04) did not show a significant difference (Wilcoxon test, N=7 T = -1.261 p = 0.125) 
(see Table 7.18). In fact, use of the Gap method declined in most monkeys. Thus lack 
of success cannot be ascribed to confusion with the Gap method. 
 
Table 7.18 Average percent of Gap behaviour during Poke + Baseline phases and the 
Complex method phase. 
 
phase 
         
         name 
Poke + 
Baseline 
phases  
Complex 
phase 
Direction 
Duba 4.54 0.00 Reduced 
Shpigler 0.00 0.00 Reduced 
Seffie 9.83 0.00 Reduced 
Zorba 0.00 4.54 Increased 
Drorit 4.33 1.04 Reduced 
Milky 0.00 1.75 Increased 
Zed 20.66 4.37 Reduced 
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b. Second, it might have been too difficult for the monkeys to learn the 
function of pushing the bolt in the hole, as it was concealed. The monkeys 
might not have understood the effect of removing the bolt on opening the lid. 
However, the end result of the open lid could have been salient enough. Thus 
there should be more attempts to open the lid of the box in different ways in 
this phase. Behaviours in this direction were seen only in this phase yet they 
were very few (see Table 7.19).  
 
Table 7.19 Incomplete lid opening behaviours. L= lever with stick P = pull with hand.  These 
behaviours were only seen in the first, second and fifth sessions of the Complex method 
phase. 
 
Session 
          Name 
1 
 
2 5 
Duba    
Shpigler    
Seffie    
Zorba 1 (12.5%) L 2 (2.5%) p   
Drorit    
Milky   8 (20.5%) L, 1 (2.56%) p 
Zed    
 
A comparison of the average incomplete lid opening behaviour in the 
Complex method phase with the Poke method phase using a Wilcoxon test was not 
significant  ( N=7 T = -1.342 p = 0.250). 
 Zorba started to manipulate the box only in this phase. He used the Gap 
method as well as the Poke method. He also exhibited a behaviour which the other 
monkeys did not; namely, pounding a stone on the box in two of the sessions (in 
session 4 he did this 23 times!). This was done perhaps to open the box as he would 
open a hard shelled fruit.    
c. Since the monkeys could obtain a rather large amount of the reward using 
the Poke method, they might not have been motivated to switch to the Complex 
method. Therefore four additional sessions were given in which the reward was not 
jam, which was easily obtained by dipping the stick, but rather pieces of solid fruit. 
Dipping the stick in the box would get the taste of the fruit on the stick but only 
opening the box would enable the monkeys to actually eat it.  
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A comparison of the different levels of behaviour, between the first six 
sessions of the Complex method phase and the four sessions of the enhanced 
Complex method phase using a Wilcoxon test revealed no significant difference: 
Incomplete target behaviours:  T =   0.0      p=1.0 
Target aimed no tool:               T = -1.342    p=0.180 
Target locus orientation:          T = -1.095     p=0.273 
Thus, partially blocking the Poke method in this way did not facilitate the 
performance of the Complex method. 
 
Discussion 
The current experiment showed that a behaviour naturally seeded in a group of 
capuchin monkeys could spread to other members of the group, as took place  with 
the Gap method. It was also shown that when a new method, related to the same 
object, is introduced to the group it is possible for this behaviour to be socially learned 
and used by the group as shown by the introduction of the Poke method. 
The second question asked at the beginning of this study was about the nature of 
change in traditions: can a new tradition introduced by an immigrant monkey 
overpower an old established one or does the old one continue to exist?  If it does, 
does each monkey continue to use both methods or perhaps the two traditions are 
maintained in the group with different subgroups using them? 
To prefer to use the more efficient method, the monkeys would have to appreciate 
its advantages; for example, a larger quantity of reward made available by using the 
method.  Studies have shown that Cebus monkeys in experimental settings are 
capable of estimating a difference in quantity (Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005) as well as 
food value (Westergaard et al .2004). Thus the reason the monkeys did not abandon 
the Gap method immediately is probably not due to lack of perception of quantity.   
Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa (1999)  showed that in imitation tasks 
chimpanzees made errors which showed "preservative repetition of previously 
instructed actions". Thus, the capuchin monkeys in this study that were using both  
the Gap method and the Poke method could have been following this principle 
especially as both are related to the same box and make use of the same tool. Over 
the course of 24 sessions the Gap method almost disappeared but it was still seen 
during the final sessions of this experiment 
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When the Complex method was introduced the monkeys failed to learn it. 
Explanations for this failure can be sought in two directions: the general aspects of 
how new behaviours spread in a group and the specific characteristics of the Complex 
method used in this study.   
 One possibility is again perseveration. With now two existing optional ways 
to manipulate the box, the difficulty of learning a third method perhaps increased. 
Although the reward was changed in the last sessions in order to partially block both 
the Gap method and the Poke method, the monkeys still did not learn the Complex 
method. Such perseveration is perhaps the obstacle impeding the ratchet effect 
characteristic of human culture (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998). Human culture evolves 
by adding new behaviours to previous ones, creating more complex traditions. The 
Complex method was an improvement on the earlier Poke method, making use of the 
same behaviour of opening the sliding door and inserting the stick, yet the monkeys 
were not able to add the needed actions to the basic behaviour.  
Other possible explanations concern the actions of the Complex method. As 
mentioned earlier, it may be that the structure of the bolt, hidden on the side of the 
box made it very difficult for the monkeys to comprehend the connection between the 
bolt and success. Perhaps they thus considered placing the stick there as redundant.  
In an unpublished MA thesis (Fredman, 1995) dealing with  understanding of 
physical causality in capuchin monkeys, it was found that even after  monkeys had 
witnessed hundreds of trials in which a ball rolled down a chute and disappeared into 
a box, and a second later “Jack in the box” popped out, at the end of the study the 
monkeys, when given the ball to make the puppet jump themselves, pulled the puppet 
by its hair and pushed the ball under it. The connection between the ball and puppet 
was perceived but not the necessity to roll the ball down the runway where the actual 
launching of the puppet was not seen. Perhaps something similar was happening here: 
inserting the stick into the hole without being able to see its result was not informative 
enough for the capuchin monkeys.  
In order to test whether the failure to shift to the Complex method was due to 
the influence of perseveration of the Poke method or the difficulty of the Complex 
method, we would need to demonstrate the Complex method to a different group of 
monkeys, without demonstrating other methods beforehand. If these monkeys are not 
able to socially learn the Complex method in this condition, it would suggest that the 
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structure of this method cannot be learned socially by capuchin monkeys. However, 
such a test was not possible in this study. 
 
Social learning mechanisms 
Although the monkeys did not learn to open the box using the Complex 
method, social influence was seen in the fact that one monkey inserted the stick to the 
bolt hole, which could imply a localized stimulus enhancement effect. Also, the fact 
that the monkeys tried in this phase, even though  instances were few, to  pull open 
the lid with  their hand, or lever the lid open with the stick, could imply a form of 
object movement re -enactment  or goal emulation.  
 
Learning tool-use from observation 
Monkeys in this study were able to socially learn a tool-using task whereas in 
the Coffee-Tin study (Chapter 6 in this thesis) the same monkeys did not socially 
learn to use the tool to open the lid and usually moved it away from the apparatus. 
Two factors might explain this difference: 
Firstly, in this experiment the tools were natural sticks and twigs, whereas in 
the Coffee-Tin study it was a metal + plastic artificial tool.  Monkeys in the Island 
group might be more familiar with sticks and twigs as potential tools, as they have 
them daily in their enclosures. Therefore they might have been able to learn more 
easily how to use them in a new situation. 
Secondly, in order to obtain the reward in this experiment it was necessary to 
use a tool, whereas in the Coffee-Tin study it was possible to extract the reward 
without a tool.  
 
In conclusion: 
Capuchin monkeys in this study were able to socially learn to use a tool to 
solve a task. Further, this experiment showed that through social learning, one, 
apparently superior, tool use tradition can replace an earlier one. 
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Experiment 2: The Enculturated monkeys 
 
 The monkeys from the enculturated population were tested on the same Dipping-Box 
task.  
 
Subjects 
Four subjects were available: three males, Adam, Koko and Rusty, and one 
female, Hezda. Adam and Koko were housed together and Hezda and Rusty were 
housed together in a different enclosure. Cacao, familiar with all four subjects, served 
as the model in this experiment too (see Figure 7.3). Cacao was housed with Hezda 
and Rusty but spent time with the other two subjects as well, sometimes sleeping in 
their enclosure at night if she wanted to. Thus all four monkeys were accustomed to 
her.  
 
Apparatus 
 The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
The experimental plan was the same as for Experiment 1. All sessions lasted no more 
than 30 minutes or were terminated if the monkey left the apparatus for more than 10 
minutes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Adam watching Cacao demonstrate how to open the Dipping-Box using the 
Complex method. 
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Results  
 
Phase One: Baseline 1 
 One of the four subjects, Adam, solved the task during the second session of 
this phase. None of the monkeys used the Gap method observed in the Island group, 
although actions orientated towards the gap were seen. General behaviours related to 
the Poke method were seen as well.  
The MI index was calculated in this experiment in the same way as it was used 
in Experiment 1 of this study.  A score of MI > 0.5 indicates that the Poke method 
was dominant; MI<0.5 indicates the Gap method was dominant.  Applying the MI for 
target-like behaviours of the Poke method and Gap behaviours showed that two of the 
monkeys, Hezda and Adam, tended to show more behaviours orientated to the Poke 
method, while the other two showed a trend of orientating their behaviour towards the 
Gap (Table 7.20).  
 
Table 7.20 MI for incomplete and target aimed Gap and Poke actions during the Baseline-1 
Phase. MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only used Gap behaviours. MI=1 
(shaded purple) indicates that the monkey only used Poke behaviours. 
 
 
 
                                   Baseline-1 phase     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Hezda 0.50 0.87  1.00 0.00  
Rusty 0.40 0.33  1.00 0.00  
Adam - 0.60 1.00    
Koko 0.00  0.00  0.77 0.33 
 
In the fifth and sixth sessions Koko showed orientated attention towards the bolt-hole 
(8.33% and 6.67% of his actions respectively) which is associated with the Complex 
method. 
 
Phase Two: the Poke Method 
 The three monkeys who did not discover the Poke method during the Baseline 
sessions, Hezda, Rusty and Koko, observed Cacao demonstrate this method in Phase 
Two.   
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Results 
All three monkeys learned the Poke method during this phase. Hezda and 
Koko solved the task on the second session, Rusty only on the fourth. However Koko 
stopped using it for two sessions. Once the monkey was observed using the Poke 
method in two consecutive sessions, s/he moved to the next stage. 
 
Table 7.21 MI for target Gap and Poke behaviours in the Baseline (sessions 1-6) and the Poke 
method (sessions 7-12) phases. MI=0 (shaded green) indicates that the monkey only used Gap 
target behaviours. MI=1 (shaded purple) indicates that the monkey only was only using used 
Poke target behaviours. 
  
 Baseline 1 phase Poke phase 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Hezda        1.00 1.00    
Rusty          1.00 1.00  
Adam  1.00 1.00  1.00        
Koko        1.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
Looking at the behaviours related to the Gap method and the Poke method 
reveals a less clear picture. The fact that Adam discovered the Poke method in the 
baseline phase left only 3 subjects for comparing the change in behaviour between the 
phases; however, a Wilcoxon test for only 3 subjects is meaningless. A descriptive 
comparison of all Poke related behaviours between the Baseline phase and the Poke 
method is presented in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Incomplete Poke behaviours during the Baseline and the Poke method phases.  
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Phase Three -Baseline II 
After having learned how to obtain the food in the box using the Poke method, 
all four subjects received six additional sessions to manipulate the box to see whether 
they would discover the Complex method on their own. None of the subjects did so 
during this baseline phase. All four monkeys continued using the Poke method 
behaviours.    
As previously mentioned, the Island group only received three sessions in this 
baseline phase. However, the enculturated monkeys reached this stage having had 
many fewer sessions to manipulate the box. Thus, if they had received only three 
sessions in Baseline II it could have been argued that with more time they might have 
found the Complex method on their own.   
 
Phase Four: The Complex Method 
The monkeys were given six sessions in this phase as with the Island group. 
Hezda showed the first signs of using the Complex method in the fourth session and 
Adam in the fifth session.  
As with the Island group, the monkeys were given four additional sessions in 
which a piece of fruit was placed in the box instead of jam in order to enhance the use 
of the Complex method by the monkeys who had not learned it. 
Rusty started using the Complex method in the second session of the enhanced 
phase, and Koko in third. They both needed another session in order for a full switch 
to be made. Thus all four enculturated monkeys eventually learned to use the 
Complex method (see Table. 7.22). 
Table 7.22 MI for target Poke and Complex behaviours during Phase Four. MI=1 indicated 
the monkeys only used the Complex method (shaded blue).  MI=0 indicated they only used 
the Poke method (shaded purple). 
 
 The Complex Method  phase Enhanced Complex  
phase 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Hezda 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Rusty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.27 0.70 1.00 
Adam   0 0.05 0.60    1.00 1.00 
Koko    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.00 
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Comparing the MI for Complex target behaviours (MI=Complex/Complex+ 
Poke) between the Complex phase and the Poke method phase shows a strong, but not 
significant trend (Wilcoxon test, N=4 T = 1.83, p = 0.063). 
The switch to the complete Complex method was not a radical one, as it might 
seem when looking only at the target behaviours.  The monkeys started to use 
Complex target-like behaviours already in earlier sessions of Phase 4 (see Table 7.23). 
A comparison  of the average MI for  all related Poke  and Complex behaviours 
(Complex method / Complex method  + Poke method)  between  the Complex method  phase 
(median 0.25)  and  the Enhanced Complex method phase (median =0.27 ) showed there was 
not a significant difference (Wilcoxon test,  N=4  T = 0.0, p = 0.563). 
 
Table 7.23  MI for all related Poke and Complex behaviours during the entire Complex 
phase. MI=1 indicated the monkeys only used the Complex method (shaded blue).  MI=0 
indicated they only used the Poke method (shaded purple). 
 
 
 Complex method  phase Enhanced Complex  phase 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Hezda 0.18 0.56 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.39 0.53    
Rusty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35   1.00  0.59 1.00 
Adam    1.00 0.83      
Koko     1.00 0.14 0.11  0.54 1.00 
 
 
Hezda for example spent a great deal of time in the second and fourth sessions 
examining the bolt-hole and the way it worked; poking her finger in it while trying to 
open the lid with the other hand or with a stick. At times she would do this while 
lying down, inspecting the bolt-hole intensively. 
 
Island group versus enculturated group 
A comparison between the groups has its limitations, one of which is the 
experimental setting. The Island monkeys were tested in a group whereas the 
enculturated monkeys were tested alone. Tested in a group setting can have an 
inhibiting effect on responding by the low ranking monkeys (Visalberghi, 1990). 
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Thus, at least for the dominant monkeys, for which a group setting may be less 
inhibiting, a comparison with singly tested subjects could be made with caution.    
A comparison was made between the four enculturated monkeys and the four 
higher ranking monkeys in the Island group (Zed, Milky, Zorba and Drorit) on the 
average MI for target behaviours (Complex method/ Complex method +Poke method) 
in Phase Four. There was a significant difference between the mother-reared monkeys 
(median=0) and the enculturated monkeys (median=0.2399) (Mann Whitney test 
U=0.0 n1=4, n2=4, p=0.014). 
However, as stated previously, the Island group monkeys showed some 
general Complex behaviours in this phase. Comparing the two groups on these 
general behaviours, using the Mann Whitney test, did not reveal a significant 
difference (see Table 7.24). 
 
 
Table 7.24 A comparison between the four high ranking Island group monkeys and the 
Enculturated monkeys on general Complex method behaviours. 
 
Incomplete target 
behaviours 
Target aimed- no tool  Target locus orientated 
Enculturated 
median=2.740 
Island 
median=1.389 
Enculturated 
median=0.737 
Island 
median=1.260 
Enculturated 
median=1.247 
Island 
median=3.86 
1.114 1.250 15.824 0.253 2.349 4.173 
2.124 0.000 1.212 0.000 2.657 1.111 
3.356 8.485 0.263 0.256 0.145 12.542 
4.034 1.528 0.000 0.000 2.727 3.540 
U=6 n1=4, n2=4 p=0.343 U=3 n1=4, n2=4 p=0.1 U=3 n1=4, n2=4 p=0.1 
 
 
Discussion 
Except for Adam, who found the Poke method on his own, the other three 
monkeys performed the complete Poke method only after watching the 
demonstration. However, this behaviour cannot be attributed to the demonstration 
alone as the monkeys showed behaviours related to the Poke method in the Baseline 
phase. Thus, watching the demonstrator apparently helped canalize their behaviour 
towards the complete Poke method. This cannot be said for the way the monkeys 
learned the Complex method. 
The monkeys did not show signs of this method during the two baseline 
phases and the Poke method phase, except for two brief occasions in which Koko 
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orientated his attention towards the bolt-hole during the first baseline and one instance 
of Hezda looking in the bolt-hole in the first session of the Complex method phase.  
 All four monkeys switched entirely to the Complex method. However several 
points must be mentioned. 
1.  It seems that these monkeys like the Island group monkeys, did not 
understand the effect poking the bolt  had on opening the lid, as they mainly inserted 
the stick into the hole pulling it up as a lever. Nevertheless these monkeys copied the 
insertion of the stick to the hole, implying that they might have been imitating. 
If the enculturated monkeys' behaviour was based on imitation it was not a 
perfect copy. The observing monkeys acted differently than Cacao in several ways. 
Cacao demonstrated poking the bolt when it was positioned on the right side of the 
box.  The observers often preferred to sit in front of the box with the bolt hole at the 
far end to them. This is perhaps an easier way to hold and manipulate the stick in 
relation to the bolt-hole. Further, the stick was often poked in the bolt- hole and then 
with a levering action moved up and down, more as though they were trying to lever 
the lid open from that angle. Perhaps levering had a more obvious effect on the lid, as 
it moved a little with the levering. 
Opening the box using the Complex method demanded that the monkeys use a 
fixed sequence: first unlocking the bolt and then opening the lid. However it was seen 
that the monkeys, after having opened the box using the Complex method, still tried at 
times to first open the lid and then insert the stick in the bolt-hole. This behaviour 
may also imply that they did not understand the effect unlocking the bolt had on 
opening the lid. 
Not all the monkeys used the stick to open the lid. Some used their finger 
while others, Adam and Rusty, found an original way and after poking the bolt with 
the stick they inserted the stick in the door, brought a stone and hammered the stick 
until the lid opened. However they did not continue with this, maybe realising there 
was no advantage in using the stone (note they did not see each other do this action). 
Thus the Complex method was transmitted socially between the monkeys, but 
they modified it.  
This study responds positively to the question posed by Bering (2004) whether 
“enculturated” primates would show complex social learning abilities when viewing a 
monkey instead of a human model. However, attention to the monkey model was 
lower than seen towards the human model in the previous two studies (the Artificial 
 173 
Fruit and the Coffee Tin studies) in which their attention to the model was almost 
perfect. If more monkeys were available for the study it would have been possible to 
address this question more directly and compare attention to human versus monkey 
models demonstrating the same task, as well as test the effect on latency to first 
success as a function of model type.  
 
Mother reared versus Enculturated monkeys 
It was clear that only the enculturated monkeys were able to fully switch from 
the Poke method to the more complex yet more advantageous Complex method. Four 
of the Island group monkeys nonetheless showed behaviours related to this method 
after observing the demonstrations. The fact that the Island group did not perform the 
complete Complex method could be a result of confounding factors. 
Both groups showed they were able to undertake one switch between the 
different techniques. It is possible, as mentioned in Experiment 1, that the Island 
group did not manage to learn the Complex method as it demanded that they make a 
second switch. Thus, testing mother-reared monkeys having to make only one switch 
from the Poke method to the Complex method would eliminate this factor. 
However, recent results with a similar task tested on eleven young 
chimpanzees found that these subjects, who only had to master one switch from a 
poking to a more complex probing method, were unable to do so (Marshall-Pescini & 
Whiten, 2008). These results with chimpanzees emphasise the positive results found 
in the enculturated capuchin monkeys. 
The question of the enculturated monkeys' superior experience with objects 
still remains open. This appears most clearly in their lack of neophobia. It took six 
sessions for the Island group to stop threatening the box whereas the enculturated 
monkeys immediately approached the box and started to manipulate it. It cannot be 
ruled out that perhaps this experience with objects was the component missing for the 
Island group monkeys to acquire the complete Complex method. 
One way to avoid the effect of the influence of experience with tools, which 
enculturated monkeys have, is to test the enculturated monkeys’ understanding of the 
abstract concept of imitation. Such understanding goes beyond mere experience with 
the affordance of tools and can be manifested in other domains such as actions 
without tools and gestures.  The ability to understand this abstract concept of imitation 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
 
CAN “CEBUS SEE CEBUS DO”? - A PRELIMINARY STUDY 
The current experiment explores the question of whether capuchin monkeys are able, through training, 
to learn the concept of imitation. An eight stage training strategy employing a “do as I do" paradigm 
was designed to facilitate teaching the monkeys the concept of imitation,  that went from simple 
matching behaviours with objects to matching actions without objects.  
Four enculturated monkeys participated in this preliminary study. All four monkeys responded above 
chance in the first stages of matching actions on objects. One monkey proceeded to the fifth stage in 
which he was required to match different actions on the same object. The study was stopped at that 
stage because of limitations of time. 
 The results show suggestive evidence for the ability of enculturated capuchin monkeys to 
learn the concept of imitation. Factors which may enhance the learning of the concept of imitation in   
capuchin monkeys are discussed. 
 
The previous studies in this thesis have concentrated on the question: do 
capuchin monkeys learn by observing a model? testing this question from different 
angles.  
The experiment described in this chapter tries to answer the question: can 
capuchin monkeys imitate? Or more specifically, can they learn the concept of 
imitation?  
These are two different questions, the first of which (“do they?”) may be 
related to strategies of behaviours used by an animal, whereas the second (“can 
they?”) is related to the cognitive ability of the species to imitate. Primates confronted 
by a problem may employ different social learning strategies in different situations as 
has been seen with chimpanzees (Horner& Whiten, 2005). Re-enacting goals may 
take priority over imitating an action even if the action can be copied (see the short 
discussion on this topic in Chapter 5). Thus the lack of imitation may not always be a 
sign of inability.  
The “Do-as-I-do” paradigm has been used to test whether a subject has the 
ability to learn the concept of imitation. This within - subject design involves a first 
phase of moulding and teaching the subject to reproduce actions it observes and then a 
test stage which requires the observer to perform a new action immediately after the 
demonstration. Once this has been established the subject can generalize the concept 
to new instances.  
 It has already been established that except for humans, only chimpanzees, 
orang-utans and dolphins are able to perform arbitrary actions on command and thus 
seem to be able to represent the concept of imitation (Hayes & Hayes, 1952; Herman, 
2002; Custance et al. 1995; Miles et al. 1996; Harley et al.  1998).  
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Attempts to teach a macaque monkey (Macaca fascicularis) to imitate on 
command (to scratch a specific body part) failed, although the monkey did scratch in 
a general manner after seeing the demonstrator scratch (Mitchell & Anderson, 1993). 
Nevertheless, a different species of macaque monkey (Macaca nemestrina) was able 
to recognize being imitated (Paukner et al. 2005). However, the monkeys did not try 
to test this by changing their movements the way human infants and chimpanzees do 
(Nadel, 2002; Nielsen et al. 2005), thus showing, perhaps, only an implicit 
understanding of being imitated. 
Accordingly, there may be two levels of the concept of imitation: the ability to 
recognize one is being imitated and the ability to transfer this into action. The 
production of the imitative action may be more difficult as it also demands  planning 
and using the correct motor actions (Paukner et al. 2005). 
This ability to entertain the concept of imitation may have implications for the 
emergence of culture as Whiten (2000) suggests:  
“…Knowing you are imitating is a step towards this, and is a kind of 
‘meta-representation’ (mentally representing some mental process or 
representation) that may link it with other abilities to represent ‘states of mind’ 
” (p. 490).   
Why test capuchin monkeys on this task? 
The studies in this thesis have shown that the enculturated monkeys presented 
a higher ability to learn socially than the mother-reared monkeys. It has been argued 
here that one of the reasons for this difference is the high level of attention paid by 
these monkeys to the human caretaker who serves as demonstrator. Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy (2002), reflecting ten years after the publication of their paper “Do monkeys 
ape” conclude that:  
“In retrospect, we can see that intensive and prolonged interaction with 
humans (during early life, and in the course of extended training to respond to 
verbal commands issued by humans) does affect capuchins’ visual attention to 
humans, and enhances their interest in objects a human touches, and these 
perceptual tendencies may enhance the monkeys’ probability of matching 
object movement. However, such experience does not seem to lead to 
enhanced ability to match action, the signature feature of imitation” (p. 488-
489). 
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This conclusion was based partially on the attempts to test capuchin monkeys 
on a spontaneous "Do-as-I- Do" test (see Chapter 2). However, no attempt has been 
made to teach capuchin monkeys to imitate.  
In this study I will try to teach the monkeys the concept of imitation and 
suggest that there may be a way to overcome the apparent limitation of action -
imitation. I intend to try teaching the enculturated monkeys the rule of imitation using 
objects as mediators between the demonstrator’s actions and the observer’s action. 
 This is based on the following principles: 
1. Capuchin monkeys readily manipulate objects. 
2. Chimpanzees have been found to be more successful in imitating 
actions which included objects.  Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa 
(1999) used objects in their “Do-as-I-Do” study.  They found that 
chimpanzees perform differently when the action involves an object or 
only body movements. Adult chimpanzees performed better (including 
some first-trial imitations) on trials when one object was used on 
another than when the action was directed towards a single object or 
when an object was directed at the self.  Both chimpanzees and orang-
utan were found to "match aspects of actions on objects they had seen 
although they seem to have paid attention more to the object than to 
the model’s actual action" (Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000). 
3. Enculturated monkeys show a high level of attention to a human model. 
It is true that imitating actions with an object may be tapping different social 
learning mechanisms than the imitation of arbitrary gestures (see Chapter 2). 
However, even if the monkeys manage to learn the rule for this level, it will be a 
worthwhile achievement as being able to switch back and forth from one action on an 
object to the other constitutes the basic understanding of matching behaviour through 
imitation.  
Starting from such matching behaviour in a systematic training schedule may 
provide the best conditions for making the transfer from imitating behaviour with an 
object to imitating the same behaviour without the object. Once this transfer is 
achieved it may be possible to generalize it to novel actions without an object. 
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Imitation in apes is not spontaneous as is found in children; thus there is no reason 
to presume it would be spontaneous in capuchin moneys either. Learning the concept 
of imitation would demand extensive training for the capuchin monkeys to succeed, 
just as found with chimpanzees (3 months, 5 days a week training: Custance et al. 
1995). Further, other concept formation tasks carried out with capuchin monkeys 
require intensive training too (between 1000-1500 trials; Adams-Curtis, 1990). 
This study could only be carried out after the other studies in this thesis had 
been completed, because trying to teach the monkeys the rule of imitation would have 
confounded the aims of the previous studies. Therefore, as the time limits of this 
thesis would not permit the entire training schedule to be covered, this study was 
considered a preliminary one, in preparation for the full-scale study to be continued 
once this thesis is submitted. Thus, the testing at the different stages described  in the 
following section, did not continue until a high level of performance criterion had 
been met but rather 3-6 sessions were run regardless of the performance of the 
monkey. 
 
The methodological plan for this study included eight main stages:  
Stage 1. Training – in this stage the monkeys learn to respond after the command 
“Now you”. 
Stage 2.  Simple matching: The monkeys are rewarded for choosing the same object 
combination as demonstrated, out of two options. 
Stage 3.  Complex matching: The monkeys are rewarded for choosing the same 
object combination as demonstrated, combining two objects out of three possible 
options. 
Stage 4. Two-action games:  The monkeys are rewarded for producing the same 
action on an object as demonstrated. Both actions are demonstrated in each session. 
Stage 5.  Pre movement imitation: The monkeys are rewarded for matching one of 
two movements using the same object (rubbing or pounding a small stone on a 
surface, with one hand).     
Stage 6.  Action on surface: The monkeys are rewarded for matching the same action 
demonstrated on the surface, using the same actions as in Stage 6 but without an 
object; rubbing or pounding the hand on the surface. 
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Stage 7. Action with object on body:  The monkeys are rewarded for matching the 
same action as demonstrated using a small object on visible body parts:  
(a) Rubbing a stone on arm or hand.  
                        (b) Clapping or rubbing two small stones between two hands. 
Stage 8.  Action on body without object: Same as Stage 8 but without an object. 
 
Two points were taken into consideration: 
A.  Behaviours in some of the stages of the current study will most probably 
demand moulding the hand of the monkey into the correct action (Custance et a.l 
1995 1994, for chimpanzees). Such a procedure is possible with the enculturated 
monkeys and might assist the process of learning.  
B. The physical differences between the human model and capuchin monkeys 
are immense and may be an obstacle for teaching action imitation. Nevertheless, it 
seems that these monkeys do have at least a rudimentary understanding of the 
similarity of function between human and monkey body parts. For example, these 
monkeys put an object in the human hand to “make it work”. Understanding the 
similarity in function of the human mouth and the monkey mouth may be suggested 
from the following observation: 
Cheppy used to like having carrots, apples and some other food items chewed 
for him by humans. When once I refused to chew a carrot for him, closed my 
mouth and turned my face to the side, he went to Hezda, who was very young 
at that time, and pushed the carrot in her mouth. He then pushed his fingers in 
it to get the little pieces out.  
 
 
Method  
 
Subjects:  
Four of the enculturated monkeys participated in this study: two females, Hezda and 
Cacao, and two males, Rusty and Adam (age range 11-18 years).  
 
Procedure 
 
The monkey sat opposite or next to the experimenter. Adam was tested in his 
cage. The other three monkeys were tested either in their cage or outside of it in an 
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area where they played freely. In the first 5 trials of each stage, when the new task 
was introduced, the human model, myself, demonstrated the behaviour and then 
exclaimed an excited “good”. The monkey was then given a reward (small portion of 
jam, yogurt, raisons or nuts).  This was done in order to indicate to the monkey that 
this was a positive outcome. Next, the monkey was told “now you”. The monkey was 
rewarded for acting in the same way as the demonstrator. After these initial trials, the 
action was demonstrated without “sharing” the reward with the monkey. Throughout 
the experiment the subjects were rewarded verbally (“good “) and with a small treat, 
for acting the same way as the demonstrator.  
 
Results  
 
Stage 1:  Training  
 
 A pot and wooden block were used for the training session. The block was put 
in the pot and then the monkey was told “now you”.  Adam, Rusty and Hezda had no 
problem responding from the first trial and did not need training. This was repeated 
ten times. Cacao was more hesitant and 10 trials were done co-acting together with 
the experimenter before she responded herself to additional 10 trials.  
 
 
Stage 2: Simple matching 
 
The apparatus in this stage consisted of two objects placed on either side of an 
up-side-down funnel fixed to a wooden board. The monkeys had to choose the same 
object as demonstrated and put it on the thin part of the funnel (see Fig. 9.1). Both 
monkey and demonstrator had the same set of objects.  The monkeys were given 120 
trials in three sessions.  Hezda stopped responding in the middle of the sessions; thus 
she only totalled 60 trials. Applying a binomial test shows that all the monkeys 
responded above chance level. 
In the test session at the end of this stage both objects were placed on one side 
of the funnel, thus checking that the monkeys were responding to the object chosen 
and not to the side it was moved from.  Only Cacao responded correctly significantly 
above chance. Results are shown in Table 8.1.  
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Figure 8.1 The apparatus in Stage 2. The monkey and the demonstrator had identical sets of 
objects. The monkey had to put the same object on the funnel as demonstrated. In the picture: 
Cacao observing and choosing the correct object 
 
 
Table 8.1 Correct responses in the matching task. n= number of correct trials. 
N= total number of trials.  
 
 Adam Rusty Hezda Cacao 
 
n(N) n(N) n(N) n(N) 
Training 83(120)   p<0.001 63(120) p=0.022 38(60) p=0.037 75(120) p=.0036 
Test 12(20)    p=0.503 14(20)  p=.0115 12(20)  p=0.503 16(20) p=0.012 
 
 
Stage 3: Complex matching  
In this stage the monkeys were presented with three out of four potential 
objects on each trial and had to choose the combination demonstrated to them out of 
three possible combinations. Thus the chance success rate was 33.3%. The objects 
included a wooden cube, a plastic circle, a funnel, and plastic cup. The sessions were 
shorter in this stage than in Stage 2 in order to better sustain the attention of the 
monkeys. In the fourth session a set of different objects was given to the monkeys to 
test for generalization of the task. A binomial test in which chance level was adjusted 
to 33.3% was used to assess the monkey’s success. All monkeys performed above 
(33.3%) chance in the first 90 trials.  In the fourth session with a new set of objects 
only Rusty did not respond above chance. Results are shown in Table 8.2 
 
Table 8.2 Correct responses Stage 3. n = number of correct trials. N = total number of trials.  
 
Adam Rusty Hezda Cacao  
n(N) n(N) n(N) N(N) 
Training  46 (90)  p<0.001         45(90) p=0.001 49(70) p<0.001 48(90)  p<0.001 
Test 12(20)  p=0.013 10(20) p=0.091 14(20)  p=0.001 12(20)  p=0.013 
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Discussion 
The paradigm used in Stage 2 and Stage 3 of this experiment resembles the 
Match-To-Sample (MTS) paradigm used to test concept formation in non- human 
animals (e.g. Katz & Wright, 2006 for pigeons; Thompson et al 1997 for 
chimpanzees). In the MTS the subject is presented with a sample stimulus and then 
has to choose a matching stimulus from an array of stimuli presented simultaneously 
or delayed. The choice is based on understanding the relation between the sample 
stimulus and its match.  After the first stage of acquisition, the generality of the 
learned relation between the stimuli is inferred from the subject's ability to match 
novel items in transfer tests.  
Several studies have been carried out with capuchin monkeys showing they 
were able to learn abstract relations between stimuli such as the concept of identity 
and oddity (D’Amato et al., 1985). D'Amato & Colombo (1989) however claimed that 
this concept is limited in capuchin monkeys. They concluded this from the extended 
length of time it took the monkeys to learn the correct choice with novel stimuli.  
However, Wright et al (2003) showed that with closer control of different elements of 
the procedure (e.g. learning set size) capuchin monkeys showed a high level of 
concept formation. Spinozzi et al. (2004) found that capuchin monkeys were able to 
learn the abstract concept of "above" and "below" using the MTS paradigm. Thus, the 
MTS has been a powerful instrument to test concept formation in capuchin monkeys. 
The paradigm used in the current study differs somewhat from the standard 
MTS. The main difference is that an agent, the demonstrator, was involved as an 
intermediary between the stimuli presented and the correct stimuli to choose. If, as I 
claim, these monkeys learn through enculturation to pay extra attention to the human 
caretaker, this should be a  much easier task than  the  previously  mentioned MTS  
experiments, as the monkeys can use an extra cue, the social cue,  for the correct 
choice. The fact that the monkeys responded above chance in the test of Stage 2 after 
only 90 trials could imply that indeed the demonstrator’s actions were used as a cue 
for choosing the correct objects.  
On the other hand, in the standard MTS paradigm the subject indicates 
understanding of the concept by pointing to a stimulus which acts as the word “same” 
or “different” or in other experiments, pointing to the stimulus with the correct answer 
on it, in order to receive food reward. In the current study, the monkeys had to 
replicate the action they saw using the correct stimuli and not just recognize the same 
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end result.  From this point of view this paradigm is more complex than the standard 
MTS.  
 In the next stages replicating the action becomes the major factor for success 
as the stimulus remains constant. 
              
Stage 4:  Two-action games  
In this stage the monkeys were presented with different games, which could be 
acted upon in two ways. In traditional two- action experiments each monkey or group 
of monkeys is shown only one way of acting on an apparatus. Here, the monkeys 
were asked to use each of the two ways according to what they saw. Further, the 
reward was not in the apparatus itself as in the different puzzle boxes experiment, but 
rather the monkey received the reward after acting the same way as the demonstrator.  
 
The games included:  
1. The Short Rod: A wooden rod (10 cm long, diameter 2 cm) was placed in a 
slot on the top of a wooden box (20x13x13 cm). By holding the top of the rod with 
one hand it could be either (a) moved in the slot along the top of the box in a sliding 
motion from one side of the box to the other or (b) pushed into the box. (See Figure 
8.2 a, and b). 
 
a                                                                   b  
 
 
Figure 8.2. The Short Rod. (a)  The rod is pushed down; (b) The rod is moved to the side. 
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2.        The Long Rod: A wooden rod (10 cm long, diameter 2 cm) was placed in a slot 
on the side of a wooden box (16x17x12 cm). By holding the top of the rod with one 
hand it could either be (a) pushed up the slot to the top of the box or (b) pulled out of 
the box and extended a further 10 cm (see Figure 8.3 a and b) 
 
a                                                                  b 
 
 
Figure 8.3. The Long Rod: (a) the rod is pushed up; (b) the rod is pulled out. 
 
 
 
 
3. The Box Lid. The lid of a wooden box (12x8x10 cm) could be opened by 
holding the handle in the middle of the lid  and either (a) sliding the lid  to the side of 
the box or  (b) pulling the lid upwards  (See Figure 8.4 a and b). 
 
 
       A                                                             b 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4. The box lid: (a) The lid is slid to the side; (b) The lid is pulled up. 
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4. The ring: A wooden ring (2.5 cm diameter) was placed on a rod (2 cm 
diameter 15 cm long) which was held by two wooden squares on the top and bottom 
of the rod (each square measuring 11x11 cm). Holding the ring with one hand it was 
possible to either (a) move it up the rod or (b) spin it round the bottom part of the rod  
(see Figure 8.5 a and b). 
 
 
a                                                                  b  
 
 
Figure 8.5.  The Ring: (a) the ring is pulled up; (b) the ring is spun round. 
 
There were two sessions of 24 trials each in which each morph of each game 
was presented three times. On the third and fourth sessions two new games were 
introduced together with 24 trials of the original four games. These games were: 
 
1.    The cardboard box – a square lid (10 x 10 cm) was placed on a cardboard box (10 
x10x10 cm). The box could be opened by either (a) taking the lid off the box or (b) 
pushing the lid into the box (See Figure 8.6 a and b). 
 
a                                                                   b 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 The Cardboard box: (a) taking the lid off the box; (b) pushing the lid into the box. 
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2.   The pastry crimper: a pastry crimper was manipulated in two ways: (a) holding 
the crimper with the wheel facing downwards and rolling it on a surface as would be 
done on pastry or (b) holding the crimper with the disc upwards and spinning the disc 
with the other hand (see Figure 8.7 a and b). 
 
 
a                                                                    b 
 
 
 
Figure 8.7 The Pastry crimper: (a) rolling the crimper on the surface; (b) spinning the wheel. 
 
 
Results: 
The overall percentage of correct responses in the 96 trials of the four base 
games was: 78.12 % (Adam), 69.79% (Rusty), 65.25% (Hezda) and 67.7% (Cacao). 
A two- tailed binomial test showed that the monkeys responded correctly above 
chance (see Table 8.3). 
 
Table 8.3 Correct responses in Stage 4. n = number of correct trials. N = total number of 
trials in session. % = percent of correct responses in each session. p = binomial statistical 
significance of responding above chance. 
 
 
 Adam Rusty Hezda Cacao 
n(N) 
% 
75 (96) 
78.12% 
67(96) 
69.79% 
62(95*) 
65.26% 
65(96) 
67.7% 
P P<0.001 P<0.001 p=0.004 P=0.001 
* Hezda left one session before it was finished 
 
 A Friedman test, testing the correct response rate for each game (Table 8.4) showed there 
was not a significant difference between the games. (Friedman test p=0.537). 
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Table 8.4  Success rate of each monkey on each morph of the games. Numbers indicate the 
number of correct trials Number in brackets indicate the total number of trials that morph was 
demonstrated in the session. Bold numbers represent correct responses significantly above 
chance. 
 
 Box Lid Ring Short rod Long rod 
  Slide Open  Up Spin Push  Slide Up   Out   
Adam 9(12) 
75% 
9(12) 
75% 
12(12) 
100% 
4(12) 
33.3% 
6(12) 
50% 
12(12) 
100% 
11(12) 
91.6% 
12(12) 
100% 
Rusty 10(12) 
83.3% 
10(12) 
83.3% 
5(12) 
41.6% 
8(12) 
66.7% 
6(12) 
50% 
12(12) 
100% 
11(12) 
91.6% 
5(12) 
41.6% 
Hezda 8(12) 
66.7% 
12(12) 
100% 
8(12) 
66.7% 
7(12) 
58.3% 
9(12) 
75% 
7(12) 
58.3% 
5(12) 
41.6% 
6(11)* 
54.5% 
Cacao 9(12) 
75% 
11(12) 
91.6% 
10(12) 
83.3% 
4(12) 
33.3% 
10(12) 
83.3% 
4(12) 
33.3% 
11(12) 
91.6% 
6(12) 
50% 
* Only 11 trials for this action instead of 12. 
 
 
 
Introducing new games 
The Cardboard box was introduced in the third session. The two morphs of 
opening the box were demonstrated four times each, randomly between the 24 
demonstrations of the four original games. Only Adam came close to responding 
successfully above chance on the test trials (see Table 8.5). 
 
  The pastry crimper apparently was difficult to operate. None of the monkeys 
managed to roll it on the surface except for one trial in which Hezda came close to 
rolling it. They did not try to respond using the second morph of spinning instead of 
rolling it, but rather rubbed the crimper on the surface, or banged it. It seemed then, 
that the actual action was not easy for them to produce and might require more 
opportunities for practice. Spinning the top was more successful, but the fact that the 
disc of the crimper was made of metal enabled monkeys to see themselves in it and 
distracted their attention. Results for the test trials can be seen in Table 8.5. 
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Table 8.5 Results for the test trials with the Cardboard box and Crimper: n= number of 
correct trials. N= numbers of trials the morph was demonstrated. In the Total column is the  
total number of successful trials. 
 
 
                   Cardboard box                        Crimper 
 Lid in 
n(N) 
Lid off  
n(N) 
Total 
n(N) 
Roll 
n(N) 
Spin 
n(N) 
Total 
n(N) 
Adam 4(4) 3(4) 7(8) P=0.07 0(4) 3(4) 3(8) P>0.05 
Rusty 3(4) 2(4) 5(8) P>0.05 0(4) 2(4) 2(8) P>0.05 
Hezda 4(4) 2(4) 6(8) P>0.05 1(4) 2(4) 3(8) P>0.05 
Cacao 2(4) 3(4) 5(8) P>0.05 0(4) 2(4) 2(8)P>0.05 
 
 
 Stage 5. Pre-movement imitation 
Only Adam participated in this stage as he had done better than the other 
monkeys on the previous stages and seemed to be more motivated. The aim of this 
stage was to teach Adam to move a small stone on a surface as a function of what he 
observed: rub or pound. This stage was a preparation for teaching the monkey to 
move his hand on the surface without an object.  
In the first session the two behaviours were established. At first, Adam mainly 
rubbed the stone on the surface in response to the demonstrations of both actions.  
It was then decided to use a second object as a mediator to achieve the 
required action of pounding. Adam was shown “pound” while pounding the stone on 
a pip. He immediately did that and after 5 trials the pip was removed and Adam was 
shown “pound” on the surface to which he responded correctly. 
This is a good example of how an object may serve as a mediator to show an 
action to the monkey and once removed the action may be repeated without the 
object.  This is the basis for the rationale of  later Stages 7-9, which aim to show   
generalization of a movement with a very small object to the same movement without 
an object.     
After the first session in which the two behaviours were established, three 
additional sessions of 50 trials each were carried out. Adam showed progress through 
the sessions. By the fourth session the number of correct responses came close to 
being significantly above chance (see Table 8.6). 
 
 188 
Table 8.6 Adam's correct responses in Stage 5. n=number of correct trials. N= total number 
of trials in session. %= percent of correct responses in each session. P= binomial statistical 
significance of responding above chance. 
 
 Session 1 Session 2 Session3 Session 4 
n(N) 
% 
20(50) 
40% 
29(50) 
58% 
30(50) 
62% 
32(50) 
64% 
P p=0.203 P=0.322 P=0.203 P= 0.066 
 
For time reasons, the preliminary study was halted at this stage. It is planned to be 
continued. 
 
 
Discussion 
   
  There were two aims to this preliminary study. The first was to investigate the 
methodological features of the "do-as- I -do" procedure in order to maximize the 
ability to teach capuchin monkeys the rule of imitation. The second was to assess the 
success rate of the monkeys in a "do- as -I -do” procedure bearing in mind that  the 
number of learning sessions given to the monkeys  in this study might not be  
sufficient to achieve a high success rate.  
 
 Methodology 
  The monkeys in this study were able to sit through most of the “do- as- I- do” 
sessions. However,  in some sessions they showed signs of frustration manifested by 
leaving the session, lying down next to the apparatus, looking backwards at an unseen 
target, and on two occasions, stressful vocalizations (Rusty).  Capuchin monkeys can 
spend a long time trying to open puzzle boxes without success (Fragaszy et al. 2004) 
but in this study the monkeys appeared to be more frustrated when not succeeding. 
This may indicate that they were not as sure of what was expected from them. Perhaps 
the goal, the food item, which the monkeys could see placed in the puzzle boxes, 
sustained their efforts. In the "do- as- I- do" type of task, the end result of their action 
is not in the apparatus itself.  
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Two solutions were used when the monkeys seemed to be frustrated: 
a. Stopping and going back to a simple task (e.g. placing one object on 
the other). Such actions were also used to end a session if the last trial 
was unsuccessful.  
b.  Doing a task together – holding the monkey's hand and co-acting. 
 
Success rate  
  The monkeys showed higher success rates in the two-action games in Stage 4 
than in the matching choice behaviour in Stage 2. This could be attributed to the 
practice they had with the “do-as- I-do” procedure by the time they reached Stage 4, 
thus gaining more understanding of the concept of imitation.  
  However, it may also be attributed to the difference in the type of actions they 
were asked to perform in the two stages.  In Stage 4 the two actions in a given game 
resulted in different end states of the apparatus (e.g. lid of the box was either up or 
moved to the side in order to open the box) whereas in Stage 2 the end state of both 
options was much the same – the funnel had an object on it (although it was either 
object A or B).   
  If capuchin monkeys, as some claim for chimpanzees, are more attuned to 
results, they might find Stage 4 easier than Stage 2 which was thought initially to be 
an easier simple choice-matching task. In order to test this, naive monkeys should be 
tested on Stage 4 without going through Stage 2, to determine whether their success 
rate differs from the results found in this study.   
 
Action centred imitation 
Stage 5 is the beginning of training for action imitation. Only 4 sessions were 
given with improvement from 40% success on the first session to around 60 % on the 
next 3 sessions. It is thought that perhaps more exemplars for the rule in each session 
are needed for a better understanding to occur (Oden ,Thompson, Premack, 1988; 
Rosch, 1978). Such actions could include scratching a surface with a small twig 
versus poking with it, as well as actions with two hands; e.g. banging two discs with 
two hands on a surface versus clapping them together. 
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Human- monkey interaction 
a. Visual attention 
Individual differences were seen in this study. Hezda, who seemed to be the 
best social learner in the previous studies, lost interest very early in this study, and 
would sometimes walk away at the beginning of a session. These sessions were 
omitted from the statistical analysis. Adam showed the longest attention span during 
the sessions. This might have been due to the fact that the other three monkeys spent 
much time socializing with the experimenter beyond the sessions whereas Adam, at 
that time, mainly spent time with the experimenter during the experimental sessions.  
Attention to demonstration was lower in this study (average 83.7%) than in the 
previous studies using a human model (Artificial Fruit study, Chapter 3 and Coffee-
Tin study, Chapter 5) in which attention reached almost 100% of the time. 
This is most probably due to the longer sessions, which included up to 50 
demonstrations as opposed to a maximum of 6 demonstrations in the previous studies.  
As attention seems to be a dominant factor in succeeding to learn socially, this 
problem needs to be approached before further testing. One way to sustain attention 
may be using a larger variety of objects and tasks in each session. This could be 
complemented by shortening the sessions as well. 
 
b. Coactions 
In some of the trials the monkeys put their hand on the experimenter’s hand 
while the experimenter was demonstrating. Such behaviour, referred to as ‘coaction’ 
by Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1989), has been considered a powerful means of learning 
novel skills. Visalberghi & Fragaszy (1990a) claim that “coaction of a skilled model 
and a learner, in which the model allows the learner to participate intimately in its 
actions, is probably the most effective setting for learning a novel motor skill in 
nonhuman primates” (p. 267).   
 
 
c. Requesting help  
 
 In the previous studies the enculturated monkeys were observed asking for 
help from the demonstrator, either by taking her hand or by putting the object in her 
hand. In this experiment as well this behaviour was seen in Stage 4, with actions on 
the crimper which seemed to be difficult for the monkeys to produce. I will further 
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discuss the nature of this type of communication and its implications for social 
learning in Chapter 9- General Discussion. 
 
Conclusion 
The preliminary test of the "do- as- I- do" paradigm shows there is a potential 
for teaching these monkeys the rule of imitation, given that they are allowed enough 
trials to enable learning of the concept. Further, in order to sustain their attention, 
sessions should not exceed 20-25 trials and should contain several exemplars of the 
rule being taught.  
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Chapter 9 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Long term observations of groups of capuchin monkeys have suggested that 
these monkeys have traditions in nature showing group contrasts in feeding 
techniques and hunting, as well as in social conventions (Perry et al. 2003). Yet it is 
mainly suggestive information, such as high tolerance and close observation of 
conspecifics, which is interpreted as reflecting  the influence of social learning in 
acquisition of these behaviours. The fact that laboratory experiments have not been 
able to simulate this in experimental studies (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990a) is 
puzzling and may be due to methodological flaws (see Chapter 2) and not necessarily 
to capuchin inability.  
The studies described in this thesis, carried out with groups of mother-reared 
as well as  enculturated capuchin monkeys, have shown strong social learning 
influences on the acquisition of behaviour patterns by these monkeys, allowing us to 
draw some conclusions which may be helpful in understanding capuchin cultural 
behaviour in nature, as well as having implications for other related cognitive 
abilities.  
High fidelity imitation was not seen in the groups of monkeys studied. 
However complex social learning, which allows for the creation of two distinct modes 
of behaviour, clearly took place. This strengthens the notion that the behaviours 
observed by Perry et al. (2003) were indeed transmitted socially. 
There is still a need for long term observations to determine whether such 
learned behaviours can be sustained in the group for longer periods of time, creating 
local traditions. In order for traditions to be sustained, there is a need for conformity 
to the norms of the group. Whiten et al. (2005) define such conformity as behaving in 
accordance to the group’s norm, even if through exploration or chance a different 
method of behaving towards the same stimulus is discovered. For conformity to take 
place the monkey may have to know when s/he is imitating. Whiten & van Schaik 
(2007) claim such conforming behaviour has only been found in humans and 
chimpanzees. However, some possible implications for a basic level of this 
understanding may be found in the current experiments in Chapter 6, in the way one 
of the enculturated monkeys tried to repeatedly copy the action she had seen the 
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demonstrator do even though she had found another way to get the reward. Further, 
the preliminary results of the "do-as- I- do" experiment in this thesis, in which  Adam, 
after a relative short training period,  showed signs of matching the movement he saw 
with the stone, may imply some rudimentary understanding of this sort . 
However, conformity to a norm may also be achieved without relying on a 
high level of understanding of the concept of imitation, and may be strengthened by 
social rewards. The importance of a social reward was discussed in detail in Anderson 
(1998) and is seen in practice in the fact that capuchin monkeys maintain social 
traditions in nature (Perry et al. 2003).  Experimental studies are needed in order to 
further assess the extent of conformity in capuchin monkeys.     
 
The function of social learning 
Scholars have claimed that social learning has an important role in acquiring 
behaviours related to all aspects of an animal's life, behaviours which may be 
dangerous or difficult to acquire through individual learning (Avital & Jablonka, 
2000; Galaf, 1995; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990). Others question the adaptive 
function of social learning, limiting its benefits to specific conditions (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1988; Laland, 1996, 2004). The experiment dealing with cumulative social 
learning (Chapter 7) may provide some insights into this issue. Monkeys were able, 
through social learning, to switch from one established way of gaining a reward from 
a puzzle box to a more advantageous method. This was limited by the fact that a 
second switch to an even more rewarding method did not occur in the mother-reared 
monkeys.  
Social learning in the opposite direction still has to be tested in primates. 
Namely, would monkeys copy a new less efficient way? Boesch (1996) suggested that 
if an inefficient behaviour is found in a group it would imply this behaviour was a 
cultural tradition since ‘we would expect individuals to test the possibilities and 
choose the best ecological solution they find’ (p.259).  
In this thesis I added a control group to the experimental design, which was 
lacking in previous studies. In the Coffee Tin experiment this was a control group 
which had not observed a demonstrator. In the cumulative learning study this was a 
within -subjects control in which the subjects had time to manipulate the target before 
observation. Employing such control groups allows for further evaluation of the 
benefits of social learning. Mother-reared monkeys in the control group of the Coffee 
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Tin experiment were slower in opening the box, implying a benefit for social learning 
over individual learning, whereas the enculturated monkeys in the control group were 
not slower than the experimental subjects, even though the latter exhibited higher 
fidelity copying than mother-reared monkeys. Thus, the tendency to copy faithfully 
may be costly at times, where emulation would be more beneficial. The fact the 
enculturated monkeys behaved this way strengthens the notion that these monkeys 
show a higher fidelity capability for imitation than has been observed in previous 
experiments (see Visalberghi & .Fragaszy, 1990, 2002). 
 
Social learning mechanisms 
At the outset of this thesis I inquired what capuchin monkeys are tuned to 
when watching a human or conspecific act.  The merit of carrying out experiments as 
described in this thesis lies not only in showing the influence of social learning but 
also trying to respond to this "how" question, which is usually impossible  to answer 
in natural environments.  
Fragaszy & Visalberghi (1996) originally claimed that capuchin monkeys 
have only been seen to attend to the general stimuli a conspecific was manipulating, 
thus showing social learning based on stimulus enhancement. Almost ten years later, 
with the accumulation of more data, Fragaszy, Visalberghi & Fadigan (2004) 
concluded that “Watching another monkey solve a problem promotes the observing 
monkey’s interest in the places and objects where the other worked or is working. 
However watching others is not sufficient for a capuchin to learn a sequence of 
actions or to produce specific relations between objects" (p. 259).  
The studies in this thesis produced different results, showing low fidelity 
copying, object movement re-enactment and very localized stimulus enhancement in 
the mother- reared-monkeys. This shows more complex social learning than has been 
demonstrated in a laboratory setting up to now. These results may shed light on the 
process of transmitting knowledge in a natural environment.  For example, a Cebus 
apella monkey in Surinam watching a conspecific process a hard husked fruit such as 
capsules of  Phenakospermum guyannese (Boinski et al. 2003) may learn through 
very localized stimulus enhancement the precise locus of the fruit, the apex, to which 
to orientate his  pounding behaviour or other pressure, as well as learning  through 
object movement re-enactment how to open the husk after it cracks from the 
pounding. With canalization of the monkey’s behaviour, as found in the studies of his 
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thesis, as well as needed practice, the fruit would be opened in a similar way to that 
observed.   
The social conventions found in capuchin monkeys in nature (Perry et al. 
2003) cannot be interpreted by such mechanisms. The results of the enculturated 
monkeys may help better understand this domain of social traditions. The enculturated 
monkeys showed higher fidelity copying than the mother-reared monkeys, which 
might indicate a simple form of action-centred imitation that is important for 
transmitting social conventions. Nevertheless, to further understand whether the 
enculturated monkeys were extracting information about action, experiments in which 
the monkeys only see the attempts of the model to operate the apparatus without the 
actual movement of the object would be of interest. Such studies have been carried 
out on chimpanzees and children (Call, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005) 
Further, all experiments targeted to test social learning in capuchin monkeys 
have dealt with tasks in the material domain. However, high fidelity copying may be 
more important in the social realm than in the ecological one. This is in line with 
theories claiming that primate cognitive abilities had evolved first and foremost 
through selective pressures of the social environment (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & 
Whiten, 1988).   Experiments simulating social conventions with capuchin monkeys, 
although methodologically difficult to produce, would provide more insights into the 
role of imitation in the social domain (see Bonnie et al. 2007, for an attempt to test 
this with chimpanzees). 
 
The importance of practice  
Experiments designed to test for imitation have usually analysed only the first 
few responses of the subjects to the apparatus, after having seen the observation (e.g. 
Whiten & Custance, 1996; Custance, Whiten & Fredman, 1999). This is logical, as 
after the initial attempts to manipulate an object some individual learning may be 
involved.  
However, for simple such as bidirectional actions, it may be sufficient to solve 
the task in one or two trials. More complex actions may not be possible to master in 
such a short time and may demand practice. These perhaps abnormal testing 
conditions, in which only a few demonstrations are given, as well as only a few trials 
to perform in, can result in underestimation of complex social learning and imitative 
abilities of chimpanzees (McGrew, 1992) and perhaps capuchin monkeys as well. The 
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Dipping-Box experiment approached this problem by allowing more time for the 
monkeys to integrate the information they observed with practice, and thus was a 
more ecologically valid test. The results showed how, with time, monkeys canalized 
their behaviours towards the observed action. This suggests that for more complex 
behaviours, more time may be needed for the observer to faithfully reproduce the 
action. The fact that practice is needed even in a species as highly imitative as humans 
was shown in Teleki’s (1974) attempt to learn how to fish for termites by imitating 
chimpanzees. Although he was consciously trying to imitate, it took much more than 
just observation for him to obtain a termite. 
 
The effect of enculturation 
  The enculturated capuchin monkeys in the studies in this thesis appeared to 
show higher fidelity copying than the mother-reared monkeys. They were able to 
copy the tool use behaviour they observed and even when realizing the task could be 
done without a tool still tried to do so in the way it had been modelled to them 
(Coffee-Tin experiment). They also showed the ability to learn the Complex method 
of opening the Dipping-Box as opposed to the mother-reared monkeys.  
The fact that the second complex method of opening the Dipping Box was an 
elaboration of the first method may imply that these monkeys are capable of 
cumulative learning.  Further experiments designed to directly test this basic 
cumulative learning hypothesis should be carried out.  
At least one of the enculturated monkeys showed signs of potentially being 
able to understand the meaning of imitating, which he manifested by switching from 
one movement with an object to another as a function of the movement he saw 
demonstrated. What factors in the history of these monkeys can explain the difference 
in performance between the enculturated and non-enculturated monkeys on social 
learning tasks? There are several possible options: 
 
1. Experience with objects  
The idea that the enculturated monkeys have had more experience with objects 
and therefore watching a demonstrator only serves as a prime for performing a known 
response, tends to be  the default explanation for the monkeys’ performance.  It is true 
that finding something totally novel for these monkeys to imitate is not an easy task.  
Previous experience with objects can perhaps explain their lack of neophobia but not 
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the fact that they switch from one morph of acting on a game to the other as a function 
of watching a human do so (do-as-I-do,  Chapter 9). 
 
2. Attention  
It has been claimed that attention to the model is an important factor in social 
learning (Kumashiro et al. 2003). The enculturated monkeys were seen to closely 
observe the human model. However mother-reared capuchins in everyday settings 
have also been observed watching others very closely (Boinski et al. 2003); 
sometimes their heads and hands are almost under the pounding stone of their group 
mate (personal observations). Thus, it may be more than just paying attention to the 
demonstration that makes the difference. Rather, the information these monkeys 
extract from the demonstration may be different, through perhaps paying some 
attention to the action of the model as well.   
 
3. Intentional communication 
In all the experiments involving the enculturated monkeys the subjects 
occasionally made two types of actions involving the human demonstrator. 
1. They took the demonstrator's hand, moving it towards the 
apparatus.  
2. They tried to give the tool or object to the demonstrator. This 
was seen when monkeys handed the screwdriver in the Coffee-
Tin study or the crimper in the Do-as- I-Do study to the 
demonstrator. 
Similar behaviours have been seen in apes. Kohler (1927) described how in 
his classic experiment, in which chimpanzees had to stack boxes in order to reach an 
out-of-reach banana, one of the chimpanzees took the human’s hand and brought him 
close to the banana then tried to climb on the human to get the reward.  Kohler 
claimed this was an instance of “using a human as an instrument”.  
 Gomez (1990) found similar behaviours with a young hand-reared gorilla that 
was tested on different out-of-reach tasks. He described two strategies involving 
humans which the gorilla employed in order to reach the reward:  
1. Intentional manipulation - using a human as a tool e.g. climbing on a human 
to reach the reward.  
2. Intentional communication- requesting help from the human.  
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I have observed enculturated capuchin monkeys using a human as a tool in 
different free play occasions. For example, the monkeys sometimes moved the 
human’s foot, placed a nut under the shoe of a human and then pulled his/her foot 
down using force to crack open the nut, or wait for the cooperative human to break 
the nut this way.  
The capuchin monkeys’ behaviour in the experiments in this thesis fit into the 
second category of intentional communication, in that they both took the human’s 
hand and gave the object to the human. Gomez concludes that  "the only possible 
reason why the gorilla includes the human in her schemes is that she considers the 
human as a subject capable of carrying out by himself the action of opening the door's 
latch" (p. 345). Gomez claims that such behaviour represents a basic form of 
intentional communication. The onset of intentional communication in humans is seen 
between the ages of 9-12 months when human babies start to engage in gestures and 
vocalizations to request help from humans (Sugarman, 1984). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Cacao requesting help in the Coffee –Tin Study. 
 
Can we, through homology, claim that the enculturated capuchin monkeys 
behave like the human infants and the gorilla? It may very well be the case although 
such conclusions may at times be misleading. For example Huffman & Hirata (2004) 
suggested that the use of medicinal plants by chimpanzees is partially transmitted 
socially. Capuchin monkeys also use plants for self-medicating purposes. They use 
plants and worms to rub on their fur as an insect repellent (Baker, 1998). Young 
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monkeys closely watch older monkeys while behaving this way and may scrounge 
parts of the garlic or orange peels they are using for this purpose (personal 
observation). However the enculturated monkeys, who were separated from their 
mothers at about the age of 6 weeks and most probably never saw their group mates 
acting in this way, immediately rub onions on their fur when it is given to them. 
Nevertheless I believe that intentional communication as discussed above does 
take place in enculturated monkeys. The nature of the interaction between human and 
monkey in the help request context is important for the emergence of such 
communication. If a monkey were to hand over a nut to a more proficient nutcracker, 
he would most probably never get it back. The monkey-human relationship, similar to 
the human mother–infant relationship, is based on the fact that the human has the 
intention to help and teach. The monkey learns not only that the human can solve the 
task, but also that she will do so for him and thus will hand over very important items 
he would most probably never hand over to a conspecific - exactly those items which 
are important for him to learn how to manipulate. 
This active behaviour of requesting help when confronted with a difficult task 
is what Vygotsky (1978) claims to be the basis for cultural learning in humans. 
Requesting help can only emerge when the complementary process of teaching and 
scaffolding exists, as in these dyads of human mother-infant and human-enculturated 
monkey/ape.  These two processes may explain the more complex social learning 
found in enculturated primates.  
Such handing over of objects for manipulation in the mother-reared monkeys 
(Island group or Enclosure group) has not been seen. Interestingly, although rare, such 
instances between the enculturated monkeys themselves were observed (see Cheppy 
using Hezda to chew carrots for him described in Chapter 8) implying that these 
monkeys might have tried to generalize such aiding interactions to other enculturated 
monkeys in their group. 
Another aspect of intentional communication is making eye contact during 
requests to make sure that the focus of the receiver is on the request. Making eye 
contact was seen only in some of the cases of requesting help by the capuchin 
monkeys in the studies described in this thesis.  The role of making eye contact by the 
enculturated capuchin monkeys still needs to be further examined.  
What does all this say about the cognitive representational ability of the 
enculturated monkeys?  By actively requesting help, monkeys may be trying to 
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influence what the human thinks, namely “the monkey needs help,” implying a 
second- order intentional system (Denett, 1988). Nevertheless it may be more 
parsimonious at this stage to conclude from the data available that the monkey is 
trying to influence the human’s behaviour (first order intentional system).Through 
experience s/he may have learned that requesting help gets the problem solved. There 
is still need for more controlled experiments in this domain. 
 
Individual differences  
 Cebus apella monkeys are known to show definite individual difference in 
tool use abilities (Boinski et al. 2003).  Social learning is considered by some to be 
part of general a-social learning (Fragaszy & Perry, 2003). Thus we might expect to 
find individual differences in the strategies monkeys employ while watching a 
conspecific. The fact that most experiments with capuchin monkeys have tested only 
a small number of subjects highlights the personal differences and may obscure what 
may be a “general characteristic capuchin behaviour”. Recent experiments with 
chimpanzees have employed a great number of subjects and have been able to show 
significant social influence. I suggest that if we want to better understand capuchin 
monkeys’ social learning abilities subjects in different experimental locations need to 
be tested using the same tasks as an attempt to override individual difference (bearing 
in mind the differential influence of housing and settings on results).       
 
Practical implications of the results 
Understanding the way social behaviour may be transmitted socially has 
practical value when attempting to rehabilitate monkeys who were raised in isolation 
from members of their species. In the Israeli Primate Sanctuary (IPSF), where the 
Island group and enculturated monkeys live, an effort is made to reintroduce 
confiscated monkeys and ex-laboratory monkeys to social groups. Many of these 
monkeys did not have the chance to learn social behaviour norms during their 
childhood, as group- raised monkeys would (Walters, 1987). Thus it is hoped that the 
monkeys can learn some of the social codes of behaviour, through observation, and 
not have to undergo slow trial and error learning which at times can be distressing for 
them. Further, the question raised above as to whether a monkey could socially learn a 
maladaptive behaviour from his new group mates (such as self-biting seen in some 
ex-laboratory and ex-pet newcomers) has important implications when contemplating 
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which monkeys to introduce to each other in the sanctuary. Some indications that 
abnormal behaviours are socially transmitted in chimpanzees have been found (Nash 
et al. 1999).   
 
General Conclusions  
The battery of experiments in this thesis has provided new information about 
the social learning abilities of capuchin monkeys. Two methodological issues which 
were addressed in these experiments, and were lacking in previous studies, 
contributed to the findings: 
1. Employing   a control groups which emphasises the difference between social 
learning and individual learning. 
2. Carrying out a detailed analysis of the sublevels of the observers’ actions, such as 
target behaviour, target-like behaviour etc., which emphasises the fact that imitation is 
not an “all or nothing” phenomenon. 
The results have enhanced our understanding of the role and function of social 
learning in capuchin monkeys. It has been shown that: 
1. Mother reared capuchin monkeys can socially transmit information to the extent 
that two groups will show two different behaviours dealing with the same stimuli as a 
result of viewing a model (See behaviours towards the coffee tin) 
2. Social learning has been found beneficial in terms of 
a. latency  
b. switching to more advantageous techniques. 
Both demonstrate the role of social learning in maximizing a monkey’s position in 
relation to its environment.  
3. The mechanism of canalization, as well as perhaps low fidelity imitation, has been 
shown to underlie this process in mother- reared monkeys. 
4. Enculturated monkeys show higher fidelity imitation, which was manifested in:  
a. Learning a new method to use a tool from a model.  
b. Showing signs of conforming, in their persistence to try to copy the model 
even when the monkey discovered a different way to solve the task on its own.   
c. Exhibiting the basic ability to understand the concept of imitation which up 
to now was thought to exist only in apes and dolphins.  
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5.  The main role of enculturation as regards to social learning appears to be the 
development of very basic understanding of intentional communication in the human 
monkey dyad. 
  
Suggestion for further research 
In addition to the various suggestions for further research mentioned above, 
two issues still need to be addressed:  
1. Piaget (1962) claimed that deferred imitation was more cognitively 
demanding as it depends on the ability for mental representation.  At nine months, 
human infants are capable of deferred imitation, a Piagetian Stage 6 achievement. 
Mathieu & Bergeron (1981) and Mignault (1985) found chimpanzees are also able to 
display deferred imitation. However, there has not been any systematic experiment on 
deferred imitation in monkeys. This is crucial with the capuchin monkeys, because 
using deferred imitation as an experimental design would serve to rule out criticism 
claiming that the findings could be attributed to response facilitation (e.g. see Byrne, 
2005 for a criticism of the results of the artificial fruit study with the capuchin 
monkeys, discussed in chapter 3, and other two-method experiments). In other words, 
incorporating a delay between observation and production, would show that such a 
facilitating influence cannot play a role in the behaviour of the observer. 
 2. Research on imitation in monkeys has mainly focused on looking for 
evidence of action imitation. However, research needs to go one step backwards and 
establish how monkeys perceive similarity and differences between actions. One 
appropriate possibility is to use  a variant of the match- to-sample paradigm, as 
implemented in the training phases of the Do- as- I- Do study in this thesis, in order to 
test the nature and limits of the same/different concept regarding action stimuli in 
capuchin monkeys. The subject would be presented with an action stimulus (video 
clip) and would have to match it to one of two action stimuli on the screen.  Different 
levels of similarity could be used, accelerating the abstractness of the concept from 
same action on the same stimulus to the same action on different stimuli, in order to 
avoid classification on the basis of information on the object or the end result on the 
original object. 
Results from such an experiment could help pinpoint the shortcomings of 
action imitation in the subjects and will be useful in designing experiments which aim 
to better elicit the production of action imitation.  
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Ethical end note 
The enculturated monkeys tested in the studies described in this thesis used to 
belong to a “Helping-Hands” program in Israel, which aimed to teach capuchin 
monkeys to be helpers for quadriplegics. This program was closed down mainly 
because it was decided that the socialization of monkeys into the human world, away 
from other conspecifics, was not warranted. Given advances in technology, many 
actions in the household that were done by the monkey can now be achieved 
technically. The emotional contribution of the monkey to the quadriplegic can be 
found by using guide dogs instead. With the closure of the Helping Hands project, the 
monkeys who participated in it were introduced to each other, allowing them to live in 
social groups. 
The results of the experiments carried out with these monkeys are intriguing 
and pose questions for further research. However it is my great hope that it will not 
encourage enculturating new monkeys.  
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